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A Study of the Client Kings 
i n the early Roman Empire 
When the city-state of Rome began to exert her 
influence throughout the Mediterranean, the ruling classes 
developed friendships and alliances with the rulers of the 
various kingdoms with whom contact was made. During the 
great military struggles which heralded the end of the 
republic, i t became clear that the general who could count 
on the clientship of the powerful kingdoms within Rome's 
sphere of influence would have a decided advantage over less 
fortunate r i v a l s . 
Moreover when Octavian, later Augustus, became 
the sole ruler of the Raman world after the battle of Actium, 
these client kingdoms were an important factor i n the defence 
of the Roman Empire, and Octavian insisted that their kings 
became the personal clients of the emperor. 
Augustus saw beyond the former uses of these kings, 
as military supporters i n battles for supremacy, and realized 
their f u l l potential to a unified empire - some client states 
he used as buffers against more remote hostile nations, others 
protected trade routes and others maintained a sense of 
national identity, whilst introducing the Pax Augusta to their 
troublesome subjects. At the same time the emperor realized 
the annexation of some of these kingdoms was necessary and 
desirable, and so the gradual transformation of kingdoms into 
provinces began. 
-JF 
! 
Augustus' successors found that "their predecessor, 
who had inherited so many small but potentially powerful 
clients, had set a good example i n dealing with them. The 
Julio-Claudians and Flavians continued the process of 
rcmanlzation and annexation, and new clients were onJy 
contemplated when the legions needed support or a respite 
from warfare; only i n Armenia did the clientship pose 
problems. Trajan, the warrior-emperor, was the f i r s t to 
attempt to annex a l l his clients and his failure showed the 
wisdom of Augustus1 settlement - a settlement which lasted 
for several centuries. 
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P R E F A C E 
I n examining the development of relations between the 
government at Rome during the early Roman Empire and the various 
client states which existed during this period, I have attempted 
to c l a r i f y and explain policies and events which, during less 
detailed studies, I had not been able to investigate i n sufficient 
depth. To me and, I suspect, to many others, the words "client 
kingdom" became almost synonymous with "Armenia", or at least with 
"Asia Minor". Certainly, after a year of research, that 
connection has been modified. 
The footnotes, which appear at the end of the chapter to 
which they refer, consist of references to the authorities, both 
ancient and modem, from which I have gleaned my information, but 
i n several cases I have found i t necessary to use these notes to 
explain and expand the main text. 
I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Mr. R.P. Wright, 
whose help has been invaluable i n the compilation of this thesis. 
His high standard of scholarship has aided me i n picking out many 
flaws i n my arguments which I have attempted to eliminate, and his 
rules for presentation, though rigorous, have benefitted me greatly. 
Any errors which remain are the result of my own negligence. 
I should also l i k e to record my thanks to a l l those who have 
helped me during this study; to Mrs. K. Hollis, who has patiently 
and laboriously deciphered my hand-writing to type the thesis; to 
Mrs. I . Parkin, who has agreed to type the Greek symbols; to the 
staff of the Classics Department of Durham University, who have 
provided f a c i l i t i e s and encouragement throughout my period of study 
i n their department; and especially to my parents, whose support 
has been invaluable during my five years as a student, for without 
i i . 
their encouragement such a long and enjoyable period of study would 
have been impossible. 
J . D. Everatt. 
August, 1971. 
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1. 
CHAPTER I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The Development of the Relations 
between Rome and her Dependent Allies. 
As the political, military and economic resources of a 
state expand, so that state begins to extend i t s influence over 
weaker neighbours. I t must then decide -what form this influence 
is to take, and there are two main policies to adopt. The f i r s t 
of these is a military invasion, which, i f successful, enables the 
dominant power to subjugate i t s neighbour and assume complete 
control of the defeated country's government and resources; i t 
was by this means that Adolf Hitler hoped to increase the power 
of Germany's Third Reich; his annexations led to the Second World 
War in 1939• The second method is not quite so drastic; for a 
variety of reasons, the dominant state may wish, to influence the 
policies of i t s neighbours without imposing total dependence. 
In this way the subject country is allowed a certain degree of 
self-government whilst acknowledging the right of i t s overlord to 
impose limitations on i t s policies. Modern examples of such 
satellite states are the communist countries of Eastern Europe; 
they are nominally independent, but any decisions which are not 
in accord with the policies of the U.S.S.R. are soon reversed on 
the application of political pressure from Moscow, ( l ) 
The course of action to be taken depends on the sociological 
and political natures of the oppressor and the oppressed, and as the 
power of Rome expanded throughout Italy and beyond, the governing 
classes found i t necessary to employ both methods of control in 
varying degrees. 
2. 
An Important factor i n the establishment of alliances 
and relations between two states or two individuals, was the system 
of guest-friendship which had existed i n Homeric times (2), and 
which spread throughout the Mediterranean as Greek influence 
expanded. The high degree of contact between Greece and Italy 
ensured that these friendships were widespread throughout the 
Italian peninsula, and i t seems probably that the city of Rome and 
i t s ruling classes enjoyed many such relations with foreign rulers 
and states during the early centuries of i t s existence. Originally 
these arrangements of hospitium and amicitia were made between states 
or individuals of equal rank, and any obligations undertaken i n such 
contacts were reciprocal, but as the political and economic power of 
Rome and her nobles increased, i t seems likely that the term ' amicus1 
began to indicate relations between a superior and an inferior rather 
than between equals; just as a noble in Rome established a circle of 
clientes who received financial rewards i n return for their support, 
so Rome herself and her individual statesmen fostered amicitia amongst 
foreign rulers and states, who received the military and economic 
support of Rome in return for a certain amount of obedience to Rome's 
wishes. I n this way, amicitia became another term for client ship. (3) 
Obviously this system of client relationships soon became an 
integral part of Roman foreign policy, but i t was not used to the 
exclusion of other means of control. The standards of civilization 
were higher i n the Eastern Mediterranean than they were i n the West, 
and the system of amicitia was not accepted amongst the tribes of 
Western Europe. Therefore Rome followed a policy of direct annexation 
in the West, and Spain, for instance, was subdued by force of arms 
rather than by the use of client kings. But i n Italy and further east, 
even before the Second Carthaginian War, Rome had discovered the 
3. 
principle of the free client state; by making alliances of 
friendship f i r s t l y i n Latium, then throughout Italy, then beyond, 
the Roman senate realized that, without committing either party 
to legal obligations, i t was possible to bind foreign states to 
Rome by means of moral obligations by including them amongst the 
arnica..of Rome. (4) 
I n this way Rome extended her influence throughout the 
Eastern Mediterranean, and not only the cities of Greece, but also 
the great kingdoms i n Asia Minor and Egypt were included among the 
friends of Rome. Agreements made by Roman generals were regarded 
as agreements with the Roman state, for the generals were merely 
representatives of the senate. Thus even when Flamininus gave 
legal autonomy to the cities of Greece i n 196 B.C., those cities 
were expected to respect Rome's w i l l , as an indication of their 
gratitude. (5) 
As long as the client states were prepared to accept Raman 
guidance on matters of foreign policy, the senate were prepared to 
refrain from interference i n their internal affairs, but i t was 
inevitable that at some stage the internal policies of a client state 
would conflict with the desires of Rome, and thus i t was only a matter 
of time before the senate tried to influence the internal affairs of a 
kingdom. 
The f i r s t recorded instance of such an attempt was i n I82f B.C., 
when Philip of Mace don sent his son, Demetrius, to Rome as an ambassador. 
I t appears that the senate tried to persuade Demetrius to take over his 
father's throne. (6) 
Despite this unsuccessful attempt, Rome's attitude to client 
states in the east changed drastically after the defeat of Macedon at 
Pydna in 168 B.C. Previously Rome had exerted a minimum of influence 
4. 
on the states of Greece, bat with the balance of power now swinging 
in Bane's favour she began to take a firmer hold on her eastern allies. 
In 165 B.C., Rhodes was compelled to accept an alliance which made her 
a client state of Rome, and shortly afterwards the senate attempted to 
secure a change on the throne of Pergamum. Although this was 
unsuccessful, Pergamum was humbled. 
But even more important were the two customs which arose 
after the battle of Pydna. Firstly, the heirs of various client 
kings In the east were sent to Rome to be educated, thus allowing 
Raman influence to spread even further; secondly, on the death of 
a king, the successor found i t expedient to seek recognition for his 
own rule. Thus not only did Rome hold the various kingdoms i n a 
client relationship, but she was also able to decree who should hold 
the throne of these kingdoms. The eastern kings were now truly 
dependent on Rome. (7) 
Thus by the middle of the second century B.C., the Raman 
senate exerted a firm control over her client kings and kingdoms. 
So powerful was Roman overlordship that certain kings even bequeathed 
their kingdoms to Rome in their wills. (8) 
The influence of Rome had now grown to the extent that most 
of the kingdoms with which she had contact were her clients - i.e. the 
various bodies politic were the clients of the Roman senate. But 
parallel to this development, the influence of i-ndividuals also 
expanded. Relationships of hospitium and amicitia had developed 
between Roman families and private families a l l over the Mediterranean. 
As Reman power became dominant, so the power of her citizens increased, 
and a Raman citizen's foreign amici became his foreign clientes. I f 
a Roman politician could include among his clientes a king or an 
important public figure i n a foreign country, then his career in 
public.life was assured; indeed, his influence abroad could become 
so great that he could influence Raman foreign, policy. An example 
of this is the kingdom of Numidia; after the Second Funic War 
Masinissa of Numidia was given his throne by Scipio Africanus, and 
on the latter 1s death the clientship was transferred to Scipio 
Aemilianus. Therefore, when Masinissa died i n 348 B.C., the 
disposal of his kingdom was entrusted to Aemilianus, and he was 
able to further Rome's interests by dividing the duties of kingship 
amongst Masinissa's sons, thus weakening the kingdom. (9) 
I t became almost essential for a Raman politician to enjoy 
a large amount of support from abroad, and important figures such as 
Sulla and Marius were greatly aided by their foreign clients. I t 
also became clear that the politician who could command the support 
of several legions as well as holding the clientship of the powerful 
eastern client kingdoms could exert tremendous influence on Roman 
policy, and the consequences of this can be seen in the career of Pompey. 
This general already commanded the support of many clients i n Italy and 
the west when he set out for the east i n 67 B.C. The successful 
conclusion of the wars against the pirates and against Mithridates 
enabled Pompey to resettle Asia Minor, Syria and Judaea. By the 
time this task was completed in 64 B.C., the general and his armies 
had traversed most of the eastern Mediterranean, settling the affairs 
of the provinces and recognising or appointing kings i n the various 
client kingdoms. I n this way, Pompey not only re-asserted the client 
relationship between Rome and her subject states, but also built for 
himself a powerful network of foreign clientes, for most of the eastern 
kingdoms were obliged to Pompey for the recognition of their thrones. 
Indeed, Pompey was able to amass a sizeable fortune by demanding 
payment for services rendered. (10) Moreover, the general was able 
to count on the support of these kings i n any wars he might have 
wished to undertake. 
Pompey's great army of clientes both i n Italy and abroad 
were his allies in the struggle for political power in Rome during 
and after the f i r s t triumvirate, but his defeat at Pharsalus and 
his death i n Egypt freed the eastern client kings from their loyalty 
to one man, although the client relationships of their kingdoms with 
Rome s t i l l remained. Caesar found i t necessary to campaign through 
Asia Minor and Africa to obtain the support of the kingdoms, and he 
achieved this i n various ways; some monarchs, for example Cleopatra, 
transferred their allegiance to Caesar on the arrival of the victorious 
general:,, whereas others were replaced by nobles who had openly 
supported Caesar, ( l l ) In one instance, that of Juba I of Numidia, 
a loyal Pompeian, the king's forces were defeated i n battle and his 
kingdom annexed. Thus Caesar had consolidated his personal supremacy, 
and i t had become clear that the ruler of the Roman world must not only 
be able to command the support of the armies, bit must also be able to 
include as his clients the rulers of the various kingdoms on the limits 
of the expanding Roman empire. 
After the death of Caesar and the defeat of his murderers at 
Philippi, the members of the second triumvirate were given command of 
the empire; Octavian received most of the western provinces and 
received the clientship of the few western kingdoms, but Antony, whose 
command was in the east, gained the allegiance of the important client 
kingdoms of Asia Minor and Syria. Antony decided to base his power 
on indirect rule through these client kings, and. when the battle for 
supremacy with Octavian ended at Actium, the victor inherited a large 
number of client states whose loyalty had lain with his r i v a l . I t 
was by now obvious that the sole ruler of the Roman Empire must obtain 
7. 
the personal clientship of these foreign kings to secure his rule. 
The ways in which Octavian obtained his security and the treatment 
which his successors gave to the various kingdoms are discussed i n 
subsequent chapters. 
The legal position of client kings i s far from clear; 
the ancient customs of amicitia and hospitium were informal 
arrangements which required no written agreements, but on the other 
hand, Rome's agreements with foreign states were often sealed by 
written documents. I t seems likely that the client kings were bound 
to Rome by strong moral obligations, strengthened by various types of 
legal treaty. As Mommsen points out (12), the agreement of 
clientship was admissible for an unlimited time between two c i t i e s , 
i.e. Rome and her dependent, regardless of changes i n government; 
but a similar contract between a native king and a Raman citizen was 
isolated, and ceased at the death of either participant. Thus, after 
the time of Augustus, the native kings made individual agreements with 
the Roman emperor, and at the death of either party the agreement 
ceased. Rome usually demanded a renewal of the contract, and so the 
death of a king was followed by a plea for recognition from his successor, 
and the accession of a new emperor was followed by applications for 
recognition from existing client monarchs. I t i s important to note 
that when this contract was ended at the death of a king, the emperor 
was entitled to refuse to issue a new agreement, and could take over 
the government of the kingdom without transgressing any law. (13) 
Thus the policies of the early emperors which led to the annexation 
of various kingdoms on the death of their kings, was i n accord with 
the law. 
Yet there can be no doubt that Rome's overwhelming military 
might enabled her to keep a close control over her subject states, and 
8. 
very few client kings were able or willing to attempt to prosecute 
the emperor for his transgressions. I f they did, they were quickly 
removed, for the emperor's power was supreme. 
9 
Notes to Chapter I . 
1. Note the attempted 'liberalisation' programme in 
Czechoslovakia during the 1960's. When the Moscow 
government found that i t s requests for the reversal 
of this policy were ignored, Soviet aimed forces 
invaded Czechoslovakia in August, 1969, and imposed 
a pro-Russian government. 
2. For a description of this system, see M.I. Pinley, 
The World of Odysseus, 1956, 109-114. 
3. This argument follows the reasoning of E. Badian (PC, 11-13) 
4. Badian, FC, 53. 
5. Badian, FC, 74-
6. Badian, FC, 94' However i t i s by no means certain whether 
this incident was true, or merely a fabrication by Philip's 
elder son, Perseus, who was jealous of his brother's success 
(H.H. Scullard, The Roman World from 753 to 346 B.C., 1935 , 291) 
7. Badian, FC, 105-111. 
8. For example, At talus I I I of Pergamum in 133 B.C., Cyrene i n 
96 B.C., Bithynia i n 75X4 B.C. (H.H. Scullard, Fran the 
Gracchi to Nero, 2nd ed.f 1959, 28 and 93). 
9. Badian, FC, 125 and 137* 
10. Badian estimates that Pompey demanded 1,650 talents from 
Ariobarzanes I I before he would allow the king to inherit 
his father's throne (Badian, Roman Imperialism i n the Late 
Republic, Oxford, 1967, 82-3) 
11. For example, Mithridates of Pergamum was granted the eastern 
part of Galatia and the vacant realm of Bosporus, i n place of 
Pharnaces, who had openly campaigned against Caesar, even after 
the death of Pompey. 
12. 
13. 
T. Mommsen, Romisches Staatsrecht, Leipzig (1887), H I , 651-2. 
Ibid., I I , 856. 
C H A P T E R H 
ID. 
THE AUGUSTAN RESETTLEMENT 
Augustus' policies i n Europe. 
I n the far west, the boundaries of direct Reman 
government had reached the natural barrier of the Ocean before 
Augustus came to power. Yet, although no external dangers 
threatened, Augustus was compelled to act. 
The f i r s t annexation of Spain had. taken place as 
early as 197 B.C., but Augustus can justly claim Gallias et 
Hispanias provinciaa ... pacavi.(l) The tribes of north-west 
Spain had been continuously troublesome, and i n 26 B.C. Augustus 
himself took the f i e l d against the Cantabri; lie 'was partially 
successful, but trouble flared up again, and Agrippa, i n 19 B.C., 
employed ruthless methods to complete the pacification. (2) 
Since Spain was divided into provinces directly governed from Rome, 
Augustus permitted no local kings or chieftains. H i l l - t r i b e s were 
resettled i n valleys, new towns were developed in the north-west 
and veterans were settled amongst the previously rebellious tribes. 
The spread of towns, roads and trade a l l helped i n the romanization 
of the Iberian peninsula. 
Augustus' policy i n Gaul followed the same pattern. 
Julius Caesar had conquered Gaul as far as the English Channel, and 
since none of the boundaries was directly assailable by barbarian 
tribes, Augustus continued the policy of rcmanization. (3) Gallia 
Comata as a whole was divided into three provinces - Aquitania, 
Lugdunensis and Belgica - with Lugdunum as the capital, and the 
extension of Latin rights to many native c i t i e s , the building of 
roads and the settlement of military colonies a l l helped i n the 
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ramanization of Gaul. Augustus himself took a great interest 
i n this area, personally superintending the census i n 27 B.C., 
and i n 16-13 B.C., he travelled through Gaul mollifying unrest 
caused "by an avaricious native administrator, Licinus. 
Britain. 
Augustus1 attitude to Britain was of necessity different. 
The tribes of Britain could have provided a threat to the northern 
coasts of Gaul, but they were divided under several kings and this 
disunity probably persuaded the princeps that lie need take no action. 
Cassius Dio t e l l s us that Augustus went to Gaul i n 27-26 B.C., with 
the intention of attacking Britain (4)» and Horace speaks as i f the 
annexation of the island was inevitable. (5) However, C.E. Stevens 
discusses Augustus' attitude towards Britain at the beginning of his 
reign, and decides that after 26 B.C., i t was no longer possible to 
"walk into" Britain, therefore he abandoned the idea of conquest, 
for i t would have required too great a force. (6) I t seems li k e l y 
that Augustus had l i t t l e intention of invading Britain, but kept these 
proposals alive to remind the Roman people that a conquest trans Oceanum 
was possible; he had no desire to weaken the defences of the empire by 
withdrawing legions from more essential tasks. Yet the emperor did not 
disregard Britain completely; he seems to have attempted to establish 
Roman influence over chieftains i n the south-east, whose tribes were 
nearest to the Gallic shores; when Dubnovellaunus and Tincommius were 
driven from their kingdoms, Augustus received them as suppliants in 
Rome (7), which would suggest that they had enjoyed the friendship of 
Rome before their flight. Moreover, Tincommius' successors, Epillus 
and Verica, used the Latin t i t l e rex on their coins, and were 
obviously under Reman influence (8); they may well be the B r i t i s h 
kings, who, as friends of Augustus, set up offerings i n the Capitol. (9) 
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Yet the emperor f e l t no obligations towards these kings; 
he made no attempt to reinstate Dubnovellaunus and Tincommius, and 
the former's successor, (Junobelinus, was not a friend of Rome. (10) 
Augustus seems to have decided that the B r i t i s h kings did not present 
a serious military threat, therefore he was content to continue trade 
with Britain, yet leaving the island outside the Empire. Probably a 
few of the native chieftains enjoyed client or semi-client relation-
ships with the emperor, but Augustus was unwilling to consider military 
intervention beyond the Channel. 
Germany. 
The protection of Germany was a more serious problem to 
Augustus. Julius Caesar had established the Rhine as the boundary 
of direct Reman rule, but the ease with which tlie river could be 
crossed meant that the threat, of invasion by the powerful tribes on 
the east bank was always present ( l l ) ; despite strained friendships 
with these tribes, there were occasional invasions of Raman territory, 
and the long frontier was d i f f i c u l t to patrol; therefore Augustus 
was unwilling to leave the position as i t stood. 
However, there was l i t t l e possibility of establishing client 
kings on the right bank of the Rhine, for the chieftains of the many 
t r i b a l units could not be trusted, either by each other or by Rome, 
and the establishment of a pro-Raman king in any of these tribes would 
have unified the others against this intrusion by Rome; the need to 
keep the German tribes divided precluded the use of client kings. 
The danger of raids across the Rhine by Germanic tribes, 
such as those of 29 B.C., and 17 B.C., persuaded Augustus that 
annexation of Germany east of the Rhine was the best course of action; 
moreover this annexation was to advance the frontier to the Elbe, thus 
shortening the European boundaries of Raman rule. (12) 
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With this policy i n mind, Augustus sent his stepson 
Drusus, to Germany in 12 B.C. I n the four campaigns before his 
death in 9 B.C., Drusus prepared the. ground for an advance to the 
Elbe, and his brother Tiberius continued the advance i n 8 B.C. 
Several tribes were forced to submit to Roman arms, and two of 
these> the Suebi and Sugambri, were transferred to the l e f t bank 
of the Rhine. (13) The emperor was unwilling to allow any tribes 
to enter a client relationship with Rcme> although he was prepared 
to give asylum to displaced monarchs, presumably helping them to 
create unrest among their own people, and thus weakening German 
resistance to Rome. At least two German kings sought refuge at 
the court of Augustus: Haelo of the Sugambri and the king of the 
Marccmanni and Suebi. (14) 
Maelo, whose name, according to Strabo, was Melon (15), 
probably fled to Rome before the f i n a l subjugation of the Sugambri 
in 8 B.C. The flight of the king of the Marcamanni and Suebi must 
also have taken place before this date, for the Suebi were transferred 
across the Rhine with the Sugambri, and the Marcomanni had been driven 
eastwards by Drusus in 9 B.C. Although the name of this king cannot 
be reconstructed (16), he cannot be identified with the next king of 
the Marcomanni of whom we know, Maroboduus; this fugitive was almost 
certainly an earlier chieftain, who had authority over the Suebi also. 
The Marcomanni were now the main threat to Augustus' plan, 
for although they had retreated from Drusus, they had not been 
defeated. Therefore the emperor began to isolate them. Some time 
after 8 B.C., L. Domitius Ahenobarbus settled the Hermunduri on the 
land which the Marcomanni had vacated. (17) The Hermunduri must 
have been a l l i e d to Rome, so the Marcomanni now had enemies established 
to their west. 
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At about the same time, a legate of Illyricum crossed 
the Danube, routed a host of Bastarnae, and set up an inscription 
to record i t . (18) He seems to have succeeded i n securing the 
Middle Danube, and thus isolated the Marcomanni, under Maroboduus, 
from the east. 
I n A.D.4*» Tiberius was sent to Germany once more, and 
in two campaigns in the north concjiered tribes as far as and beyond 
the Elbe. (19) Only the Marcomanni now prevented the complete 
annexation of Germany, and with Maroboduus surrounded by Reman a l l i e s , 
Tiberius planned a converging attack on Marcomannian territory (20) 
i n A.D.6. However, at this point, Augustus' policy received a 
setback when news reached Tiberius of the Fannonian revolt; the 
need for an immediate retreat forced him to come to terms with 
Maroboduus. For the f i r s t time, Augustus was compelled to recognise 
a Germanic t r i b a l chieftain as a friend and a l l y of Rome (21); this 
was not planned as a suitable policy, for only the force of 
circumstances compelled the emperor to do i t . 
Furthermore, whilst Rome was preoccupied with the Pannohian 
revolt, her influence in Germany waned. The tribes forgot their own 
differences and planned to shake off the few tie s that Tiberius' 
alliances had imposed. Their unification against Rome became obvious 
when Augustus* policy received i t s f i n a l shattering blow. 
I n A.D.9, Quinctilius Varus was withdrawing from the Weser 
to the Rhine through the Teutoburgian Forest when he was attacked by 
a German army under Arminius, chief of the Cherusci. Three legions 
were wiped out, and the Ramans lost a l l east of the Rhine. Tiberius, 
and later Germanicus^ reorganised the defence of the river, but 
Augustus' plan of annexation to the Elbe was now lost. 
Yet Arminius himself proved that Augustus' decision not to 
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trust German chieftains was correct, for he was a chief who, 
as a Roman citizen, had served i n the auxiliaries and reached 
equestrian rank. Perhaps the emperor had hoped to i n s t a l l 
him as a client king, but his treachery was a direct cause of 
Augustus1 failure. Perhaps the boast item Germaniam qua 
includit Oceanus a Gadibua ad ostium Albis fl»m-i n-i a pacavi (22), 
was not as heart-felt as the cry Quinctili Vare, legiones redde (23). 
The Alps. 
However, before Augustus could consider expanding the 
northern frontier, he had found i t necessary to protect the passes 
between northern I t a l y and Transalpine Gaul to the west, and 
Illyricum and Greece to the east, for during the c i v i l wars hostile 
tribes had caused trouble to armies using these passes. 
I n 25 B.C., communications to the west were ensured when 
Terentius Varro defeated the Salassi, and i n the eastern Alps, 
P. S i l i u s Nerva, the prefect of Illyricum i n 17-16 B.C., reduced 
a l l the tribes from the valleys from Como to Lake Garda, thus 
making safe the passes to the east. 
Shortly afterwards, two interesting measures were taken 
further south. I n 14 B.C., the Alpes Maritimae were annexed to 
form a small province governed by a military prefect; this was done 
to check the native Ligures who had been troublesome. But, i n 
complete contrast, fourteen civitates or tribes i n the Alpes Cottiae 
were placed under Cottius, the son of their former king, who received 
the t i t l e of praefectus (2^), and who was, for a l l practical purposes, 
a client king. Why did Augustus make Alpes Cottiae a client kingdom 
when he had annexed Alpes Maritimae? Presumably the troublesome 
nature of the inhabitants had necessitated i t i n the latter case, 
whereas i n the former, the firm yet peaceful control of a native 
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ruler could not be bettered by any Raman administration. I t 
was many years before Alpes Cottiae became a Roman province. 
The date of Cottius' appointment i s unknown, for the 
inscription, dated between 1st July, 9 B.C, and 30th June, 8 B.C., 
almost certainly commemorated an event of a few years earlier. 
Possibly, Cottius * position was c l a r i f i e d at the same time as the 
annexation of Alpes Maritimae. 
Further east, the operation of Nerva i n 17-16 B.C. had 
repercussions; Cassius Dio says that Noricum, formerly a kingdom (23), 
was brought under direct Roman rule as a result of revolts which Nerva 
had settled. (26) However, the campaigns of 13 B.C. were more 
decisive; i n that year, Tiberius, attacking from Gaul, and Drusus, 
moving northwards from I t a l y , conquered a l l the tribes as far as 
the Danube. Now the province of Raetia was formed, and i t seems 
reasonable to follow Strabo (27) in assuming that Noricum was 
annexed at this time. Here there i s a contrast with Alpes Cottiae, 
for i n Noricum the client kingship was abolished. (28) 
Thus by 14 B.C., the Alps were securely under Roman control, 
and a trophy set up near Monaco in' 7-6 B.C., records this; the text 
i s preserved by Pliny. (29) I t states the simple facts of the 
conquest, but does not show the human element i n the settlement, that 
three hostile tracts were annexed and placed under s t r i c t Roman rule, 
whereas between them a group of c i t i e s retained i t s independence under 
i t s own king. 
The Danube. 
East of Noricum, the extension of Raman rule to the Danube 
was essential, for the valley of the Save i n Pannonia provided the 
only land route from I t a l y to Macedonia. 
However the region was far from easy to conquer, and despite 
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several campaigns (30), i t was not u n t i l until 9 B.C., that the 
Roman conquest of Fannoniaappeared to be complete. Even then 
the revolt i n Fannonia i n A.D.6., proved that Roman rule was far 
from secure, and Fannonia and Illyricum were not recovered u n t i l 
A.D.9. At this time, Augustus formally annexed the area (31), 
and placed i t under an imperial legate, for no native rulers could 
be trusted. 
.On the Lower Danube, the situation was similar, with 
frequent raids by trans-Danubian tribes into Reman territory. (32) 
Augustus continued his policy of annexing troubles one regions when 
Moesia became a military province, probably i n A.D.6. (33) 
The emperor had attempted to quieten this frontier by 
means of alliances with tribes north of the Danube (34)* but i f 
any oath of friendship or clientship was ever made, i t was not 
kept. (33) As in Germany, i t i s unlikely that Augustus ever 
considered trying to establish a client relationship with the 
native tribes. 
Thrace. 
To the south of Moesia lay the kingdom of Thrace, where 
Octavian found the situation different from that of the other states 
i n this area. After Licinius Crassus had ejected the Bastarnae i n 
29 B.C., Thrace needed a unifying factor, and Octavian decided that 
annexation by Rome was an unnecessary step, so he l e f t the tribes 
of Thrace under Rhascuporis I . 
However, each tribe seems to have had i t s own local leader, 
and i n 11 B;C, Vologaesus persuaded the Bessi to revolt; Rhascuporis 
was. k i l l e d , and his uncle., Rhoemetalces, was driven out. L. Calpurnius 
Piso, the governor of Famphylia, was ordered to put down this rebellion, 
and after three years of hard fighting, he regained control. { % ) 
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Augustus was then l e f t with the problem of how to govern Thrace. 
Elsewhere he had brought rebellious peoples under closer Roman 
control, but again he decided the looser control of a client king 
was sufficient i n Thrace, and Rhoemetalces was given the throne. 
The decision seems to have been a wise one, for Rhoemetalces 
succeeded i n maintaining a peaceful kingdom u n t i l his death, 
between A.D.9 and 12; he even raised a force to help Tiberius 
i n Pannonia. (37) 
But when Rhoemetalces died, Augustus made a change i n 
the system; Thrace was divided into two parts, one of which was 
ruled by Rhoemetalces1 brother, Rhascuppris, and the other by the 
former king's son, Cotys. (38) Perhaps the geographical divisions 
of Thrace, or the emergence of two clearly definable p o l i t i c a l 
factions amongst the tribes persuaded the emperor to divide Thrace 
.into two kingdoms. Rhascuporis was given the more di f f i c u l t portion, 
probably because of his superior ability, and fear of Augustus would 
curb any excessive ambitions. 
So Thrace remained a client kingdom tliroughout Augustus' 
reign, although so many of her European neighbours were annexed. 
I t would appear that the small t r i b a l units of Thrace needed a 
native ruler who could give them a sense of national unity, and at 
the same time maintain their sense of independence, whereas military 
annexation would have cost Rome much in time and resources, as Fiso's 
campaigns had proved. Yet so great were the divisions within Thrace 
that Augustus found i t necessary to divide i t into two smaller units, 
thus creating a situation i n which rivalry and ambition could grow. 
Augustus seemingly considered that the frontiers of the 
Empire in Europe could only be protected by a complete annexation 
of the lands adjoining them; the barbarians beyond the Rhine and 
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the Danube had to see Reman forces guarding Roman territory before 
they would desist from attack, and several tribes within Roman 
boundaries had to be kept in check by a constant military presence. 
Obviously the princeps considered the Germans and eastern Europeans 
too uncivilized and untrustworthy to honour a client relationship. 
The emperor did allow t r i b a l kings and chiefs to seek his 
help, but those who came had been driven from their kingdoms, and 
were merely seeking refuge. Only three client kingdoms were 
maintained i n Europe, and these were suffered for reasons other than 
defence. M. Julius Cottius, king of Alpes Cottiae, was not even 
given the t i t l e rex, but remained a praefectus - obviously his loyal 
service was rewarded by the gift of the nominal control of his own 
people -when other native rulers, after defeat, were replaced by 
Roman governors. 
Maroboduus of the Marcomanni, the second client king 
recognised by Augustus, found his kingdom preserved only by the 
whim of fate, for Tiberius was already attacking him when he was 
recalled to Pannonia. He could not leave the frontier undefended 
with Maroboduus hostile, so the German became an a l l y of Rome. 
Thrace also remained a client kingdom - not to defend the 
frontier, but merely as an expedient measure to preserve the unity 
and pro-Roman policy of the country. The European frontiers were 
not breeding grounds for client kings. 
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The Eastern Frontier. 
The importance of the domains bordering the eastern 
Mediterranean had became obvious during the struggle for power 
which followed the murder of Caesar. Antony needed the support 
of the whole of the eastern empire i f he was to meet the threat 
of Octavian with the largest possible farce. To this end he had 
not attempted to change the p o l i t i c a l structures of the states i n 
Asia Minor, but merely ensured that the kings of these states 
supported him. Any country whose allegiance was i n doubt was 
given a king who would unquestionably follow his benefactor. 
Hence Amyntas was given the kingdom of Galatia, although 
he had been only the secretary of Deiotarus, the previous ruler. 
His domain was increased by the addition of Pamphylia and Lycaonia 
from the province of C i l i c i a . (39) Similarly, the kingdom of 
Cappadocia was granted to Archelaus i n the same year. (40) Polemo, 
the king of Pontus, undertook a journey to the Parthian court as an 
envoy for Antony, and was rewarded by the extension of his kingdom to 
include Lesser Armenia. (41) Cleopatra herself received Coele-Syria, 
Cyprus, the Syrian coastline, parts of Ituraea, Judaea and Nabataea, 
Crete and Cyrene. Even i f these lands were never received, they were 
certainly promised. (42) Antony's love of monarchy even embraced 
his sons by Cleopatra: Alexander Helios was to receive Armenia, and 
Ptolemy Philadelphos the rest of Syria. 
Thus, when Antony faced Octavian at Actium, the majority 
of the countries i n the Eastern Mediterranean were ruled by client-
kings, with Antony as their overlord and benefactor. 
However, the defeat and subsequent death of Antony l e f t 
the east with a new master. Augustus could proudly boast "Provincias 
qmnis, quae trans Hadrianum mare vergunt ad orientem ... reciperavi," (43) 
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but he does not mention that i n 31 B.C., as Octavian, he inherited 
a host of client kingdoms as well as provinces. They had to be 
won over by friendship or fear, for their nominal independence gave 
Rome no constitutional ties over them. 
Antony's policy had been formed whilst he considered the 
threat from the west; he supported so many client kingdoms because 
the vassals, with their thrones secure, would :Ln turn support their 
patron. But once the east and west were unified, such a policy was 
no longer valid. Octavian had to look beyond the client kingdoms 
and estimate the dangers threatening the boundaries of Roman influence. 
The primary problem was that of Parthia: the Parthian 
Empire was the only power that could seriously threaten Roman influence 
i n Asia Minor, and i t was important that no settlement should allow 
Parthia to challenge Roman supremacy. Octavian realized that i t was 
impossible and undesirable to annex a l l territory as far as the 
boundaries of Parthia. Apart from the impracticability of a campaign 
so far east when I t a l y i t s e l f was i n turmoil, the sudden appearance of 
Roman legions on their borders would have provoked the Parthians into 
an aggressiveness which, as previous encounters had shown, the Raman 
army was ill-equipped to tackle. On the other hand, Octavian must 
have been unwilling to leave the situation as i t was. There were 
only three provinces in Asia Minor {kit), and between these and the 
Parthian Empire stood several large states whose kings had fought 
against Octavian at Actium. I f he ignored these kings, they might 
take offence and turn to Parthia, but i f he dealt with them too harshly, 
they might seek Parthian help to gain revenge. Octavian wisely 
gained the support of these kings by allowing most of them to remain on 
their thrones when they offered their allegiance to him, although some 
were not o f f i c i a l l y recognised as friends of Rome for several years. 
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The importance of trade must also have been i n Oct avian's 
thoughts. Articles of luxury were imported from China and India 
for the high society of I t a l y ; these goods came overland, and 
exorbitant t o l l s were imposed as they passed through Farthia and 
the lesser eastern kingdoms. No doubt the Roman government would 
have preferred to take possession of the caravan routes, but at the 
beginning of Augustus* reign, such considerations had to be ignored. 
Galatia. 
The most westerly of the client kingdoms i n Asia Minor 
was Galatia; i t included not only Galatia i t s e l f , but also Lycaonia, 
Famphylia, Isauria, Western C i l i c i a and P i s i d i a . The king, Amyntas, 
had been set up by Antony, but Augustus allowed him to remain, and 
several coins testify to his rule. (45) 
However, Amyntas died in 25 B.C. and, although he had sons 
to succeed him, Augustus decided to annex the kingdom (46); part of 
Western C i l i c i a was transferred to the kingdom of Archelaus (47), but 
the rest of Amyntas1 realm formed the new province of Galatia. 
Thus Augustus began the policy of annexation which gradually 
enveloped the whole of Asia Minor, but i t i s doubtful whether at this 
time i t was a consciously defined policy. Possibly Amyntas bequeathed 
Galatia to Rome, for Strabo talks of the collection of an inheritance(48), 
but no doubt Augustus regarded i t s incorporation into the empire as a 
necessity. There were undoubtedly substantial financial benefits, 
since several important trading c i t i e s were situated i n Galatia, but 
Augustus must have been more concerned with security; the mountains 
of P i s i d i a and Lycaonia harboured fierce tribes who were almost 
invincible i n their mountain strongholds. Not least of these were 
the Homanades, and Amyntas had made several attempts to reduce them; 
he succeeded i n capturing most of their fortresses, including Cremna, 
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but f e l l into an ambush, and met his death at their hands. Augustus 
must have been concerned about this disorder, and no doubt pursued a 
policy of annexation with the intention of bringing i n Roman forces 
to stamp i t out. Presumably the Homanades were restrained at f i r s t , 
for Agrippa was not called upon to campaign against them during his 
command i n the East (49), but they became troublesome later, when 
P. Sulpicius Quirinus was sent against them i n A.D.I. These tribes 
were probably the reason for the foundation by Augustus of military 
colonies i n the province (50) at Antioch, Olbasa, Comana, Parlais and 
Cremna. 
Thus the death of Amyntas and the unruliness of the native 
tribes provided the emperor with a suitable excuse for the annexation 
of Galatia. The security of the empire was certainly improved by 
this decision. 
Cappadocia. 
To the east of Galatia lay the kingdom of Cappadocia, 
under Archelaus. Despite Archelaus 1 obvious allegiance to Antony, 
who had driven out the previous king to accommodate him (51)* Augustus 
allowed him to remain on his throne. Indeed, Archelaus seems to have 
been a very able ruler, for Augustus made no attempt to replace him, 
and he became well-honoured i n his kingdom, as his coins testify. (52) 
Moreover, we learn from an inscription (53) J that Augustus 
thought so highly of Archelaus that he added parts of C i l i c i a to his 
kingdom. The date of this enlargement i s not. certain, but i t seems 
likel y that Archelaus received part of the kingdom of Amyntas when i t 
was annexed. 
However, the influence of Archelaus was to extend even further, 
for Strabo t e l l s us that he married Eythodoris, the queen of Pontus. (54.) 
This marriage, which must have been sanctioned, i f not arranged, by 
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Augustus was of the utmost importance, for i t brought together 
two kingdoms which covered a l l eastern Asia Minor from the Euxine 
to the Mediterranean, and thus set up a barrier to i n f i l t r a t i o n 
from the east. 
So, i n the figure of Archelaus, we have an example of 
Augustus* willingness to employ a client king :Ln a peaceful 
relationship beneficial to both parties. 
C i l i c i a Amanus. 
However, Augustus1 attitude was not always so benevolent. 
The Amanus region of C i l i c i a had been rulled by King Tarcondimotus I 
who supported Antony. He was succeeded by his son Philopator, but 
after Actium, Octavian deposed Philopator because of his father's 
allegiance to Antony. (55) 
I t was not u n t i l 20 B.C. that the kingdom was restored to 
another son of Tarcondimotus I , who became Tarcondimotus I I . (56) 
I t i s uncertain why Augustus waited so long to restore this kingdom; 
perhaps he was reluctant to allow a king whom he did not fully trust 
to occupy a kingdom so near to the important province of Syria; 
Parthian i n f i l t r a t i o n into C i l i c i a could have endangered the position 
and communications of the Raman forces i n Syria. 
The length of the reign of Tarcondimotus i s also uncertain, 
for we next hear of the kingdom of C i l i c i a at the death of King Philopator 
i n A.D.17. (57) Perhaps Tarcondimotus was succeeded by his son, 
Philopator, but the fact was relatively unimportant, and therefore not 
mentioned by the historians. 
However, i t may be possible to equate Tarcondimotus with 
Philopator, thanks to the revision of an inscription by J.G.C.Anderson (58) 
C ..DlO REGIS TARCQNDI 
MOTI PHILOPATQRIS F ( i l i o ) 
STRATONI DVODOlCRISn 
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Here the king i s given both names of Tarcandimotus 
and Philopator; perhaps the latter was an honorary cognomen. 
This helps i n an interpretation of the events at the beginning 
of Augustus1 reign. Fhilopator who was deposed i n 31 B.C., and 
Tarcondimotus, set up as king in 20 B.C., may well be the same 
person. I f the Philopator who died i n A.D.17 i s also the same 
man, we have a reason for Augustus1 delay of eleven years before 
he handed over the kingdom: a man who lived u n t i l A.D.17 would 
have been relatively young i n 31 B.C., and Octavian would have 
thought i t imprudent to allow a child to rule i n such an unsettled 
area, therefore he kept more direct control u n t i l the king was old 
enough to take over. (59) 
The above inscription also throws light on the position 
of client kings i n Roman policy. Strato, the son of king Tarcondimotus, 
was a Roman citizen and a duumvir i n Antioch; he represented a stage 
i n the transfer from monarchy to Roman magistracy, thus hastening the 
r.omanisation of subject peoples who were to be incorporated into the 
empire. 
Pontus. 
To the north of Cappadocia lay Pontus, which Antony had 
given to Polemo i n 37 B.C., adding Armenia Minor i n 36 B.C. ( 60 ) . 
Polemo had been one of Antony's most active a l l i e s , but he had won 
his kingdom from a dynasty backed by Parthia, therefore Octavian, 
no doubt reluctant to upset the existing balance of power, allowed 
Polemo to remain. However i t was not u n t i l 26 B.C. that the king 
was o f f i c i a l l y recognised as a friend and ally of Rome. ( 6 l ) 
He proved an able and loyal ruler, and when the king of 
Bosporus, Asander, died i n 17 B.C., Augustus helped Polemo to extend 
his kingdom and thus reunite the two parts of the old Mithridatic 
empire. Thus possible dangers from tribes outside the Roman sphere 
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of influence would be obviated, and the north-eastern frontier 
would be stabilized. M. Agrippa was sent to Sinope i n 14 B.C., 
and conducted a campaign which resulted i n Polemo's marriage to 
the widowed queen of Bosporus. Unfortunately this was a short-
lived union, for Polemo and his queen separated after a year, and 
Dynamis schemed to regain her kingdom. (62) 
After this estrangement, Polemo married Pyt hod oris, a 
grand-daughter of Antony, and produced three children by her. (63) 
Of these, Zeno later became king of Armenia, Antonia Tryphaena 
married Cotys of Thrace, and Polemo aided his mother i n Pontus. 
Despite this f r u i t f u l marriage, Polemo I continued his 
struggle to retain control of Bosporus, and there was intermittent 
warfare u n t i l 8 B.C., when the death of Polemo put an end to attempts 
at union. (64) 
However Pythodoris proved an able ruler i n her own r i g h t , 
for on the death of her husband she continued to rule Pontus with 
increasing success, and her marriage to Archelaus of Cappadocia (65) 
allowed her to succeed where her f i r s t husband had f a i l e d - i n 
extending her domain. 
From these events, a clear piece of Augustan policy emerges. 
The princeps realized that a large kingdom friendly to Rome i n eastern 
Asia Minor would act as an important buffer against attempts to attack 
the empire from outside. The f i r s t attempt to produce such a kingdom 
fai l e d , for despite Agrippa's forces, the peoples of Bosporus were 
unwilling to accept Polemo as their king. However, the marriage of 
.Archelaus and Pythodoris, with the subsequent union of their kingdoms 
produced an excellent barrier to protect the important provinces of 
Asia and Bithynia. 
Within Pontus we have an example of a kingdom granted as a 
g i f t for services rendered. Iycomedes, the priest-king of Comana, 
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had been an adherent of Antony; after Actium, Octavian deposed him, 
and gave the tiny kingdom to Medeius, who had supported him against 
Antony. (66) The relative unimportance of this kingdom i s shown by 
the fact that we do not hear of i t again. 
Bosporus. 
The Bosporan kingdom, situated on the northern and eastern 
shores of the Black Sea, was of such importance that i t was essential 
for Rome to be i n alliance with i t , i f not actually i n control. 
Economically i t was important because the region was the 
major source of food for northern Asia Minor and the Aegaean, which 
was especially important when Roman armies were campaigning i n Asia 
Minor. 
Strategically, the kingdom provided outposts against the 
hostile tribes of the hinterland. To the east were the Scythians 
and to the north and west the Sarmatian tribes; i f these were allowed 
to control the north coast of the Black Sea, they could seriously disrupt 
trade. Similarly, i t was important to police the coasts to control 
piracy, and Rome could impose this duly on a client king without taxing 
her own resources. 
Asander was the king during the time of the Roman c i v i l wars (67); 
as far as we know, he took no part i n the war between Antony and Octavian, 
but he was regarded as a friend of Rome, as an inscription t e s t i f i e s . (68) 
During his reign, Asander performed his duty of protecting 
the frontier, for he fought off Scythian and Sarmatian invaders. (69) 
He died i n 17 B.C., leaving his widow, Dynamis, i n control. A successor 
soon appeared, when a certain Scribonius married Dynamis, claiming that 
he had received the throne from Augustus (70), but the emperor, eager 
to unify the kingdoms of Pontus and Bosporus, sent Agrippa and Polemo 
against Scribonius. (71) 
28. 
On his arr i v a l Polerao found that the people of Bosporus 
had put the usurper to death, but were equally unwilling to accept 
him as king. Although the Pontic forces were victorious i n a 
battle, i t was not u n t i l after the campaign of Agrippa from Sinope 
that Polemo was accepted. Even so, the marriage of Polemo and 
Dynamis cannot have lasted very long, for Polemo married Pythodoris 
and produced three children by her before his death i n 8 B.C. 
Allowing four years for t h i s , he can have been Dynamis'. husband 
for no longer than two years. 
After the estrangement,*the war continued u n t i l 8 B.C., 
when, on Polemo's death, Dynamis1 claim was no longer contested. 
Nevertheless, she must have wondered i f she would be allowed to 
retain her throne, for she had k i l l e d Augustus' chosen representative; 
but the emperor was preoccupied with campaigns elsewhere at this time, 
and Dynamis appears to have received the t i t l e of 'friend of the 
Roman people 1. ( 72) 
The theory that, after her marriage to Polemo ended, 
Dynamis fled to the king of a native tribe and gained his support by 
marrying him i s put forward by M. Rostovtzeff (73)} I doubt whether 
such a close union was arranged,. for between 8 B.C. and A.D.7 coins 
are issued viiich bear the heads of Augustus and Agrippa and the 
monogram ' ^ ^ ^ , undoubtedly thatof Dynamis. (74) She appears to 
have ruled alone u n t i l A.D.7. 
The next king of'whom we have any knowledge is Aspurgus, 
who was ruling i n A.D. 16/17. (75) However, two coins i n the B r i t i s h 
Museum do show the head of a king: on the obverse of both there i s 
the head of Augustus, whilst on the reverse i s a beardless male head; 
the f i r s t can be dated to A.D.2, and the second to A.D.10. (76) 
Thus the same ruler was on the throne i n these two years, and from 
A.D.10 coins bearing the monogram of Aspurgus appear. (77) I t 
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seems possible that Aspurgus ruled as the consort of Dynamis during 
the last few years of the Queen's l i f e , and continued as the sole 
ruler after her death. 
Moreover, with the failure of Augustus1 plan to unite 
Bosporus and Pontus, Rome appears to have been content to leave 
the Bosporan throne to be sorted out by the natives, merely insisting 
that the overlordship of Rome be recognised. 
The Caucasus. 
Between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea lay the region 
of the Caucasus Mountains. This rugged area was controlled by the 
Albani and the I b e r i , and Augustus was happy to form alliances with 
both. (78) 
According to Cassius Dio, Canidius Crassus had conquered 
the two tribes i n 36 B.C., and Fharnabazus, king of the I b e r i , and 
Zober, king of the Albani, helped Antony i n the c i v i l war. (79) 
They probably merely transferred their allegiance after Actium. 
These two tribes were i n a very important position, for 
any Parthian advance into Armenia could be hindered by attacks from 
the north, and later emperors made use of the I b e r i and Albani i n 
campaigns i n Armenia. No doubt Augustus was glad to use these two 
kings to form the northern end of the chain of client kingdoms by 
which the eastern empire was to be protected. 
Commagene. 
The small kingdan ofCammagene, bordered on the north-east 
by Armenia, on the north-west by Cappadocia and on the south-west by 
the province of Syria, was of the utmost importance to Augustus, for 
i t s south-eastern boundary was separated from Parthia only by the riv e r 
Euphrates. The princeps could not afford to alienate i t s king, and 
thus run the r i s k of allowing Parthian influence to spread westwards. 
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Therefore, i n 31 B.C., Mithridates I I , although an adherent of 
Antony, was allowed to remain. Indeed, Octavian fervently 
supported him against his brother Antiochus; when the l a t t e r 
murdered an envoy sent from Commagene to Rome, Octavian had him 
brought before the senate, tr i e d and put to death. (80) D. Magie 
points out that this i s the f i r s t known example of a foreign prince 
subjected to a t r i a l before the Roman senate. (81) 
However, a change occurred i n 20 B.C; Mithridates I I died, 
or was deposed, and Augustus gave his throne to another Mithridates, 
s t i l l a boy, whose father had been put to death by the previous king.(82) 
The imposition of a child would give Augustus great influence. 
Mithridates I I I was succeeded presumably by Antiochus 
Epiphanes I I I , who died i n A.D.17. (83) The silence of the sources 
about the internal affairs of Commagene leads to the assumption that 
Augustus* policy was successful during the rest of his reign. 
Armenia Minor. 
This was another kingdom of small size but considerable 
importance, since i t faced the Parthian client state of Armenia Maior. 
The kingdom had been given to Polemo of Pontus i n 36 B.C.(84) by 
Antony, but i n 31 B.C., Octavian took i t from him and placed i t i n the 
hands of Artavasdes, a former king of Media Atropatene, whose friendship 
with Antony had caused his expulsion by Parthia. His client ship i n 
Armenia Minor was an astute move by Octavian, for his enmity with 
Artaxias i n Armenia Maior ensured his loyalty. 
But on the death of Artavasdes i n 20 B.C., Armenia Minor 
once more ceased to be a separate kingdom; i t was joined to Archelaus* 
kingdom of Cappadocia, presumably because Augustus wanted a king he 
could trust and who had the resources to defend the borders. (85) 
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Armenia Major 
The kingdom of Armenia Maior was Augustus1 greatest 
problem; i t i s connected to the plateau of Asia Minor on the 
west and to the Iranian plateau on the south, and therefore both 
Parthia and Rome could claim that, geographically, i t belonged to 
their respective spheres of influence. Whichever power held the 
clientship of Armenia had an advantage i n a military confrontation, 
because i t possessed a corridor into enemy t e r r i t o r y . 
But Octavian inherited a hostile situation; i n 36 B.C., 
Artavasdes, the king of Armenia, had been an a l l y of Antony, but 
had failed him at the crucial moment, resulting i n a defeat by 
Parthia. . Therefore Antony seized Artavasdes and his three sons 
and sent them to Egypt; the king was put to death, and Antony 
proposed to give the kingdom to Alexander Helios, but Artaxias, 
Artavasdes' eldest son, escaped and regained Armenia when Antony's 
attention was called to the west. (86) 
When Artavasdes of Media Atropatene, an all y of Antony, 
had been deposed by Parthia, Artaxias was safe i n his kingdom; he 
joined i n an alliance with Parthia, and thus was hostile to Rome 
when Octavian assumed control. Tacitus blames Antony for the 
situation. (87) 
Three possible courses of action were open to Octavian: 
he could conquer and annex Armenia; he could leave i t independent 
and hostile; or he could establish a client relationship. 
Annexation or the establishment of a client king might have 
involved Rome i n an expensive war with Parthia, and this Octavian was 
not prepared to undertake, although public opinion i n Rome may well 
have favoured avenging earlier defeats at Parthian hands. Therefore 
his settlements with the kings of Asia Minor safeguarded against the 
invasion of Roman t e r r i t o r y from Armenia: to the north, the I b e r i and 
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Albani threatened, to the west, Pontus, Armenia Minor, Cappadocia 
and Commagene were a l l loyal to Rome. As an additional safeguard, 
Octavian took Artaxias 1 two brothers from Egypt to Rome as hostages, 
whilst keeping a refugee claimant to the Parthian throne, Tiridates, 
i n Syria as a menace to Phraates of Parthia. 
I n i t i a l l y then, Augustus allowed Armenia to remain 
independent and hostile, and although he took adequate precautions 
to safeguard Asia Minor, there can be l i t t l e doubt that he was merely 
waiting for a favourable opportunity to improve this unsatisfactory 
situation. 
This occurred i n 23 B.C., when Phraates asked for the 
return of his son, and Augustus agreed, on condi-tion that the Reman 
standards captured by Parthia were returned. The agreement was 
carried out i n 20 B;.C, when the ramanizing parly i n Armenia asked 
for Artaxias' brother, Tigranes, to be installed as king. (88). 
Tiberius was ordered to advance into Armenia with an army, and this 
show of force had i t s desired effect; Phraates would not fight and 
agreed to return the standards lost by Crassus, Decidius Saxa and 
Antony. Meanwhile Artaxias had been murdered, and Tiberius was 
able to i n s t a l l Tigranes I I as king of Armenia, personally placing 
the crown on his head. (89) Therefore Armenia became a client 
kingdom, despite i t s Parthian sympathies arising from race and 
geography. I t was a source of great pride to Augustus; coins 
were issued proclaiming Armenia capta (90), and he boasted that 
he could have made Armenia into a province. (91) This claim was 
a l i t t l e unrealistic; perhaps the situation i n 20 B.C. would have 
allowed Augustus to annex Armenia, but such action would almost 
certainly have provoked a war with Parthia - which the emperor 
wished to avoid. 
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After the events of 20 B.C., Augustus mentions nothing 
i n the Res Gestae u n t i l 1 B.C., but Tacitus throws some light on 
the intervening years: 
nec Tigrani diuturnum inrperium f u i t , neque lib e r i s eiua, 
quamquam sociatis more externo i n matrimonium regnumque. Dein 
iussu Augusti ampositus Artavasdes, et non sine! clade nostra 
delectus (92) I t appears that Tigranes I I was succeeded by his 
children, Tigranes I I I and Erato; the date i s uncertain, but 
Cassius Dio says Tiberius was given the tribunician power and a 
command i n Armenia to deal with this situation, but he went to 
Rhodes i n retirement. (93) The date of this retirement was 6 B.C., 
therefore Tigranes I I must have died shortly beforehand. 
Dio speaks of Armenia becoming estranged since the death of 
Tigranes; presumably Tigranes I I I and Erato were turning eastwards 
i n their politics as well as i n their customs and were making overtures 
to Parthia. Therefore Augustus gave the kingdom to Artavasdes, who 
may have been the brother of Artaxias and Tigranes I I from Rome. 
But the emperor's policy failed when Artavasdes I I was 
deposed; i n view of Tigranes' letter to Rome asking for the kingship 
i n A.D.1, and Augustus' hopeful reply because he feared a war with 
Parthia (94 ) , i t seems likely that Tigranes I I I and Erato drove out 
Artavasdes with Parthian aid, thus necessitating Roman action. 
Augustus accordingly sent out his grandson, Gaius: 
et eandem fjentem postea dejscj iscentem et rebellantem demit am 
per Gaium filium meum regi Ario jbarzj ani regis Medorum Artabazi f i l i o 
regendam trad id i et post e pLuaj mortem f i l i o ejus Artavasdi. Quo 
jintejrfecto [Tigj rane jmj , qui erat ex regio genere Armeniorum 
oriundus, i n id re Jgnumjmiai (95)• So Augustus names Ariobarzanes, 
Artavasdes and Tigranes as the kings of Armenia between A.D.1 and 
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A.D.14. This account must be considered parallel to that of 
Tacitus: 
Turn Gaius Caesar componendae Armeniae deligitur. 
I s Ariobarzanen origine Medum ob insignem corporis formam et 
praeclarum arrimum volentibus Armeniis praefecit., Ariobarzane 
morte f b r t u i t a absumpto stirpem eius haud toleravere temptatoque 
feminae imperio, cui nomen Erato, eaque brevi pulsa, i n c e r t i 
aolutique et mag is sine domino quam i n libertate profugum Vononem 
i n regnum acoipiunt (96). Tacitus names Ariobarzanes, his son, 
Erato and Vonones as the monarchs i n the same period. 
There i s no doubt that G-aius was i n the east from 1 B.C. 
u n t i l his death on February 21st, A.D.4. On his a r r i v a l i n 
Armenia, the throne was vacant, since Tigranes I I I had been k i l l e d 
i n war, and his consort Erato had abdicated. (97) However, despite 
Tacitus' assertion volentibus Armeniis, Gaius appears to have had to 
impose Ariobarzanes by force - he received injuries, which later 
proved f a t a l , at the siege of Artagira. (98) 
Ariobarzanes was succeeded by his son Artavasdes (99) 
despite Tacitus.' haud toleravere, for coins t e s t i f y to his reign. (100) 
But the successor of Artavasdes i s uncertain; i f , as Tacitus 
claims, Erato did replace him, she probably did so with Parthian help, 
and Augustus had a motive for omitting i t from the Res Gestae. But 
this would have been her t h i r d time on the throne, and Tacitus may 
have mistaken the order of her return to power. Certainly Augustus 
would have been compelled to place his own candidate, Tigranes, i n 
Armenia with a show of force which would almost certainly have been 
noted by one of the authorities. 
I t i s preferable to assume that Tigranes IV succeeded 
Artavasdes, as Augustus records; perhaps his rule was so brief 
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that Tacitus does not think him worthy of mention. 
However Augustus does not record later events i n Armenia. 
Vonones appears to have been driven from the Parthian throne to 
which Augustus had sent him i n A.D.1G ( l O l ) , and. to mention him 
as king i n Armenia would have meant recording a failure i n Parthia. 
However, Josephus says that Vonones never actually received Armenia, 
but Artabanus, king of Parthia, gave i t to one of his sons, Orodes, 
i n A.D.15. (102) Nevertheless, i t seems l i k e l y that i n the years 
between the expulsion of Vonones from Parthia (103)> and the 
accession of Orodes, Vonones was king of Armenia, whether or not he 
was o f f i c i a l l y recognized i n Rome. 
Such were the d i f f i c u l t i e s Augustus faced i n Armenia. 
1 
His desire to strengthen the buffer states of the east by making 
Armenia a client kingdom provided him with several problems. As 
long as Parthia was weakened i n some way, the aim was easy to achieve, 
but when Parthia was strong enough to act, Roman pride threatened to 
bring a confrontation, and displays of military power were necessary. 
Augustus* successors were to find the same d i f f i c u l t i e s i n attempting 
to follow his policy. 
Parthia 
As we have seen, Augustus' policy towards Armenia depended 
greatly on his relations with the King of Parthia: his fear of 
Parthian intrusion i n the east impelled him to seize any opportunity 
of gaining an advantage over the King of Kings. Augustus' in a c t i v i t y 
i n Armenia between 30 B.C. and 20 B.C. was possible because Tiridates, 
a pretender to the Parthian throne, and one of Phraates' sons were 
held i n Roman t e r r i t o r y (104) i any aggression by the Parthian king, 
Phraates, would have resulted i n the execution of his son and the 
invasion of Parthia by Tiridates, backed by Raman troops. Tiridates 
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had been king of Parthia from 36 B.C., but when deposed by 
Phraates i n 30 Bf.C, he fled to Syria. Phraates established 
friendly relations with Octavian, but as a safeguard, the princeps 
allowed Tiridates to remain i n Syria, and received Phraates1 son as 
a hostage. (105) I n 23 B.C., the king sent envoys to Rome asking 
for the return of both hostages, vdiilst Tiridates appeared i n person; 
Augustus brought them before the senate, and when that body referred 
the decision back to him, he refused to hand Tiridates over to Phraates, 
but sent back the king's son on condition that the Parthians would 
return the prisoners and standards captured i n the defeats of Crassus 
and Antony. (106) 
These standards were received i n 20 B.C., when Augustus 
was able to make Armenia into a client kingdom; this was a great 
diplomatic achievement, but Phraates was not i n a position to refuse, 
since internal s t r i f e may well have added to his problems. At this 
time the Parthian king was almost reduced to the position of a client 
because of his submission, and Augustus claimed: Partho3 trium 
exercitum RcmanjVjrum spolia et signa reddere mini suppliceB 
amicitiam populi Romani petere coegi (107) • Perhaps Augustus 
exaggerated his power, yet Horace's laudatory poems express the 
same superiority. (108) There was certainly o f f i c i a l rejoicing 
over the triumph, as coins t e s t i f y . (109) 
Rome's ascendency over Parthia seems to have continued 
for more than a decade, for Augustus further claims that Phraates 
sent a l l his heirs to Rome (110), the act of a true client king. 
However Josephus offers an explanation which preserves Phraates' 
independence, i f not his wisdom ( i l l ) ; Josephus claims that an 
I t a l i a n concubine of Phraates persuaded him to send his legitimate 
sons to Rome, thus ensuring the succession for her own son Phraataces* 
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The four heirs sent to Rome were Seraspadanes, Rhodaspes, Vonones 
and Phraates; they were handed to M. Titius, wlio was legate of 
Syria from 11 to 8 B.C. (112) Two of them died i n Rome (113) , 
whilst two survived to become kings of Parthia: Vonones was sent 
to Parthia by Augustus, and Phraates by Tiberius. (114) 
With these princes safely i n Rome, Phraataces succeeded 
Phraates i n 3/2 B.C. (115), and Rome's influence continued; the 
king met Gaius on the Euphrates i n A.D.I and agreed to renounce 
Armenia. ( l l 6 ) 
The coins of Phraataces date to A.D.4 (117)* and then 
those of Orodes begin. Phraataces was replaced because he was not 
tr u l y an Arsacid (118), but Orodes himself cannot have been very 
popular, for Augustus received envoys asking for one of Phraates' 
sons to be sent from Rome (119), and the emperor, seeking to 
increase his influence, sent Vonones. The date i s uncertain, but 
Suetonius t e l l s us that the envoys were sent on by Augustus to 
Tiberius whilst he was i n Germany i n A.D.4-& (120) The coins of 
Vonones begin i n A.D.8 (121), so presumably he gained the throne 
i n A.D.7 or 8. 
However, Vonones was not popular, since the Parthians 
resented his Raman influence, and he was deposed by Artabanus, 
king of Media Atropatene. (122) Vonones was s t i l l issuing coins 
i n A.D.ll/12 (123), but Artabanus f i r s t minted i n A.D.lO/ll (124), 
and obviously by this date he had begun to replace Vonones. 
So Augustus1 influence i n Parthia ended. He had t r i e d 
throughout his reign to influence the Parthian kings, and at f i r s t 
internal struggles for power and the possession as hostages of 
various heirs to the Parthian throne enabled him to do this 
successfully, but after the death of Phraates, Augustus1 influence 
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decreased, and the Parthian threat made the client kingdoms of 
Asia Minor increasingly important. 
Media Atropatene 
The kingdom of Media Atropatene, south-east of Armenia 
Minor, was ruled by Artavasdes u n t i l Antony's support was withdrawn. 
Then Parthian and Armenian pressure forced Artavasdes into exile. (125) 
Octavian's decision to leave Armenia i n Artaxias' hands meant that 
Media.was far beyond the influence of Rome, therefore Artavasdes 
was given Armenia Minor. (126) 
However, Augustus claimed to have given Media to 
Ariobarzanes, the son of Artavasdes (127); presumably the 
establishment of Armenia M aior as a Roman client kingdom enabled 
him to extend his influence eastwards, and Ariobarzanes was 
installed i n Media i n or shortly after 20 B.C. 
The barrier of client kingdoms facing Parthia was 
further increased, but Roman influence i n Media was only transitory; 
Ariobarzanes was the last Roman supporter we hear of, and by A.D.1X) 
the Parthia Artabanus was king of Media. (128) I t seems that the 
kingdom was too distant for Augustus t o maintain his influence. 
Adiabene 
When Artaxares, the king of Adiabene on the Upper Tigris, 
fled his throne, Augustus gave refuge to him, and thus continued 
the policy seen on the northern frontiers; he maintained the exiled 
king as a pretender to his throne, thus causing internal divisions 
within the kingdom. (125) 
India 
According to Augustus1 claim (129), Indian kings sent 
envoys to Rome; despite the statement that they came often, only 
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tiro embassies are recorded: the f i r s t was i n 25 B.C. (130), and 
the second i n 20 B.C. (131)• 
I t i s not possible to claim that Augustus fostered client 
kings in India, for Rome received many articles of luxury from the 
region and Augustus made alliances and agreements with the suppliers 
only for the purposes of trade. 
ELorus counts the Chinese amongst the friends of Rome (132), 
presumably for the same reasons, but E.H. Warming ton assumes that 
Elorus confuses the Seres with the South Indian Cher as. (133) 
The Syrian Frontier 
I n the confrontation with Parthia, i t was not only the 
Armenian question that had to be considered. The Euphrates was 
the border of the Parthian Empire, and reached i t s westernmost 
point one hundred miles east of Antioch i n Syria. Rome had to 
maintain safety i n this region by making Syria a military province 
so that any incursion by Parthian forces could be countered speedily. 
But, further south, deserts d i f f i c u l t to cross separated Parthia from 
Roman spheres of influence, and Augustus decided i t was safe to leave 
this area i n the hands of client kings. 
J.udaea 
Herod the Great had been proclaimed in Borne as king of 
Judaea i n 2j0 B.C., but did not take up his throne u n t i l 37 B.C., 
when C. Sosius captured Jerusalem from the Parthians. Herod owed 
his throne to Antony and was an important ally for Antony's cause. 
However, at the time of Actium, Herod was involved i n the 
defence of his kingdom against marauding Arabs, and as soon as he 
learnt of the defeat of Antony, he sent envoys to Octavian. Partly 
because of this speedy submission and partly because Herod was 
bringing unity to Judaea, Octavian allowed him to retain his throne. 
Herod did much for his country on the material level (134), 
and therefore received continuing support from Augustus. His 
influence for peace was such that i n 23 B.C., his kingdom was 
increased by the addition of Trachonitis, Batanaea and Auranitis, 
territories east of the Jordan. (135) These areas were taken 
from Zenodorus, who had encouraged and benefitted from increasing 
brigandage; his anger was aroused at having his territories reduced, 
and Agrippa was sent to Syria to dissuade him from causing trouble. 
Three years later, Augustus himself was i n Syria when news 
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reached him of Zenodorus1 death (136), and he increased Herod's 
domain s t i l l further by granting him the rest of Ituraea. (137). 
The emperor clearly was willing to increase the power of client 
kings who were loyal and who provided a unifying factor i n their 
own domains. 
After 20 B.C., Herod seems to have been secure in his 
rule, despite various intrigues set i n motion by the sons of his 
several wives, for he retained the support of Augustus and his 
territory remained intact. I t i s interesting to note that at 
Herod's request, his brother Pheroras was given the tetrarchy of 
Peraea (138), although no doubt Herod himself retained the ultimate 
control of the area. 
Despite the opposition of the orthodox Jews, only once 
did Herod incur the displeasure of Augustus: i n 9 B.C. a dispute 
arose with Syllaeus of Arabia Petraea (139) and, without waiting 
for the emperor's decision, Herod attacked; but, despite his 
annoyance,' Augustus decided to retain the status quo. 
But when Herod died in 4 B.C., the emperor was forced to 
review the situation. I n Herod's w i l l , which he had constantly 
revised during his last years because of the plots of his various 
sons, he bequeathed his kingdom to Archelaus, with the following 
exceptions: Herod Antipas was to receive the tetrarchy of Galilee 
and Peraea, and Philip that of Gaulanitis, Trachonitis, Batanaea 
and Paneias; Herod's sist e r , Salome, was allotted the c i t i e s of 
Iamneia, Azotus and Phasaelis. (1V>) Antipas was displeased at 
this allocation, but Archelaus wisely sent the w i l l to Augustus 
for o f f i c i a l ratification. 
The emperor was now faced with a d i f f i c u l t decision. 
Herod the Great had proved a strong unifying force amongst these 
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small but troublesome territories, and i t seems likely that Augustus 
would1have preferred to keep the whole kingdom under one ruler. 
Yet Herod's sons had proved their readiness to take up arms against 
one another on previous occasions, and to deprive two of them of 
their bequest would almost certainly have resulted i n c i v i l war; 
in addition Augustus probably doubted the ability of any one of 
them to produce a leadership as strong as his father's. Therefore 
he accepted Herod•s w i l l i n part, but made suitable modifications. 
Archelaus became ethnarch, not king, of half of Herod's kingdom, 
i.e. Idumaea, Judaea and Samaria, and Augustus promised to raise 
him to the kingship i f he proved worthy of i t . Antipas received 
Galilee and Feraea and Philip's tetrarchy was increased by the 
addition of those parts of Ituraea which has father had received 
from Zenodorus i n 20 B.C. Salome received her inheritance. (12*1) 
Antipas and Philip reigned for many years, and were allowed 
to issue bronze coins with the emperor's head on the obverse, and 
their own t i t l e s on the reverse. (142) 
But Archelaus was in a different position. His relative 
independence i s shown by several coins i n which the emperor's head 
does not appear. (143) On the other hand, Archelaus was never 
considered worthy enough to be raised to the kingship, so no coins 
survive which credit him with the t i t l e of g a a i A e t f s • His reign 
proved troublesom? for whilst he was i n Rome, waiting for the 
ratification of his father's w i l l , a certain Simon, a slave of 
Herod the Great, took control and styled himself King of I s r a e l . (144) 
Another pretender, Athronges, succeeded him and Quintus Varus, the 
governor of Syria, had to restore order. (145) 
I n the tenth year of Archelaus' reign both Jews and 
Samaritans found his cruelty so intolerable that they appealed to 
Augustus; Archelaus was summoned to Rome and banished to Vienne 
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i n Gallia Narbonensis. (12*6) ^ 
At this point Augustus decided that i the important 
position of Judaea, situated as i t was between Egypt and Syria, 
i 
and so near to Parthia, demanded more direct control, therefore 
Evfpun/ 
x n s 6 ' 'ApxeAdtou X u p a s U T I O T E A O U S T i p o a v E p n S e f a n s xfi ('347) 
Obviously the threat of war between the various., factions 
of Judaea necessitated direct Roman rule, and i t was this.rather 
than any high degree of romanization which compelled Augustus to 
annex Archelaus* kingdom. His contentment , with peaceful rulers 
i s shown by the long reigns of Herod Antipas and Philip, 
Ituraea. 
The kingdom of Ituraea was incorporated into the realm 
of Herod the Great i n 20 B.C., but before this time i t had been a 
separate client state. 
During the period of the second triumvirate, the king of 
Ituraea, I$rsanias, had a l l i e d with Antony, but he was put to death 
by Antony and Cleopatra; the date of his death i s uncertain, for 
Josephus records i t i n 40 B.C., and Cassius Dio i n 36 B.C. (148) 
Antony then gave Ituraea to Cleopatra. (149) 
After Actium, the area became ruler-less, and the lease 
was given to a certain Zenodorus (130), u n t i l his death i n 20 B.C. (151) 
Arabia Petraea 
To the south and east of Judaea were the deserts of Arabia, 
inhabited by several obscure tribes. The Sinai peninsula and the 
region to the east of i t was the homeland of the Nabataean tribe, 
called Arabia Petraea, after the principal c i % of Petra. 
Obadas, the king of the Nabataeans, was not o f f i c i a l l y a 
"friend of the Ramans", but an alliance must have existed, for i n 
25 B.C. he supplied auxiliaries to Aelius Gallus for an expedition 
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to Southern Arabia. Augustus himself mentions this 
expedition (152), but according to the accounts of Strabo and 
Cassius Dio (153)* i t was not a success; disease and privation 
decimated the army, and although the Romans reached Mariba, the 
capital of the Sabaeans, they failed to capture i t . 
The treachery of Syllaeus, the guide and leader of the 
Nabataean contingent, i s given as the reason for this failure. 
Certainly the Nabataeans must have been concerned for the safety 
of their own caravan routes, but without Syllaeus' help the Roman 
army could not have crossed the Arabian peninsula, and in Syllaeus 1 
t r i a l at Rome some fifteen years later no charge of treachery on 
this campaign was brought against him. Although the effects of 
Gallus 1 campaign were minimal, Strabo records that both the 
Sabaeans and the Nabataeans became subject to Rome. 
However, any clientship which was established i n 24 B.C. 
cannot have been taken very seriously, although no trouble i s 
reported i n this area u n t i l 10-9 B.C. Obadas remained as king of 
Arabia Fetraea, but possibly because of his increasing old age, 
Syllaeus gradually assumed power. (154) 
Syllaeus, as the rejected suitor of Herod's s i s t e r Salome, 
began to foster revolt against Herod by harbouring rebels who made 
attacks on Judaea and Syria, and by encouraging sedition i n 
Trachonitis. (155) Herod's appeal to Saturninus, the governor of 
Syria, was upheld, and Syllaeus was ordered to repay sixty talents 
lent by Herod to Obadas. Syllaeus decided to appeal to Augustus 
and travelled to Rome. 
But whilst he was there, Obadas died and Aeneas assumed 
the throne. (156) Augustus was angry because Aeneas, who changed 
his name to Aretas, had not sought permission to rule; his temper 
was not improved when Herod attacked Arabia. Syllaeus took 
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advantage of these two incidents to find favour with the emperor, 
but Aretas wrote to Augustus accusing Syllaeus of several crimes 
including regicide and eventually he was tried in Rome and executed. 
Augustus was inclined to give Fetraea to Herod, but the 
latter*s old age and troublesome sons decided him against this; 
moreover, Aretas * presumptuousness had been mollified by a formal 
request for the throne, and as the only remaining contender, 
Augustus granted his request. (157) Aretas received his throne 
in 9 B.C. and ruled unhindered for almost f i f t y years. 
Emesa 
Rome had l i t t l e contact with tribes beyond the limits 
of Arabia Petraea, but in one case Augustus was compelled to 
interfere. The tribe of the Emesenes had been ruled by 
Iamblichus I (158), who had supported Antony, but i n 31 B.C. the 
latter had him put to death (159), and his brother Alexander 
obtained the sovereignty by bringing accusations against Octavian. 
After the battle of Actium, Octavian was able to obtain 
revenge: not only did he deprive Alexander of his throne, but also 
humiliated him in the victory parade i n Rome, and finally put him to 
death. (l6o) Alexander's relative unimportance l e f t him without 
the diplomatic protection of an Amyntas or an Herod, and Octavian was 
able to exact vengeance for personal attacks. ( l6l) 
However, in 20 B.C. the kingdom was given back to the 
royal family during Augustus' great eastern settlement, for 
Iamblichus I I , the son of Iamblichus I , received the throne. (162) 
Obviously the emperor f e l t that on this frontier, the t r i b a l chiefs 
would prove more efficient than Roman governors. 
Thus Augustus seems to have been content to allow the 
south-eastern corner of the empire to remain i n the hands of client 
kings. No doubt he f e l t that the Semitic and Arabian tribes 
could best be governed by one of their own people, as later events 
proved. However loyalty to Rome was enforced, and the legions i n 
Syria were quick to stop any military offensives. The appeals to 
the emperor by Archelaus, Antipas, Aretas and Syllaeus prove that 
Augustus took a very real interest i n the client kingdoms, and the 
annexation of Archeiaus' kingdom shows his refusal to persevere 
with unpopular monarchs. 
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The African Kingdoms 
The north coast of Africa had long been tinder Roman 
influence, and since the defeat of Jugurtha there had been no 
threat to their superiority. The vast Sahara, desert to the 
south of the coastal strip protected the Empire from any serious 
threat of invasion, and i t was of l i t t l e strategic importance 
whether Rome ruled directly, through provincial governors, or 
indirectly, through client kings. 
Egypt 
The one exception was Egypt, where control was v i t a l to 
Rome; i t was an important trading centre at the confluence of 
trade routes from three continents, and i t supplied I t a l y with a 
large proportion of i t s grain. At the same time i t s proximity 
to the eastern and southern frontiers gave i t military importance, 
which was increased by the knowledge that attacks on North Africa 
from the south would come mainly via the Nile valley. 
Julius Caesar had made Egypt into a client kingdom, but 
this semi-independence had proved extremely dangerous during the 
second triumvirate. Antony's alliance with Cleopatra had shown 
that the financial resources of Egypt could be used to provide the 
basis of an empire i n the eastern Mediterranean which could threaten 
the military supremacy of Rome. Octavian could not afford to grant 
Egypt a large degree of independence, and the opportunity for 
complete annexation came when Cleopatra committed suicide i n 30 B.C. (163) 
Octavian disposed of the children of Antony and Cleopatra 
by various means: Antyllus and Caesarion were slai n , Cleopatra: Selene 
was married to Juba (l&f), and Alexander Helios and Ptolemy Philadelphos 
were spared as a favour to their s i s t e r . Their ancestral domain was 
annexed to the Roman Empire (165)» but i t did not become an ordinary 
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imperial province; Egypt was regarded as some!thing between a 
province and the personal domain of the emperor (166), and 
senators had to receive special permission from the emperor to 
v i s i t i t . 
Octavian showed outstanding p o l i t i c a l insight i n 
adopting this policy, for the Egyptians had always believed that 
their monarch was divine; the institution of normal provincial 
procedure i n Egypt would have introduced the annual governorship, 
and even the most reverent Egyptians might have had difficulty i n 
believing they were presented with a new god every year. Therefore 
Octavian introduced a system by which he himself was successor to 
the Pharaohs, receiving divine honours, and his prefects were regarded 
as viceroys of a god. 
Thus the emperor disposed of one of the largest and most 
important client kingdoms. The p o l i t i c a l , economic and military 
advantages of this move were so great that lie could not afford to 
leave Egypt under i t s own kings; even Tacitus approved of his 
action. (167) 
Ethiopia 
Within six years of the annexation of Egypt, the legions 
stationed on the Nile were called upon to repulse an attack from 
Ethiopia. I t seems that Augustus was planning an exploratory 
expedition into the kingdan (168), and Candace, queen of Ethiopia,• 
encouraged by Gallus' failure i n Arabia (169), decided to forestall 
this by taking the offensive. 
C. Petronius, who succeeded Gallus during 24 B.C., had to 
meet the invasion; he gathered an army and advanced into Ethiopia, 
driving the invaders from Egypt; on capturing the Ethiopian capital, 
Napata, he withdrew, but an attack on the Roman garrison at Premnis 
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necessitated a further campaign i n the following year. (170) 
Candace begged for peace and sent envoys to Augustus in Samoa. 
These were received favourably and the emperor remitted the 
tribute imposed on the queen. (171) 
Ethiopia can hardly have been regarded as a client: 
kingdom and no doubt Augustus was happy that the country to the 
south of Egypt had become an all y of Rome. He showed no further 
desire to influence the internal affairs of Candace's realm, and 
as long as Egypt was not troubled, he was happy to retain the 
frontiers established by Cornelius Gallus. (172) 
Numidia 
After the battle of Thapsus i n 46 B.C., the king of Numidia, 
Juba I , committed suicide and his son, Juba I I , was taken to Rome to 
grace Caesar's triumph. (173) He was well, treated i n I t a l y , and 
seems to have obtained the favour of Octavian, for.he was present i n 
the campaigns i n the east. Certainly Juba benefitted in the 
settlement after Actium, when he was married to Cleopatra Selene and 
restored to his father's kingdom. (174) 
However, Numidia had been governed from Rome for sixteen 
years, and i t s habitants must have reached a high degree of 
romanization - indeed, the majority were Roman citizens. (175) 
Therefore Augustus reorganised Numidia as a province, but he was 
unwilling to deprive Juba of a throne and transferred him to Mauretania. 
Mauretania 
Yfhereas, Numidia became a province after being ruled by a 
client king, the reverse seems to have applied in Mauretania, The 
rulers of Mauretania, Bocchus and Bogud,had been Caesarians, but 
after Caesar's death, Eocchus i n eastern Mauretania supported Octavian, 
and Bogud in the west favoured Antony. I n 38 B.C., B'ogud campaigned 
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in Spain, and an uprising at heme was aided by Bocchus. The 
latter then took control of the whole kingdom, and his rule was 
later confirmed by Octavian. (176) 
However, Bocchus died in 33 B.C., and i t would appear 
that Mauretania became a province. Certainly no king was appointed, 
and the government was conducted from Borne. (177) 
Yet in 25 B.C., Mauretania was returned to the hands of a 
client king when Juba I I was transferred from Numidia. (178) This, 
would appear to be a retrogressive step, but Augustus must have had 
a reason for i t . Perhaps the large numbers of Roman citizens i n 
Numidia necessitated i t s annexation, but to rid North Africa of a l l 
i t s client kings, necessitating the patrol of the long frontier from 
the Atlantic to the Red Sea by Raman troops, would have required too 
many troops for such a peaceful frontier. Therefore Augustus 
decided to economise on his forces by returning Mauretania to his 
trusted friend who had already proved himself f i t to rule. 
Juba seems to have ruled well, and was so popular with his 
subjects that they paid him divine honours after his death. (179) 
His fame as an author was well known, and his works are often 
mentioned by extant authors, especially Plutarch and Pliny, but 
his martial fame was not so great. I n A.D.6, the Gaetulians, 
fearful that their romanized king would bring direct Raman rule, 
revolted, and i t took a Roman army under Cornelius Cossus to restore 
peace. (180) The difficulty of this campaign i s shown by the fact 
that Cossus received the t i t l e "Gaetulicus" and was awarded triumphal 
honours. 
Augustus' policy towards the client kingdoms of North 
Africa seems to have been one of convenience, rather than a series 
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of delicate diplomatic manoeiyres. The annexation of Egypt was 
necessary for the safety of the principate, but i n Juba's two 
appointments, we can see that the emperor was taking note of the 
internal situations of the countries concerned. 
Whereas the appointments i n the east were made with a 
view to establishing a bulwark against Parthia whilst maintaining 
an uneasy peace, i n Africa there was l i t t l e danger of invasion to 
threaten the safety of the empire (181), and Augustus was able to 
concentrate on the romanization of the various peoples with a view 
to their f u l l participation i n the empire. 
Conclusion 
From this' survey of Augustus* relations with client kings, 
i t i s clear that kings were not used consistently throughout the 
empire; the emperor realized that the usefulness of client states 
was limited by geographical and sociological factors, and his policies 
were formulated accordingly. 
Central and northern Europe had no tradition of st a t i c 
population structures; the nomadic t r i b a l units were acquainted 
with very few of the sophisticated delights of ci v i l i z a t i o n , and 
their primary s k i l l was that of warfare. A series of client kingdoms 
to protect Roman settlements would have been useless, for the European 
nomads would merely have driven them out one by one. They could only 
be halted by means of a consistent military frontier guarded and 
patrolled by the army. So Augustus employed only one client king, 
Maroboduus, on the European frontier, and he owed his alliance to 
circumstance rather than policy. Of the other two kingdoms i n 
Europe, both well within the boundaries of Roman influence, one was 
given a king as a unifying factor and the other was, in practice, a 
province with a permanent native governor. 
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However, in the eastern Empire the situation was 
different. The peoples of the Hellenistic east were used to 
the government of monarchs, and belief i n their semi-divine 
powers made their p o l i t i c a l affiliations extremely important 
to Rome, for they had great influence over their subjects. 
I t had become almost traditional for Rome to use these 
kingdoms as a buffer against the unified military strength of the 
Parthian Empire; Augustus' attitude towards them f a l l s into two 
parts. The f i r s t phase was apparent whilst Parthia held influence 
i n Armenia: Octavian, who had fought against a l l the eastern kings 
at Actium, needed their support as soon as the battle was won, for 
the empire had to be guarded against Parthia. So the kings of the 
larger client states kept their thrones, and one by one were recognised 
as "friends of Caesar". Nevertheless, several less Important monarchs 
lost their thrones as a warning to the others, thus allowing Raman 
government to work alongside other kings. 
But Augustus' policy changed in 20 B.C.; the establishment 
of a pro-Raman king in Armenia, and the reduction of Parthia almost 
to the status of a client state herself, enabled Augustus to return 
several of the smaller states to their respective royal families. 
A trend towards large kingdoms as more effective buffer units can also 
be seen in the emperor's encouragement to unite by marriage the royal 
houses of several states. 
Under this acceptance of client states in the east, Augustus 
may have been advocating a policy of romanization with a view to 
peaceful annexation. Galatia was ready to be included i n the empire 
on the death of Amyntas, and similar moves by succeeding emperors 
suggest that the romanization process was consciously encouraged. 
However, on the African frontier there was no need for 
the client states to act as buffers, for they were employed merely 
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as stop-gaps u n t i l the native populations were ready to enter the 
empire. 
Augustus employed client kings as buffers against Parthia, 
as factors i n the process of romanination and as the basis of national 
unity; his policies seem to have been basically sound i n that he met 
no open resistence from the kings themselves, and he certainly provided 
precedents for his successors, as far as they chose to follow his 
guidance. 
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C H A P T E R I I I 
Europe under Augustus1 Julio-Claudian Successors. 
Augustus1 long reign had seen the emergence of c learly 
defined frontiers i n Europe beyond which barbarian tribes should 
not pass, but his policy did not include the use of c l ient kings. 
The f i r s t emperor preferred to keep the warlike tribes i n check 
by military rather than diplomatic means, and so the northerly 
l imits of the Roman provinces were guarded by army instal lat ions 
rather than buffer states. During the f i f t y years following the 
death of Augustus, his policy was modified, with varying degrees 
of success. 
Br i ta in . 
The twenty-two miles of water which separated Br i ta in from 
the provinces of Gaul had seemed to provide suff ic ient security 
against invasion, and Augustus had deemed i t unnecessary to send 
forces across the Channel; he was content to allow Roman influence 
to spread slowly to the Belgic tribes in the south of Br i ta in , as 
his coins show, ( l ) 
His immediate successor, Tiberius, determined to follow 
the same policy, and the l i terary authorities record no dealings 
with Br i ta in during his reign. I t i s to the coins of this period 
that we must turn, and C . E . Stevens (2) ca l l s on the evidence 
presented by D.P. Allen (3) to trace Tiberius' policy towards 
Br i ta in . 
We have seen that Epi l lus and Verica , the kings of the 
Regni and Atrebates, had issued coins with the t i t l e rex (4 ) , but 
soon after Tiberius' accession, the t i t l e disappears from Verica 1 s 
coins (5 ) , and Roman coin-types of Epi l lus appear i n east Kent 
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without the t i t l e rex. (6) Presumably Tiberius wanted to 
modify Augustus* sphere of influence, and a l lay suspicion of 
a bogus conquest, therefore he denied the B r i t i s h chieftains 
the t i t l e of king. On the other hand, the appearance of E p i l l u s 1 
coins i n east Kent suggests that Rome'&fr lends held a l l the south-
eastern corner of B r i t a i n , and therefore Reman territory was 
unlikely to suffer any unexpected attacks. 
However, Ep i l lus seems to have been expelled from Kent 
i n c . A.D. 25 by Cunobelinus. (7) ' The lat ter issued Roman 
coin-types, but his friendship with Rome may wel l have been suspect, 
for his sons Epaticcus and Caratacus made inroads from the north on 
the kingdom of Verica. (8) Stevens suggests that Cunobelinus was 
unwilling to attack personally, and could disown his sons i f Rome 
disapproved of their advance. During Tiberius' reign, Rome seems 
to have lost a l i t t l e of her influence over the kingdoms i n B r i t a i n . 
Nevertheless; Rome was s t i l l a place of refuge for exiled 
Britons, and i n A.D.40, the emperor G-aius received the surrender of 
Adminius, a young B r i t i s h prince who had been expelled by his father, 
Cunobelinus. (9) Suetonius refers to Cunobelinus as rex Britannorum, 
which suggests that the lat ter was effecting some kind of national 
•unity, at least in south-eastern B r i t a i n . I n the face of such a 
situation, Gaius may wel l have decided to invade the is land; he 
certainly advanced to the Gal l i c coast, where the famous events 
recorded by Suetonius took place. (10) Whether or not Gaius 
actually planned an invasion, as Tacitus asserts ( l l ) , i s uncertain (12), 
but the fact remains that the Roman army did not embark, and the 
B r i t i s h kings were l e f t to their own devices for a few more years. 
Yet the conquest of the southern kingdoms of Br i ta in must 
by this time have become a p o l i t i c a l , mil itary and economic 
necessity (13) and Gaius• successor, Claudius, seized an opportunity 
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to effect th is , when Verica, the pro-Roman king of Surrey and 
Sussex, was expelled and f led to Rome to seek help. (14) 
Therefore, i n A.O.43, four legions under Aulus Plautius 
Silvanus landed i n B r i t a i n . Cunobelinus had died only months 
before, and his sons, Togodumnus and Caratacus were defeated on 
the Medway; Claudius himself conducted a battle north of the 
Thames, entered Camulodunum, and established i t as the capital 
of the new province of Britannia. (15) 
However, the conquest of Br i ta in had only just begun, 
and Claudius 1 general realized the impossibility of conquering 
a totally hostile country: i t was necessary to rely on the 
support of some local chieftains to protect the flanks of the 
Roman advance. Therefore we see i n Bri ta in the emergence of 
three client kings who were important strategical ly rather than 
po l i t i ca l l y . 
The f i r s t of these was Cogidumnus, who inherited the 
kingdom of Verica , i n Sussex. An inscription found at Chichester 
ver i f ies his unusual position (16), for i t shows that Cogidumnus 
was not only rex, but also les;atus Augusti, which, with i t s 
implied senatorial rank, was an unusual position, for a barbarian 
nobleman to hold. Nevertheless this honour, coupled with the 
more mundane grant of cit izenship, ensured the loyally of this 
king for many years, as Tacitus v e r i f i e s , ( l ? ) Cogidumnus' 
friendship was v i t a l to the early invaders, for i t allowed Vespasian 
to advance westwards into Dorset and Wiltshire, and the king's 
reward may wel l have been assistance i n the building of the 
magnificent palace at Fishbourne, near Chichester, which can 
have been bui l t only by Cogidumnus. (18) 
The second of these cl ient kingdoms was that of the 
I c e n i , i n East Anglia, who guarded the right flank of the Roman 
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advance towards the northwest. (19) But the king Prasutagus (20), 
was not as successful as Cogidumnus, for when P. Ostorius Scapula 
ordered a general disarmament i n A.D.47, the Icen i revolted. (2l ) 
Nevertheless, Prasutagus continued as king u n t i l A.D.60. (22) 
Whilst the armies were campaigning i n the south-west 
and against Caratacus i n Wales, the north could not be disregarded, 
and i t seems l ike ly that Cartimandua, the queen of the Brigantes, 
whose realm covered modern Yorkshire and Lancashire, entered into 
an alliance with Rome. Certainly she helped Rome i n A.D.51, when 
she handed over Caratacus who had taken refuge after his defeat. (23) 
But Cartimandua's subjects were not to remain as c l i ents , far as 
Tacitus says (24), the wealth and prosperity gained from Raman 
favour was her ru in . She divorced her husband, Venutius, and 
married his armour-bearer, Vellocatus. But Venutius retained 
the support of his tribesmen, who rebelled; Cartimandua was 
rescued with d i f f i cu l ty by Roman forces and Venutius, who inherited 
her throne, remained hostile to Rome. The dates of these events 
are obscure (23), but the reference occurs in H i s t . I l l , 45, and 
i f Tacitus' chronology i s correct,Venutius must have been troublesome 
i n A.D.69. 
However, the surrender of Caratacus by Cartimandua i n 
A.D.51 resulted i n the former being taken to Rome and exhibited 
to the populace. (26) Claudius then erected the following 
commemoration of his victory over the B r i t i s h kings: 
T i . Claujdio Drusi f . C a i j s a r i Augujsto Germanijco 
pontif i c [ i maxim, t r i b . potesjtat. XI cos V im|p X X . . . pa tr i 
pa J - t r i a i senatus pojpulusquej Rojmanus qjuod reges B r i t janniafj XI 
ajVyictos sinej u l l a iacturja in deditionem acceperitj gentesque 
b jarbaras trans Oceanumj primus i n d i c i |onem populi Romani 
re degerit] . (27) 
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Although Claudius proudly boasted of his victory over 
eleven B r i t i s h kings, his successor, Nero, inherited a province 
i n which three c l i ents , Cogidumnus, Cartimandua and Prasutagus, 
helped to keep the peace. 
Of these, Cogidumnus remained loyal throughout his reign, 
and the south remained secure. An inscription found at Chichester 
which must have been set up during Cogidumnus1 reign, shows the 
king's acceptance of Nero as his overlord and emperor. (28) 
But the other monarchs were not so re l iable . I have 
already dealt with Cartimandua's dethronement, which must have 
taken place during Nero's reign. Tacitus gives two different 
dates for Venutius* r i s i n g . I n the Anhales (29) he says Aulus 
Didius Gallus was the governor who rescued Cartimandua, 
therefore the revolt must have taken place before A.D.57* I n 
the Historiae (30) he says Venutius was encouraged to rebel by 
the discord i n the Raman armies caused by the c i v i l wars of 
A.D.69. Presumably the trouble began early i n Nero's principate 
and had not been settled by the time of h is death. 
Yet the loss of Prasutagus was even more dangerous for 
Roman rule i n Br i ta in . The king died in A.D .59-60, naming as 
co-heirs the emperor and his own daughters. (31) I n the absence 
of a male heir i t was decided to add the territory of the I c e n i 
to the province. Prasutagus1 widow, Boudicca, was flogged and 
their daughters violated. This outrage, coupled with the fear 
of further trouble i n their provincial status, impelled the I cen i 
to revolt , and Camulodunum and Londinium were destroyed. Only a 
b r i l l i a n t victory by Suetonius Paulinas, the governor, saved the 
province. This near calamity shoved that Claudius' policy of 
protecting his advance with cl ient-states had been correct, and 
proved the fo l ly of attempting to incorporate kingdoms into the 
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empire before they had become rcmanized. 
From this evidence i t i s clear that, during the time of 
the Julio-Claudian emperors, the Raman attitude towards Br i ta in 
changed, for a policy of gradual i n f i l t r a t i o n became one of 
direct annexation. However Claudius found that he was able to 
use in ter - t r iba l r i v a l r i e s to enl is t some B r i t i s h chieftains as 
friends and a l l i e s , who, unlike the cl ients of Asia Minor, were 
pro tempore a l l i e s , useful as strategic units i n a campaign. 
Once Rome had a foothold in Br i ta in they could be absorbed into 
the province, although the revolt of the Icen i proved that this 
might not be too easy, and only Cogidumnus survived as a friend 
and a l ly to Rome beyond the f i r s t twenty years of Roman ru le . 
Germany 
Augustus had always re l i ed on his armies to keep the 
German tribes out of Roman terr i tory . His distrust of the 
warlike Germanic chieftains was shown by his refusal to enrol 
them as cl ient kings, and only Maroboduus became a friend and 
a l l y of Rome, obtaining this position merely because of Tiberius' 
r e c a l l to Fannonia. (32) 
Tiberius, whose campaigns had taught him much about the 
Germans, followed the same policy. He allowed Germanicus to 
campaign across the Rhine (33) to restore prestige lost by Varus' 
defeat, but he did not intend to advance permanently, and as soon 
as that prestige was restored, Germanicus was recal led. Tiberius 
was convinced that the German tr ibes , when l e f t to their own 
devices, would quarrel amongst themselves. (34) He was soon 
proved to be r ight , for as soon as Germanicus returned, war broke 
out between Arminius and Maroboduus; the Suebi did not l ike 
Maroboduus' t i t l e of king, and many of his subjects turned to 
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Arminius. (35) JIaroboduus appealed to Rome, as a friend and 
a l l y , but Tiberius refused, since Maroboduus had not helped him. 
Maroboduus was defeated. 
Tiberius' policy of keeping his enemies divided and 
weak was certainty successful, for i n A.D.18 Maroboduus was 
expelled by one of his own exi les , Catualda. (36) The former 
king f led across the Danube to seek asylum, and Tiberius allowed 
him to settle i n Ravenna, where he remained u n t i l his death i n 
A.D.36.. 
Catualda suffered the same fate, for he was driven out 
by the Hermunduri and given refuge at Forum J u l i i i n Narbonese 
Gaul. Tiberius thus had two kings whom he could use as a threat 
to troublesome German tr ibes . 
However the followers of these two. chieftains promoted 
an interesting decision by Tiberius: 
barbari utrumque comitati ne quietas lyovincias 
immixti turbarent, Danuvium u l t r a inter flumina Marum et 
Cusum locantur, dato rege Vannio gentis Quadorum. (37) 
For the f i r s t time, Rome settled a Germanic people outside the 
recognised l imits of Roman territory and imposed on them a king 
from another tr ibe . Thus Rome had a c l ient state on the north 
bank of the Danube to break the shock of possible invasions. 
Yet this was to be an isolated case. I n A.D.28, the 
F r i s i i , near the mouth of the Rhine, rebelled against excessive 
taxation and defeated the army of L . Apronius, the legate of 
Lower Germany (38), but Tiberius made no effort to reconquer them. 
Gaius, Tiberius' successor, took an active interest i n 
the Rhine armies, and was the f i r s t reigning emperor to campaign 
with his troops i n this region, but even so he seems to have had 
l i t t l e contact with Germans beyond the Rhine. Suetonius and 
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Cassius Dio (39) report that Gaius indulged i n fu t i l e campaigns 
which resulted i n the "capture" of some of his own troops; 
however Baladon (40) seems to have interpreted these events 
correctly. He suggests that Gaius hastened to the German 
provinces i n A.D.39 to fores ta l l a conspiracy by Gn. Cornelius 
Lentulus Gaetulicua, the legate of Upper Germany)and found the 
German legions had suffered from lax discipl ine. He appointed 
Servius Galba, the future emperor, as the new legate of Upper 
Germany, and together they organised military exercises (Suetonius' 
"games") which succeeded i n restoring a suitable standard of 
disc ipl ine . Obviously, Gaius was i n no position to dictate to 
German chieftains, but Galba was able to repel German raids into 
Gaul. (41) 
Thus in A.D.41 Claudius inherited eight well-organised 
legions on the Rhine, but his predecessors had followed a non-
aggressive policy. I t had been twenty-five years since a large 
Roman force had campaigned beyond the Rhine, and the German tribes 
on the l e f t bank, encouraged by Roman inact iv i ty , must have been 
growing i n strength. The fai lure of Tiberius to reconquer the 
F r i s i i i n A.D.28 probably encouraged contempt for Rome. This 
growing German power i n the north was encountered i n the f i r s t 
year of Claudius' reign; P . Gabinius Secundus, the governor of 
Lower Germany, met and defeated the Chauci, recapturing the las t 
eagle lost by Varus. (42) However, i n A.D.47, the Chauci caused 
further trouble, when, with the F r i s i i , they attacked Reman 
shipping at the mouth of the Rhine and raided the G a l l i c coast. 
Gn. Domitius Corbulo was sent as governor to Lower Germany, and, 
after restoring Roman discipline which had once more grown lax, 
brought warships up the Rhine, sank the German f leet and ejected 
their leader, Gannascus. (43) 
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^ Corbulo was eager to subdue the P r i s i i completely, 
but Claudius, unwilling to advance beyond Augustus1 frontier , 
forbade i t . Nevertheless the P r i s i i were settled on lands 
delimited by Corbulo, and they were given a senate, magistrates, 
and laws. Thus Claudius set up the f i r s t Roman cl ient state 
beyond the Rhine, but i t was not a kingdom, for Corbulo had 
driven out and k i l l e d Gannascus, and the F r i s i i were given a 
Roman constitution. Yet the withdrawal of Roman troops l e f t 
no Roman overseers to implement this settlement, and the 
disregard for Rome shown by the F r i s i i i n A.D.57 (44) would 
suggest that the success of this state as a c l ient was short-
l ived . 
Yet i n the same year (45), a more important c l ient 
state was set up i n Germany. According to Tacitus (46), the 
Cherusci, from the Weser watershed, asked Claudius to give them 
a king, since their nobility had been almost annihilated by c i v i l 
wars. Presumably the son of the great Arminius who had been 
brought up.at Ravenna (47) had died, and the only remaining member 
of the royal house was I t a l i c u s , Arminius1 nephew, whose father, 
Flavius , had fought with Germanicus against the Cherusci. (48) 
I ta l i cus himself had been brought up at Rome and was a Raman 
c i t i zen , and Claudius probably hoped to achieve by diplomacy what 
his predecessors had fa i led to do through force of arms. Certainly 
the emperor thought i t important that: ilium (Italicum) primum 
Romae ortum nec obsidem, sed civem ire externum ad imperium. (49) 
I f I t a l i c u s ' reign had been successful, an important 
advance i n Roman policy would have taken place, for the protection 
of the Rhine by means of c l ient kingdoms had never before been 
attempted. However the German love of freedom impelled an ant i -
Roman party to oppose I t a l i c u s . At some stage i n his ru le , he 
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defeated them i n battle, but he was later expelled, being restored 
only with the help of the Langobardi. Tacitus says that throughout 
his reign: (ita l i c u s ) per laeta per ad versa res Cheruscas 
adflictabat. (50) No more i s heard of I t a l i c u s , so presumably 
Claudius* policy was successful i n that for a time a pro-Roman 
king was established beyond the Rhine, and the Germans were divided 
amongst themselves. 
To the south of the Cherusci lived their enemies, the 
Chatti. Galba had checked them in A.D.41 (51) and they remained 
quiet for nine years, but in A.D.50, a marauding raid into Upper 
Germany was crushed by the governor, Publius Pomponius Secundus. (52) 
The Chatti, fearful of being trapped between the Ramans and the 
Cherusci, surrendered a few survivors from Varus 1 disaster, and 
sent envoys and hostages to Rome. By this act i t seems lik e l y that 
they acknowledged subservience to Rome, and may well have become a 
vassal state. Claudius seems to have built a line of client states 
to protect the northern frontier. 
Yet: i n the same year, a client king north of the Danube 
received a setback. Vannius, the king of the Suebi, Marcomanni and 
Quadi, who had been set up by Tiberius (53)» was attacked by Vibil i u s , 
the king of the Hermunduri, and his nephews, Vangio and Sido (54) $ 
Vannius appealed to Rome. I f the appeal had come: from a king i n 
Asia Minor, doubtless Claudius would have sent help, but the Roman 
policy of non-intervention i n inter-tribal wars was evident here. 
Just as Tiberius had refused aid to his 1 friend 1, Maroboduus, so 
Claudius declined to help Vannius. He merely offered a safe refuge 
to the chief, and ordered the governor of Pannonia to post troops 
along the Danube to protect the losers. Vannius was defeated and 
sought refuge with the Roman fleet on the Danube; he and his 
followers were granted land in Pannonia, and his nephews shared 
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his kingdom. The wisdom of Claudius 1 policy was then proved, 
for Tacitus adds that Vangio and Sido remained loyal to Some; 
the frontier had been preserved, and the vassals kept weak. 
Thus, when Nero succeeded Claudius, the Northern frontier 
from the Vfeser to the H7aag was protected by states loyal to Rome. 
The emperor's attention had been turned to Britain, and Nero showed 
no desire to advance into Germany. However the Romans were forced 
to take action i n Northern Germany, for i n A.D.57 the F r i s i i , who 
had been given a Raman constitution ten years before (55) j migrated 
to r i c h grazing ground between the rivers Lippe and Ems.(56) 
Obviously they regarded themselves as independent. However, 
L. Dubius Avitus, the governor of Lower Germany, ordered them to 
obtain Nero's permission for the move. Despite a deputation of 
their chiefs, Nero refused, and a small show of force persuaded them 
to return. 
The vacant land was then occupied by the vagrant 
Ampsivarii. (57) Despite reminders that they had always been 
a l l i e s of Rome, Avitus crossed the Rhine and drove the Invaders 
into the forests of Central Germany. Rome thus showed she was 
capable of maintaining a firm control on the east bank of the Rhine. 
Further south, two tribes who were vassals of Rome 
quarrelled i n A.D.58. A dispute over boundaries led to a war 
between the Chatti and the Hermunduri; the latter were victorious, 
and in honouring a vow they slaughtered many of the Chatti. (58) 
This cannot have been unpleasing to Nero, for the Chatti had always 
been warlike, and had only been subdued in A.D.50 after raiding 
Roman territory. (59) 
Once Augustus had abandoned any attempts to annex Germany, 
his Julio-Claudian successors followed his example. The valley of 
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the Rhine had became a frontier beyond which the barbarians 
should not'pass; the Rhine legions, when proper ly disciplined, 
were adequate to repel an invasion, and the fleet patrolling the 
river prevented the native tribes from crossing as they pleased (60), 
the only exception being the Hermunduri. (6l) Tiberius followed 
Augustus' advice to the letter, for, after G^rmanicus' campaigns, 
no Roman army crossed the Rhine, although Vannius ruled beyond the 
Danube under the aegis of Rome. Claudius was more imaginative i n 
that he protected the northern empire by a series of client states -
yet these differed from client kingdoms i n other parts of the empire, 
for they were not included i n the empire i t s e l f , but remained beyond 
the sphere of Roman arm3. His successor was content merely to 
maintain the situation he inherited. 
Besides the basic security of the river frontiers, there 
was another reason for forbidding advance: Syme says that "the 
responsibility and the glory of war could not be resigned to a 
subject, conquest must be achieved, i f at a l l , by or at least i n 
the presence of the emperor himself". (62) 
The Alpes Cottiae 
Among the high passes of the Alps, Augustus had l e f t only 
one area under a native ruler; that was the kingdom of Alpes Cottiae 
under Marcus Julius Cottius, who was o f f i c i a l l y praefectus of the 
region. Because of his loyalty, he was allowed to remain by 
Tiberius, who called on him to supply troops to stop a c i v i l 
disturbance i n Pollentia. (63) 
The next reference to Marcus Julius Cottius i s by Cassius 
Dio (64) under the year A.D.^4. and presumably this was the son of 
the man recognised by Augustus i n 9 B.C. The loyal service of both 
father and son was rewarded by Claudius when he allowed the latter 
to be given the royal t i t l e for the f i r s t time, an action the 
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equivalent of a peerage i n the New Year Honours L i s t , which made 
l i t t l e practical difference either to Cottius or to his subjects. 
However, during the reign of Nero, Cottius died, and: 
item Alpium defuncto Cottio i n provinciae formam redegit. (65) 
Presumably the inhabitants of the kingdom -were sufficiently ramanized 
to be included i n the empire on the death of their king. 
The date of this annexation i s uncertain, but Pliny (66) 
includes the Cottiani amongst those who had received the ius L a t i i . 
Nero granted this privilege to the Alpes llaritimae i n A.D.64 (67), 
and he probably extended i t to the Alpes Cottiae at the same time. 
This would suggest that Cottius died shortly before this date. 
The Danube 
I f the Julio-Claudian emperors felt unable to trust the 
tribes of Germany, even less did they trust the tribes beyond the 
Danube, north of the province of Moesia. No attempt was made to 
make clients of the Daci or Sarmatae. 
However, an inscription found at Tivoli. t e l l s of Roman 
contact with these tribes. (68) Tiberius Plautius Silvanus, a 
governor of Moesia during the latter half of Nero's reign, settled 
100,000 natives from the northern bank of the Danube within the 
province, on lands given to them by Rome. Thus eastern Europe had 
a barrier against invasion. But Silvanus proved Roman superiority 
beyond the Danube. I n A.D.62 he crushed a disturbance among the 
Sarmatae whilst half his army was serving in Armenia. He then 
received token of goodwill from the kings of the Daci, Bastarnae 
and R. oxo lard, and deposed the king of the Scythians i n the Crimea. 
Whether he advanced by land or sea i s unknown. 
Henderson (69) sees i n this advance an attempt to control 
the coast of the Black Sea. Certainly by A.D.63 Roman. arms must 
have reached as far as the Crimea, but there i s no evidence to 
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suggest a general advance north of the Danube. The alliances 
with the native tribes were in no way meant to establish permanent 
client kingdoms, for only the control of a coastal strip was feasible. 
Unfortunately the c i v i l war of A.D.68, enforcing the r e c a l l of legions, 
removed a l l subsequent traces of this policy begun by Silvanus. 
Thrace 
Thrace had been divided into two kingdoms by Augustus on 
the death of Rhoemetalces I . (70) This division had been 
geographically and po l i t i c a l l y obvious, for the cultivated and 
ci v i l i z e d south and east, with i t s Greek culture, contrasted with 
the t r i b a l , mountainous north and west, bordered by the military 
province of Moesia. 
Rhascuporis, the king of the wilder section, soon became 
ambitious, and shortly after the death of Augustus, began to 
encroach on the kingdom of Cotys. Tiberius, anxious to retain 
Augustus' settlement, ordered the kings to keep the peace and 
Cotys readily obeyed, but Rhascuporis treacherously captured his 
r i v a l and seized the whole of Thrace. Tiberius replied by sending 
a letter by Latinius Pandusa, the governor of Moesia, that 
Rhascuporis should surrender Cotys and present himself before the 
senate, but the king put Cotys to death. On the death of Pandusa, 
his successor, Fomponius Flaccus, a friend of Rhascuporis, enticed 
the Thracian into a Roman military post, where he was made a prisoner. 
Rhascuporis was tried before the senate, convicted on the evidence of 
Cotys' widow, Antonia Tryphaena, and banished to Alexandria, where he 
was k i l l e d whilst attempting to escape. (7l) 
Tiberius now had to reorganize Thrace. As always, he 
wanted to retain the Augustan settlement, so, i n A.D.19, he provided 
new monarchs for the two kingdoms. Rhascupris' son, Rhoemetalces I I , 
was given his father's kingdom, for he paterhis c o n s i l i i s adversatum 
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const abat (72) and an inscription found at Philippi verifies this 
appointment. (73) 
The southern kingdom was also given to the children of i t s 
former king, hut since they were not yet of age, a former praetor, 
T. Trebellenus Rufus, was appointed to act as regent. (72) 
Obviously Tiberius was unwilling to r i s k the exploitation of the 
young kings i n such a situation. 
Yet this settlement was odious to the tribes of northern 
Thrace whose love of freedom forced them to rebel against Roman rule. 
I n A.D.21, anger against Rufus and Rhoemetalces, who was cr i t i c i z e d 
for not avenging his people's wrongs, led to a revolt by the 
Coelaletae, the Odrysae and the D i i . These three tribes acted 
independently; one plundered i t s own neighbourhood, another crossed 
Mt. Haemus to seek support from outlying tribes, and the third 
besieged Rhoemetalces i n Philippopolis. Divided in this way, the 
rebels were easily crushed by Fublius Vellaeus, who was presumably 
Flaccus 1 successor i n Moesia, and Rhoemetalces regained his 
kingdom. (74) 
However, a more serious revolt took place four years 
later, when the Thracians objected to the system by which their 
auxiliaries would no longer be able to serve i n Thrace. Various 
mountain tribes sent envoys to Rome, threatening war, and C. Poppaeus 
Sabinus conciliated them un t i l he had prepared an army. This force, 
together with loyal native auxiliaries provided by Rhoemetalces, 
restored the authority of Rome and her client king. (75) 
After this date, we hear-pf no further trouble i n Thrace 
during the reign of Tiberius. Although he followed his predecessor's 
policy without question his diplomacy must be admired; he ejected 
Rhascuporis without a major war, and he took thought for the love of 
freedom of the native population, although two minor revolts did take 
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place. His choice of Rhoemetalces I I as king i s attested by 
the fact that the last twelve years of the latter's reign were 
peaceful. Yet Tiberius did not, so far as we know, replace the 
praetorian regent i n the southern kingdom, for we hear nothing 
of the restoration of Cotys' children. 
These three sons had been brought up i n Rome with 
Tiberius' nephew, Gaius, and when the latter received the principate, 
he found thrones for his friends. Rhoemetalces was the one who 
received his father's kingdom. (76) The fact that this Rhoemetalces 
was the son of Cotys i s shown by an inscription found at Maraneia (77) 
and he became the third Thracian king of that name. 
But what of Rhoemetalces I I , the king of the other part of 
Thrace, for the literary sources do not mention him after A.D.26? 
The date of his death i s unknown, but R. Neubauer (78) argues that 
there were two Rhoemetalces alive and ruling i n A.D.37/8. This view 
has been generally accepted. 
Gaius' imposition of Rhoemetalces I I I may have thrown the 
country into disorder, for Claudius soon found i t necessary to annex 
the kingdom. The date of this annexation l i e s between A.D .46 and 
48 (79), and the incidents which led up to i t are surrounded i n 
mystery, but i t appears that Rhoemetalces was murdered by his wife (80) 
thus throwing the kingdom into confusion. However, we do not even 
know whether the last surviving king was Rhoemetalces I I or 
Rhoemetalces I I I . (81) 
Yet the fact remains that Claudius annexed Thrace. 
Although the action was technically contrary to Augustus' 
recommendation not to extend the empire, i t was i n complete 
agreement with his example, as Augustus had annexed Galatia. (82) 
The royal house had been very loyal to the Empire, but the peoples 
of Thrace had been opposed to their kings, and internal s t r i f e had 
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necessitated the use of Roman troops on several occasions. 
Direct government made i t possible to control the tribes of 
Thrace by a unified command. 
Conclusion 
Augustus' firm belief that Roman power i n Europe had 
reached i t s most defensible boundaries was meant to provide a 
guide-line for his successors. Tiberius faithfully followed 
this maxim, and his caution resulted i n twenty years of stagnation 
along the Rhine and Danube. 
Seldom did the legions cross these great rivers, and the 
emperor seemed totally unconcerned i n anything beyond the provinces: 
even the Augustan settlement i n Thrace was imitated, as i f i t were 
a divine command. 
Gaius* principate was too short for a consistent policy 
to emerge, so i t remained to Claudius to use his imagination i n 
adapting Augustan policies as the situation demanded. I t was he 
who launched the successful invasion of Britain, and began to use 
client kings strategically, to protect his. armies' advances and he 
was the f i r s t to employ client kingdoms amongst the more c i v i l i z e d 
of the Germanic tribes, to protect the dubiously defensible water 
frontiers. Yet Claudius could also see that i n same cases more 
direct rule was necessary, as his action i n Thrace shows. Nero 
followed Claudius* example, but his experience with the Iceni and 
F r i s i i taught him not to rely on the client-ship of Germanic tribes; 
even a l l i e s remained outside the empire. 
On the whole, Augustus would have approved of the use 
which his descendants made of client-kings i n Europe. They were 
used mainly to protect the provinces and any rebellion was quickly 
crushed; distrust of northern European tribes did not allow the 
Julio-Claudian emperors to take the ris k of including i n the 
empire areas of indirect rule on the Northern frontier. 
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C H A P T E R IV 
The Client Kingdoms of Aaia Minor under 
Augustus' Julio-Claudian Successors 
The client kingdoms which Augustus fostered In Asia 
Minor were Important to Rome, for p o l i t i c a l , strategic and 
economic reasons* The sociological development of this region 
had enabled Augustus to trust the monarchs to keep their subjects 
relatively loyal to themselves and to Rome, and...thus the emperor 
was able to safeguard the trade routes and to provide a reliable 
system of buffer states to keep the menace of Farthia out of 
Roman spheres of influence. I t was clearly Impossible for 
Augustus' successors to extend these spheres of influence without 
committing themselves to a dangerous war with Parthia, therefore 
In this respect the empire i n Asia Minor remained s t a t i c under the 
Julio-Claudian emperors. 
However, with the annexation of Galatla i n 25 B.C., 
Augustus had shown that he was not unwilling to Increase direct 
rule from Rome, i f this could be achieved peacefully. This was 
a policy which his successors continued. Nevertheless, the 
security of the empire was always the f i r s t consideration during 
this period, and annexation was rarely attempted i f there was a 
r i s k of provoking Farthia. 
Lycia 
An example of this policy of annexation was Lycia; 
situated between Asia and Pamphylia i n the Bouth-western corner 
of Asia Minor, Lyoia had never been a client kingdom. The 
federation of c i t i e s which controlled the area had never given 
the Roman government any reason to interfere, therefore they were 
allowed to remain Independent, ( l ) 
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However, i n A.D.43, c i v i l s t r i f e broke out i n I y c i a , 
and Claudius, eager to gain glory for his new regime, ordered 
the d i s t r i c t to be included i n the empire and added i t to the 
prefecture of Famphylia. (2) 
Thus, although Claudius did not interfere with a 
kingdom, he showed his willingness to include hitherto free 
peoples i n the Roman jurisdiction* 
Cappadocia 
Yet, i n his annexation of I y c i a , Claudius had more than 
the example of Augustus to turn to, for Tiberius had not been slow 
to incorporate the kingdom of Cappadocia into the empire. 
I n A.D.17, Archelaus was summoned to Rome by Tiberius and 
tried before the senate. The charges may well have been false, and 
Archelaus was not convicted, but we do not know whether or not the 
t r i a l was concluded, for Arohelaus, worn out by the indignity of the 
t r i a l and by old-age, died i n Rome. There seems to be no other 
reason for this unfortunate episode than that offered by Tacitus: 
Tiberius wanted to annex Cappadocia because he bore a grudge against 
Arohelaus, who had ignored him whilst he was In Rhodes. (3) 
Yet the situation i n Armenia provides a olue to the 
eagerness of Tiberius to gain control of Cappadocia. The 
installation of a Parthian prince on the Armenian throne (4) must 
have led to anxiety for the safety of Asia Minor. Roman control 
of Cappadocia would enable Roman forces to guard the Melitene 
crossing of the Euphrates, and thus protect the main route from 
the Euphrates to the west coast of Asia Minor. The strategic 
importance of Cappadocia cannot have escaped Tiberius, and, on 
the death of Archelaus, he immediately reduced Cappadocia to the 
status of an imperial province under Quintus Veranius. (5) 
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C i l i c i a Tracheia. 
But not a l l of the kingdom of Archelaus was incorporated 
into the new province of Cappadocia. The old. king had been granted 
the coastal region of C i l i o i a Tracheia by Augustus (6), and Tiberius, 
perhaps feeling a twinge of conscience at his treatment of a king 
who had been loyal to Rome far more than f i f t y years, granted this 
region to Archelaus' son, also named Archelaus. Despite Tacitus' 
silence, an inscription found i n Athens proclaims: 6 6nyos 3aoUeus 
'ApxeXcJou inbv 'ApxeXctov (7) 
and Archelaus was certainly i n control i n A*D..$6> when he had to 
receive help from the governor of Syria to put down a rebellious 
tribe. (8) I t i s not unreasonable to suppose that Archelaus was 
given his kingdom on his father's death. 
Archelaus cannot long have outlived this rebellion, for 
i n the following year, A.D.37, C i l i c i a Traoheiu no longer remained 
as a separate kingdom. As soon as he received the purple, Gaius 
returned Commagene to i t s royal house, and added this part of 
C i l i c i a to the kingdom of Antiochus Epiphanes IV. (9) 
C i l i o i a Tracheia remained part of the kingdom of Commagene 
for over thirty years, but the rule of Antioohus was not without 
incident. I n A.D.52, the tribes who had oaused trouble for 
Archelaus again revolted, and Antiochus had to use bribery to 
subdue them. (10) 
But, beoause of i t s attachment to various other kingdoms, 
this region of C i l i c i a remained a client kingdom throughout the 
reigns of the Julio-Claudians. Perhaps the emperors were unwilling 
to burden their own troops with the responsibility of subduing the 
mountain tribes. 
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C i l i o i a Amanus. 
Augustus had restored C i l i c i a Amanus to i t s royal house 
i n 20 B.C. when Tarcondimotus was given the throne. At the 
beginning of Tiberius* reign, a certain Philopator was ruling i n 
Amanus ( l l ) but the relationship of this Philopator to Tarcondimotus 
i s uncertain (12); however he did not survive Augustus by long for 
i n A.D.17, Philopator died. (13) As i n Gappadocia, Tiberius 
seems to have used the death of the monarch as an opportunity for 
annexation. Tacitus records that the inhabitants were desirous 
of Roman rule, and Amanus was probably added to. the province of 
Syria, along with Commagene, whose king had died at about the 
same time* 
Cm ola : Olba. 
The d i s t r i c t around Olba i n C i l i c i a Tracheia was of 
religious importance, for, towards the end of Augustus1 reign, 
a high priest named AJax issued coins which proclaimed his 
over lordship of the neighbouring regions. (34) Those coins 
which are dated indicate that his priesthood began i n A.D.lO/11, 
and continued into the reign of Tiberius* 
The next coin we have Indicates that Marcus Antonius 
Polemo was high-priest of Olba and dynast of the neighbouring 
tribes (15), but i t i s not possible to date this coin accurately, 
for i t merely refers to the tenth year, which could be the tenth 
year of the. era which began i n AJ).10/ll, or of Polemo's own 
tenure of the office. The latter i s more l i k e l y , for the former 
would put his accession i n A.D. 19/20, during the reign of Tiberius, 
but no reference to this Polamo appears i n literature u n t i l the end 
of Claudius* reign, when Polemo married Berenice, the s i s t e r of 
Agrippa. (16) 
Polemo seems to have been raised to the kingship during 
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his rule, for Magie (17) identifies him with the M. Antoniua 
Polezno whose name appears, together with the t i t l e BacuAeiJs , on 
a coin with the head and t i t l e s of G-alba (18), and with the ruler 
of . Olba whose ooins are inscribed lloX£yu>vos &aoi\£wg. (19) 
Marcus Antoniua Polemo cannot be identified positively, 
but attempts have been made (20) to equate him with the son of 
Pythodoris of Pontus, who, as a private citizen, helped his mother 
to rule. (21) I f this equation is correct (22), i t seems likely 
that this Polemo was reluctant to rule Pontus as king, and so, 
when the son of Cotys of Thrace was granted the kingdom of Pontus 
in A.D.38, the son of Pythodoris accepted the priesthood of Olba. 
Obviously Some was willing to compensate her loyal servants. 
Pontus. 
At the death of Augustus, eastern Asia Minor from the 
Black Sea to the Mediterranean was united, for Pythodoris, the 
queen of Pontus, was married to Arohelaus, king of Cappadooia. 
The death of Archelaus and the subsequent annexation of his 
kingdom by Tiberius broke up this union, but the emperor allowed 
Pythodoris, now widowed for the second time, to continue her rule 
in her own kingdom. This she did with the aid of her elder son 
who remained a private citizen. (21) 
The silence of the authorities on the affairs of Pontus 
between A.D.17 and A.D.37 probably pays tribute to the wisdom of 
Pythodoris * government, yet we are given no clue to the date of 
the queen's death* Possibly she died before AJ>.J7 and the 
kingdom was taken over by her elder son, s t i l l i n a private 
capacity; possibly Rome assumed more direct control; but 
probably, like Oynamla before her (23) and Queen Victoria after 
her, Pythodoris continued to rule despite advancing years, and met 
her death i n the same year as Tiberius. 
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Therefore, on or shortly after his accession, Gaius 
found the throne of Pontus empty, Mat iToA^ycovi, T£ TOO noX^puivos 
u i e T rnv narpifav dipxrfv.. .exapiTaaxo. (2t|.) This Polemo was 
the son of Cotys of Thrace and Antonia Tryphaeiia (23), and 
therefore the grandson of Polemo I of Pontus, not his son as 
Cassias Dio states. He had been brought up in Home with the 
young emperor, and he and his two brothers were provided with 
kingdoms by their friend. 
Cassius Dio seems to have been unaware that there were 
two Polemos, for he claims that i n A.D.41 Claudius re allot ted the 
Bosporan kingdom, thus depriving Polemo of the Bosporan lands i n 
his kingdom, but gave him in compensation parts of Cilioia. (26) 
The province of Cappadocia divided Cilicia from Pontus, and i t is 
unlikely that Claudius would unite two regions so far apart under 
one monarch. In any case, Josephus clearly distinguishes between 
noA^ywv TT)V I I C J V T O U MexTniJ^vos dwaaxeCav (27) and IloXeyujv, K i X i x f a j 
6e ?iv O S T O S g a a i A e u s . (28) The king of Olba was Marcus Antonius 
Polemo (29) and the king of Pontus was Julius Polemo. (30) 
However, Cassius Dio raises a further problem, for he 
clearly states that Polemo was deprived of Bospoz'us i n A.D.41. 
Unfortunately there is no other evidence that Polemo I I ever ruled 
i n Bosporus; indeed there is evidence to the contrary, for a coin 
indicates that a certain Hithridates was king of Bosporus i n 
A.D.39 (31), during the period of Polemo's rule i n the same kingdom, 
according to Cassius Dio. Whether Polemo ever ruled Bosporus must 
be debatable. Perhaps he governed only a small part of the kingdom, 
whilst Mithridates retained control of the rest. He certainly 
received no more than limited recognition i n his Bosporan dominions, 
and Claudius found i t expedient to recognise the existing situation 
by making o f f i c i a l the rule of Mithridates. 
89. 
But once the limits of his kingdom 3n Pontus had teen 
defined, the reign of Polemo remained uneventful. Presumably 
he was a wise ruler who angered neither his master nor his 
subjects, and thus his reign was not thought to be worthy of 
mention by the literary authorities* He did, of course, issue 
coins, and these appear with his name on the obverse, and the 
head of Claudius, and later Nero, on the reverse. (32) 
The administration of Pontus under Polemo I I seems 
to have been trouble-free, but for no apparent reason, he suddenly 
abdicated his kingdom at some time during the reign of Nero (33) 
and the emperor turned Pontus into a province. Unfortunately 
Suetonius gives neither reason nor date for this extraordinary 
abdication, but from other evidence i t is possible to arrive at 
a satisfactory explanation. 
Henderson (3V) claims that Eutropius (35) dated the 
annexation to A.D.66, and that the revolt i n A.9.69 (36) was due 
to. annexation; i n fact, Eutropius puts no date to his statement 
that Polemo gave up Pontus, and Tacitus' words indicate that i n 
A.D.69 only Anicetus, the leader of the revolt, was angry at 
annexation because of his loss of position. No definite date 
can be assumed from this. 
The coins of the area give a much more realistic clue, 
as Henderson says. The coins of Trapezus, Neocaesarea and Zela 
start a new dating era i n A.D.63 (37), and such a change must 
have indicated a change i n government. 
I f Polemo abdicated in A.D.62 or 63, what possible 
reason could he have? Pontus possessed the port of Trapezus 
from which a military invasion of Armenia could be launched. 
In A.D.62/3, Rome was i n the middle of her c r i t i c a l struggle 
with Parthia over the clientship of Armenia, and military strength 
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was extremely important. Perhaps pressure was exerted on Polemo 
to cede his realm so that a Roman army could be stationed to the 
north-west of Armenia. 
But even i f Nero had no military motives, the annexation 
of Pontus after i t s king had l e f t was an obvious move. The people 
of Pontus had been ruled by client kings for over a century and had 
caused no trouble. The standard of romanlgation may have been high, 
and by A.D.63 most of the population was probably ready to come 
under the direct rule of Rome. 
Bosporus. 
The looser control by Rome of this kingdom north of Pontus 
meant that i t did not interest the historians and so our knowledge of 
i t is rather uncertain. Augustus seems to have insisted that i t s 
kings should recognise the over lordship of Rome,, but he did not 
interfere with the choice of monarch. Unfortunately the emperor 
seems to have insisted on his own head on coins of the area, and 
since the coinage is our main source of information, we must decipher 
the kings' monograms rather than read their actual names. 
From A.D.10, coins with the monogram l / \ appear (38), 
and from A.D.14 this becomes K M J - ' • Coins with this monogram 
have been found for the year A.D.37 (39), but whose monogram was it? 
The editor of BMC. Pontus, etc. claims that i t belonged to a king 
Rhascuporis. However, a deed of manumission found at Phanagoria 
proclaims that a king Aspurgus, a friend of Rome, was ruling i n 
A.D.16-17 (40), and a further inscription records that he was a 
friend of Caesar. (i*l) 
Therefore i t would appear that Aspurgus was the client 
king of Bosporus during the time of Tiberius, and E JI. Minns (42) 
suggests that the monogram J / ^ J " ^ is that of Aspurgus, and when 
Tiberius recognised him as a king (fftViXeos) i t became 
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But with the death of Aapurgua i n A.D.37 (43), the 
situation becomes rather confused. The literary authorities 
t e l l us that Mithridates was given the throne in preference to 
Polemo i n A.D .41 (44), but by A.D.49, Cotys I was king of 
Bosporus and Mithridates was trying to regain his throne. (45) 
However, I have already shown that Mithridates was i n control 
in A.D.39-40, and Polemo did not rule Bosporus. (46) Moreover, 
a coin of Cotys proves that he was on the throne in A.D.45/6 (47), 
therefore the probable dates of Mithridates3 rule are A.D.39/40 -
A.D.44/5. Who then ruled after Aspurgus but before Mithridates? 
There are several clues to this problem. Mithridates and Cotys 
were brothers (48), and the sons of Aspurgus (49); a coin 
appeared proclaiming Gepaepyris as queen (50), and another coin 
had BAEIAEfiE MI9PAAAT0Y on the obverse, and BAEIAIEEHE rEIIAIIIYPEfiE 
on the reverse. (31) Obviously Gepaepyris was either the wife 
or mother of Mithridates. But coins with the monogram 
survive, dated to A.D.37/8 - 39, and this monogram also appears 
on coins of Cotys. (52) Most of the letters of the queen's name 
can be picked out i n this monogram, and Rostovtzeff (55) claims 
that Gepaepyris was the wife of Aspurgos, who ruled alone after 
the death of her husband, and then with Mithridates, Aspurgus• 
elder son. This explanation succeeds i n making sense out of a 
very obscure situation. 
What of Rome's attitude to these monarchs? So far as 
we know, there was no interference with Aspurgus or Gepaepyris, 
but Mithridates set a precedent i n issuing coins which showed his 
name rather than a mere monogram. Minns (54) sees this as a sign 
of revolt against his position as a vassal, and this theory is 
supported by the fact that Cotys replaced his brother i n A.D .45. 
A Roman garrison under A. Didius Gallus seems to have supported 
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Cotys at the beginning of his reign. (55) This shows the 
importance of the Bosporan kingdom to Home, for Claudius obviously 
insisted on complete subservience to protect the shores of the 
Black Sea against the hostile tribes beyond. 
Gotys was ruling i n Bosporus i n A.D.45/6 (56), but the 
next extant coin of his reign was not issued u n t i l A.D.48/9, which 
probably reflects Mithridates' attempt to regain his throne. (45) 
Mithridates seized control of the Dandaridae and formed an alliance 
with Zorsines, chief of the Siraoi. Cotys, together with 
C. Julius A qui la, the equestrian i n command of the few Roman troops 
remaining i n Bosporus, organised his defence and entered i n alliance 
with Eunones of the Aorsi. They also received the assistance of 
the Legion VI Viotrix. (57) 
An advance by the Roman, Bosporan and Aorsan troops was 
very successful, i f ruthless, and Zorsines was quick to save his 
subjects by surrendering to the Romans. Mithridates then realized 
his position was hopeless and threw himself on the mercy of Eunones. 
He was escorted to Rome, but was treated mercifully by Claudius,on 
the plea of the Aorsan chief. 
Thus, by A.D.49, Cotys was in firm control of Bosporus, 
and the war with Mithridates had improved the defences of the 
empire, for Claudius had succeeded i n stabilizing Bosporus and 
entered alliances with the Aorsi, the Siraci and the Dandaridae. 
thus strengthening the barrier against the tribes of Scythia and 
against Parthia. 
Cotys remained as king of a peaceful Bosporus for the 
rest of Claudius' reign, and inscriptions show that he was just 
as secure during the early years of Nero's principate. (58) 
However, the last extant coin issued by Cotys is dated to A.D.62/3 
(59), and from this date nothing is known of Cotys. Hence i t is 
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impossible to say whether he died or was deprived of his throne, 
or continued to reign beyond A.D.63. 
Josephus reports that i n A.D.66 the peoples of the 
Bosporus region were kept i n order by three thousand hoplites and 
forty warships (60), but these could have been under the control 
of the Bosporan king Just as easily as a Raman governor. 
B.W. Henderson (6l) links this apparent total subjection 
by Cotys with the campaigns of Plautius Silvanus north of the 
Danube and the annexation of Pontus. He puts forward the theory 
that Nero intended to complete the subjugation of the coasts of 
the Black Sea; which seems to be the only way to explain the 
disappearance of a monarch in Bosporus. 
However, the revolt of Vindex destroyed any plans for 
the Black Sea, and very shortly after Nero's death a monarch issued 
coins i n Bosporus. An extant coin has the head of Vespasian on the 
obverse, that of Titus on the reverse, and bears the monogram 
(62) . This is the monogram of Rhescuporis which appears on other 
coins during the Flavian period, and the coin was issued i n A.D.68. 
Obviously, Rhescuporis was quick to. recognise the emperor who was 
proclaimed i n the east, and the Bosporan kingship regained i t s client 
relationship. 
This kingdom presents an interesting study into the 
attitudes of the Julio-Claudian emperors. Tiberius was prepared 
to let Aspurgus run his country without interference, but Gains 
was unwilling to settle the succession, and may even have granted 
the kingdom to Polemo with a wave of his hand. I t . was l e f t to 
Claudius to deal with the ambitious Mithridates, and he succeeded 
in strengthening the frontier. Nero may have wished to extend 
Roman control even further, but his plans were l e f t too late, and 
in A.D.68, Bosporus enjoyed the same relationship with Rome that 
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i t had in A.D.14. 
The Caucasus 
Antony had been the f i r s t Roman to form alliances with 
the tribes of the Caucasus region, and Augustus continued these 
friendly relations. Whilst Armenia remained the most important 
factor i n the struggle between Rome and Parthia, i t was v i t a l for 
the emperor to retain the friendship of the peoples to the north 
of Armenia. Yet Augustus allowed the alliance to remain passive; 
Tiberius was the f i r s t emperor to use the military support of the 
Caucasian tribes. 
In A.D.34* the death of Artaxias, king of Armenia, had 
resulted in Artabanus, the Parthian king, placing one of his own 
sons, Arsaces, on the Armenian throne. (63) 
Tiberius then began negotiations with Pharasmenes, the 
king of the Iberi, reconciled him with his brother, Mithridates, 
and offered the Armenian throne to Mithridates. The Iberians 
persuaded the Armenians to murder Arsaces, and a Caucasian army 
captured the capital, Artaxata; Artabanus replied by sending 
another son, Orodes to regain Armenia, and the two armies prepared 
for battle. However, Pharasmenes had strengthened his force by 
alliances with the Albani and some of the Sarmatae, and the Iberians 
defeated the Parthian army and drove Orodes out of Armenia. 
Artabanus himself then mobilized another army, but was dissuaded 
from attempting a further invasion of Armenia by the news that the 
governor of Syria, Lucius Vitellius,was preparing to cross the 
Euphrates. 
This was perhaps Tiberius' greatest diplomatic triumph. 
Without involving the Soman army i n any direct warfare, he regained 
the Armenian throne for a Roman client king, and strengthened Rome's 
allies i n the Caucasus. 
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Galas did not interfere with the Caucasian kingdoms 
although he did deprive Mithridates of his throne. (64) But 
Claudius was not slow to encourage Mithridates to regain Armenia, 
hacked by his brother's resources (65), and again i t was the army 
of Pharasmenes which gained control of the kingdom, although 
Claudius did send a Roman force to reduce the mountain fortresses. 
For the second time an emperor had secured the settlement 
of the Armenian question by a conflict between Iberia and Parthia, 
with Rome taking l i t t l e action. However this policy was soon to 
prove embarrassing, for i n A.D,51 Pharasmenes, anxious for his own 
position i n the face of his son's ambition, helped this son, 
Radamistus, to attack Mithridates i n Armenia. (66) Mithridates 
fled to the Roman auxiliary garrison at Goraeae; the commander, 
Caelius Pollio, attempted to deter Pharasmenes from his invasion 
and persuaded Mithridates to meet his attacker, but Radamistus 
treacherously put his uncle to death. Here Roman caution, prompted 
by the fear of provoking Parthia, overcame the desire to punish an 
over-presumptuous client king, for the governor of Syria, Ummidius 
Quadratus, refused to redress the crime committed by Pharasmenes and 
his son. He was probably unwilling to drive Radamistus into an 
alliance with Parthia. Radamistus was crowned by Julius Paelignus, 
the procurator of Cappadocia. Quadratus, feeling Roman pride had 
suffered a crippling blow, led a force into Armenia, but was recalled 
ne initium b e l l i adversus Parthos exiateret (67), and the crime of 
Pharasmenes and Radamistus was allowed to stand.. For the f i r s t time 
a client king had, by force of arms, overthrown the imperial policy 
i n Armenia, and Claudius, fearful of a Parthian war, had failed to 
act. 
But Claudius had at least retained the friendship of 
Pharasmenes, and this was to prove useful to Nero, for the Iberi 
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were ready to help i n further wars i n Armenia. In A.D.58, 
Pharasmenes prepared to help i n the Roman war against Tiridates 
and another Caucasian tribe, the Heniochi, overran remote areas 
of Armenia. (68) Pharasmenes1 reward was received i n A.D.61, 
when he was given the part of Armenia which bordered Iberia to 
add to his own kingdom. (69) 
But Nero could hot have been very happy with the security 
of his client kingdoms in the Caucasus. In A.D.35» the Albani had 
been allied to Pharasmenes (70), but at some time before A.D.51, the 
king of the Albani had been involved i n hostilities with the Iberi. (71) 
We do not know whether or not these differences were settled, but i t 
appears unlikely, for, towards the end of his reign, Nero began to 
assemble an expedition which was to advance to the Caucasus against 
the Albani (72) j unfortunately, the death of Noro and the ensuing 
o i v i l wars caused this expedition to be abandoned. However, i t is 
obvious that the security of the Roman client states had suffered a 
serious blow since the time of Augustus. Perhaps the policy of the 
Julio-Claudians made this inevitable: Tiberius had attempted to 
manage the affairs of the east by diplomacy rather than by force, for 
he had allowed Pharasmenes a free hand in Armenia. Gains had then 
withdrawn Roman interest i n Armenia, and Claudius had only regained 
i t by reviving Tiberius' policy. Pharasmenes' growing disregard 
for Rome was shown by his expulsion of the Rinnan-nominated king of 
Armenia, yet Claudius was unwilling to punish him. This refusal by 
Rome to show her military strength beyond her own provinces must have 
fostered contempt amongst states on the fringe of the empire. At 
last Nero realised that the Roman alliances i n the Caucasus needed 
to be enforced by an expedition, but he realized too late, and i n 
A.D.68, Roman influence i n the Caucasus was weaker than i t had been 
f i f t y years earlier. 
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Commagene. 
Augustus' policy of maintaining a client king on the 
boundary of Armenia in Commagene, although successful, was quickly 
reversed by Tiberius. 
In A.D.17, Antiochus Epiphanes I I I of Commagene died. (73) 
According to Tacitus, the majority wanted the kingdom to be turned 
into a province, but Josephus records that the masses wanted a monarch, 
and only the men of substance favoured provinciAlisation. (74) 
Tiberius, eager at this time to strengthen the border with Parthia, 
annexed Commagene and Joined i t to the province of Syria. (75) 
We do not know whether or not this arrangement was satisfactory, 
but i n A.D.37* Gaius reversed his predecessor's policy by giving the 
kingdom back to the son of Antiochus, who became Antiochus Epiphanes IV. 
(76) Gaius even enlarged the kingdom by adding the part of Cilioia 
previously ruled by Archelaus (77) , and gave Antioohus the profit which 
had accrued during the Roman administration of the province. 
Yet, despite this action, Gains' policy showed inconsistency, 
for he soon deprived Antioohus of his kingdom. Neither Josephus nor 
Cassius Dio give any reason for this, but i t must have been the result 
of the emperor's personal whim rather than any laisgovernment by 
Antiochus, for Claudius restored Commagene to i t s king as soon as 
his prinoipate began. (78) 
Antiochus remained a loyal vassal of Rome under Claudius. 
In A.D.49, C. Cassius Longinus took an army into Commagene to defend 
the Euphrates' crossing at Zeugma (79)» and in A.D.53 Antiochus 
himself was able to put down a revolt of the Cietae i n Cilicia 
Tracheia. (80) 
The military importance of Commagene was further demonstrated 
during Nero'8 reign; i n A.D.54, Antioohus was ordered to prepare an 
army to invade Armenia (81); this invasion was abandoned, but four 
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years later the king helped Corbulo's invasion "by attacking the 
regions nearest his border.(82). Antiochus received his reward 
i n A.D.61 when Nero granted him the part of Armenia which bordered 
Commagene (83), and he was s t i l l on his throne when Nero's reign 
ended. 
Clearly the Julio-Claudian attitude to Commagene was not 
consistent. Augustus had wanted to protect the provinces of Asia 
Minor with a series of client kingdoms of which Cammagene was one, 
but Tiberiu8, who i n other areas followed i n his predecessor's 
footsteps, annexed this kingdom only three years after Augustus1 
death. Perhaps Commagene had reached a high degree of 
rcmanization, but i n view of the fact that there was opposition 
to the annexation (84), this seems unlikely. Yet a mare reasonable 
explanation is not d i f f i c u l t to find. Antiochus Epiphanes IV, the 
son of the king who died in A.D.17, was deprived of his throne i n 
A.D.72 by Vespasian (85) and lived i n Rome for several years after 
this. Therefore he can have been l i t t l e more than an infant when 
his father died; i t is not surprising that Tiberius was unwilling 
to entrust the kingdom, which was i n such an important strategic 
position, to a child. Perhaps he joined Commagene to Syria so that 
the governor of the latter could act as regent i n the kingdom, just 
as a regent was appointed i n Thrace i n A.D.19 (86); i t seems a 
reasonable surmise that Tiberius may have forgotten to restore 
Cammagene to i t s rightful king when he came of age, and i t was l e f t 
to G-aius to correct this oversight when he came to power i n A.D.38. 
Yet why did Gaius immediately take the kingdom away from 
Antiochus? Perhaps this was the whim of a madman, but perhaps 
Antiochus needed a l i t t l e instruction i n the administration of his 
realm. Certainly after his restoration by Claudius, the king seems 
to have ruled well and his loyalty to Rome was unquestioned. The 
increase of his kingdom by Nero testifies to the gratefulness of 
the Soman government. 
Sophene 
Across the Euphrates, east of Commagene, was the district 
of Sophene. Originally i t formed part of Armenia, but Pompey had 
taken i t from Tigranes i n 66 B.C. (87), and Sophene appears to have 
been under Roman influence from that time; i t was added to the 
kingdom of Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia (88), and possibly i t formed 
part of the province of Cappadooia under the annexation of A.D. 17. 
However, Nero saw the necessity of a separate command i n 
this region to guard the Zsoghli crossing of the Euphrates, and the 
route leading across the Taurus mountains into Mesopotamia. 
Therefore, in A.D.54> (Nero) regionem Sophenen Sohaemo cum inaignibus 
regis mandat (89). The emperor thus Installed a client king i n a 
kingdom which was of the greatest strategic importance, for Sohaemus 
could guard the main routes eastwards. Nero realized that a client 
king i n this position would be less provocative than a Roman military 
governor, yet could safeguard Rome's interests. 
Sophene's strategic importance is seen during the war with 
Vologaeses, later i n Nero's reign, for an inscription shows that 
Rome quartered a legion in this client kingdom, even though this was 
not normal practice. (90) 
Armenia Minor 
Augustus1 attempt to form an extensive client state i n 
Asia Minor had united Armenia Minor with Cappadocia under Arohelaus 
in 20 B.C.. So, in A.D.17, Armenia Minor was included i n the new 
Roman province of Cappadocia. (91) 
Yet, as i n Commagene, Gaius reversed the policy of Tiberius, 
for, i n A.D.38, Armenia Minor became a client kingdom under Cotys, 
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the son of Cotys of Thrace. (92) Perhaps Gaius was merely 
providing a kingdom for his friend, out i n view of his policy 
i n Armenia Mai or (93)* he seems to have wanted to reduce Roman 
commitments i n the east, and guarded the frontier by reverting 
to client states. 
Claudius allowed Cotys to remain i n his kingdom, but, 
in A.D.47, the king incurred imperial displeasure, for, whilst 
Iberian forces were struggling to place Mithridates on the throne 
of Armenia Maior, they were hindered by Cotys, to whom some of the 
Armenian leaders had turned. He seems to have wanted to help the 
anti-Roman party, and i t took a letter from Claudius to pull him 
back into line. (94) 
Claudius appears to have persevered with Cotys, but as 
soon as Nero came to power, a change took place i n Armenia Minor. 
Presumably Cotys died, for we do not hear of his expulsion, but i t 
is perhaps significant that a new royal house was instituted. Nero, 
eager to ensure the loyalty of the kingdom, gave i t to Aristobulus, 
the son of Herod of Chalcis. (93) The king was expected to help 
i n the proposed campaign against Armenia, and received the reward 
fir his loyalty when, i n A.D.61, his kingdom was increased by the 
addition of the neighbouring portion of Armenia Maior. (96) 
The importance of Armenia Minor i n Reman policy under the 
Julio-Claudians is obvious. Tiberius was unwilling to reverse 
Augustus1 policy, and so the kingdom was included i n the large Raman 
province of Cappadocia, but Gaius preferred to bound Armenia Maior 
with client kingdoms, so Cotys was installed. Claudius needed to 
remind the king that Rome was his overlord, and INero preferred to 
give the kingdom to a more trustworthy friend. Since Parthian 
influence was so great i n Armenia Maior during this period, Gaius, 
Claudius and Nero had to maintain a loyal king i n Armenia Minor, 
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and i n this at least they were successful. 
Armenia Malar. 
Augustus' greatest problem i n safeguarding the eastern 
empire had always been Armenia Mai or. whenever the king of Parthia 
had faced trouble within his own empire, Rome had been able to impose 
the monarch of her choice on the Armenian throne, but any restoration 
of Parthian unity enabled the Great King to counteract this Roman 
domination with the threat of military confrontation. Yet Augustus' 
policy was the only one which would protect the provinces of Asia 
Minor without the need for a conquest of Par this., therefore his 
successors found i t necessary to attempt to maintain this balance 
of power. 
Unfortunately, the last years of Augustus' reign had seen 
a rise i n the power of Parthia, and so Tiberius inherited a 
situation which demanded his immediate attention. Vonones had been 
sent by Augustus, i n A.D.10, to take over the Parthian throne (97), 
but he had been expelled and seized instead the throne of Armenia; 
yet Augustus, realizing that the recognition of Vonones i n Armenia 
would record his failure i n Parthia, refused to sanction Vonones' 
rule. Even after Augustus' death, Tiberius refused to grant the 
throne to Vonones; his reasons were Vonones• cowardice and the 
threat of war from Parthia. (98) Without Roman support, Vonones' 
throne was Insecure, and in A.D.16 he fled to Syria. Whether he 
surrendered himself to Creticus Silanus the governor of Syria (99) 
or was summoned (100) is uncertain, but he seems to have been well 
treated because of his Roman education. 
His abdication l e f t the throne of Armenia vacant, and 
Josephus says that the Parthian king, Artabanus, gave the kingdom 
to one of his sons, Or odes. (lOl) But Josephus is the only 
authority to mention this, and i t seems likely that the historian 
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placed this sentence out of context. I t should refer to A.D.36, 
when Artabanus sent Orodes to avenge Arsaces. (102) Presumably 
the Armenian throne remained vacant after the abdication of Vonones. 
Tiberius could not have been happy with this situation, and 
so Germanicus was given maiua imperium for the eastern provinces i n 
A.D.18, i n order to reach a settlement i n Armenia. A highly satisfactory 
solution was found, for the Armenians had decided that a certain Zeno, 
the son of Polemo I and Pythodoris of Pontus, should be their next king. 
Germanicus travelled to Artaxata and crowned Zeno, amid great pomp 
which was designed to deter Artabanus from interfering. The new king 
further pleased his subjects by taking the Armenian name of Artaxiaa.(103) 
The problem was thus ideally solved from a Roman point of view, for a 
pro-Roman king had been installed who was popular with his subjects, 
and he had received the royal diadem from the hands of the chosen heir 
of the Roman empire, Just as Tiberius himself had crowned Tigranes i n 
20 B.C., and Gaius crowned Ariobarzanes in A.D.I. (104) Zeno's 
links with Rome were remembered with pride by the peoples of Asia 
Minor, for an inscription from Smyrna recalls his descent from Antony 
(105), and Armenian coins depict his investiture by Germanicus. (106) 
Tiberius seemed to have found the solution to the Armenian 
question, for Zeno's reign proved to be peaceful, and for fifteen 
years the Roman and Parthian empires seemed to have forgotten their 
disputes. Yet, with the death of Zeno i n A.D.34-* the old quarrel 
was resurrected. By this time; Artabanus had forgotten his fear 
of Germanicus and had begun to despise the diplomacy of Tiberius as 
the policy of an old and unwarUke man. Therefore, as soon as the 
Armenian throne became vacant, he placed one of his sons, Arsaces, 
on i t . (107) 
Tiberius called upon his diplomacy again, for without 
involving the Roman army i n any serious warfare, he succeeded i n 
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giving the Armenian throne to Mithridatea, the brother of the 
Iberian king (108), despite Artabanus' attempt!} to aid Arsaces, 
and, on the latter's death, to replace him with Orodes. At the 
same time, the emperor almost succeeded i n establishing a Roman 
client king on the Parthian throne. (109) Tiberius' policy, 
which followed that of Augustus, was more successful than that of 
his i l l u s t r i o u s predecessor, for his s k i l l i n placing both Zeno 
and Mithridates on the Armenian throne, whilst allaying any threat 
from Artabanus, was so adept that not a blow was struck by a Roman 
legionary. 
Yet, despite i t s success, Tiberius' policy was reversed 
by Gaius; Mithridates was recalled to Rome, deprived of his kingdom 
and imprisoned. (110) Gaius did not appoint a successor, so from 
the r e c a l l of Mithridates to his recovery of the throne i n A.D.43, 
Armenia was completely abandoned by Rome. Why did Gaius adopt a 
policy ao contrary to that of his predecessors? As Balsdon points 
out (111), there were three possible policies open to the Ramans. 
They could annex Armenia to hold a defensible frontier i n Mesopotamia; 
they could nominate the Armenian monarchs and thus hold the suzerainty; 
or they could abandon Armenia to the Parthians. 
Gaius realised that Rome was unable to follow the f i r s t 
course, for her military resources were too small; the second course 
had been followed by Augustus and Tiberius, and the constant trouble 
proved i t s inadequacy. Gaius had seen that as soon as Parthia was 
strong enough to place a usurper on the Armenian throne, Rome was 
forced to act, and he decided that to abandon Armenia would be to 
lose l i t t l e of practical value; by reinstating Armenia Minor and 
Commagene as client kingdoms, the system of buffer states surrounding 
Armenia would be sufficient to check Parthian advances beyond the 
Euphrates. Certainly, for a few years, Gaius* policy was successful 
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for the abandonment of Armenia did not result i n an immediate 
invasion by Parthia. 
However, Claudius was not prepared to continue Gaius* 
policy, for he realized that Roman withdrawal beyond the Euphrates 
would encourage Parthian aspirations to more valuable parts of the 
empire, and this withdrawal, which appeared to be an act of weakness, 
would have a bad effect on the morale of his government. 
Therefore Claudius sent Mithridates to resume his throne, 
helped once more by his brother (112), but he was not able to effect 
this policy by diplomacy alone. The resistance which Mithridates 
met suggests that the Armenians had been under Parthian influence, 
and Claudius was obliged to send i n Roman troops. The Roman garrison 
at Gorneae, firmly established by A.D.51 (113)* was probably established 
at this time. Claudius, i n reverting to Augustus' policy, had 
succeeded i n re-establishing the balance of power, but at the cost 
of direct Roman mili t a r y intervention. 
Yet the failure of Tiberius' and Claudius1 policy was not 
caused by Parthia. The freedom which they had allowed Pharaamenes 
of Iberia i n in s t a l l i n g his brother on the Armenian throne rebounded 
on Rome i n A.D.51, when Pharasmenes replaced Mithridates with his own 
son Radamistus. (134) Claudius* refusal to allow Ummidius Quadratus 
to uphold Roman pride by opposing the usurpation was to have serious 
consequences,for Vologaeses, who was well established on the Parthian 
throne i n A.D.52, saw that the Armenians were unhappy with their king 
and that Rome was not prepared to intervene. Therefore he invaded 
Armenia and expelled Radamistus; a severe winter and lack of food 
forced him to withdraw i n turn, but Radamistun1 cruelty drove the 
Armenians to revolt. Radamistus was expelled again (115) > and 
Vologaeses was able to i n s t a l l his brother, Tiridates, as king, so 
Armenia became a vassal state of Parthia. 
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So Claudius* policy i n Armenia proved a dismal f a i l u r e . 
He had t r i e d to follow the example of Augustus and Tiberius by 
relying on diplomacy rather than force, but his undue reliance on 
vassal-states and his unwillingness to oppose Parthian advances by 
a legionary campaign resulted i n the loss of Armenia and the growth 
of the threat from Parthia. 
Thus Nero inherited a grave situation i n Armenia, just as 
Claudius had done, for, i n A.D.54, the Parthian party was firmly i n 
control of Armenia, and the way was open for an invasion of Roman 
provinces. Nero was anxious to alleviate the situation, and sent 
Cn. Dcmitius Corbulo, a most impressive strategist, to command an 
army against Armenia, but when Corbulo arrived i n the east i n A.D.55, 
he found his troops t o t a l l y u n f i t for war. Luckily, Vologaeses had 
to face a revolt i n Hyrcania, so he too had to withdraw from Armenia, 
and was prepared t o give hostages to Rome. Thus the threat of a 
Parthian advance was alleviated. (116) 
For two and a half years, Corbulo let Tiridates reign 
undisturbed, whilst he retrained his Roman troops who were no longer 
an ef f i c i e n t fighting force after their long period of i n a c t i v i t y , 
and Vologaeses was too involved i n Parthia to be a menace. But i n 
the winter of A.D.57/8, Corbulo advanced into Armenia, hardened his 
army i n the mountains, and i n the spring of A.D.58, marched on 
Tiridates, aided by Antiochus of Commagene and Pharasmenes of Iberia. 
When Tiridates asked for peace, Corbulo disclosed Nero's terms, that 
Tiridates must receive his crown from Nero; obviously the emperor was 
prepared to sacrifice actual for nominal suzerainty. 
However, Tiridates rejected these terms, so i n the following 
year Corbulo advanced on Artaxata. Tiridates f l e d , and the capital 
was taken without a f i g h t ; yet Corbulo was unwilling to withdraw i n 
view of Tiridates' continued freedom and the possibility of a Parthian 
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attack from the south. The general decided to destroy Artaxata 
and inarch on to Tigranocerta. (117) This inarch was extremely 
hazardous, and resulted i n abandoning lines of communication, but 
Corbulo's success j u s t i f i e d the risks he had taken; by the end of 
A.D.59* Corbulo controlled Tigranocerta, and thus he could deny 
access to Armenia from Parthia. I n A.D.60, Tiridates made an 
incursion into Armenia from Media, but Corbulo drove him out and 
began to harry a l l Armenians who were hostile to Rome. By this 
time, the annexation of Armenia was an established fact, but Nero 
realized that to maintain this annexation would require a large 
permanent force, therefore he decided to return to the Augustan 
policy of actual suzerainty. Therefore, i n the summer of A.D.60, 
Tigranes, a grandson of Archelaus of Gappadocia, arrived i n Armenia, 
to be installed as king by Corbulo. The general l e f t Tigranes with 
five thousand men, and further strengthened Armenia by enlarging the 
client kingdoms on i t s borders. Corbulo then retired to Syria to 
take up a new governorship. Thus by the end of A.D.60, Rome was i n 
a strong position, with their nominee on the .Armenian throne and a 
strong strategic advantage. There seemed to be no reason why an 
Augustan policy should not work at l a s t . (118) 
Vologaeses1 empire was free from trouble by the beginning 
of A.D.61, but the Parthian king was unwilling to invade Armenia, 
and thus provoke Rome; i f Tigranes had been content to rule peacefully, 
the settlement might have been permanent. But Tigranes wanted 
compensation for the t e r r i t o r y he had lost to client kings on the 
north and west, so he attacked Media Adiabene. Monobazus, the 
satrap of Media, threatened to ally with Rome i f he did not receive 
help, so Vologaeses was. compelled to act: he sent Monaeses and 
Tiridates into Armenia whilst he himself threatened Syria. Corbulo 
replied by dispatching two legions into Armenia, but the rest of the 
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army bad to remain i n Syria, I n reply to Corbulo's request that 
Armenia be given a separate commander, Nero appointed Caesennius Paetus 
to attack from Cappadocia, but when the campaigning season ended, 
Corbulo and Vologaeses agreed to withdraw a l l troops from Armenia. 
Thus Tigranes* action had been costly to Rome, for not only was the 
king ejected, but Armenia was also l e f t undefended. Once again 
Nero's policy had fail e d ; therefore he decided on the course of 
action, and ordered Paetus to annex Armenia. At the beginning of 
A.D.62, Paetus immediately advanced into Armenia, without waiting for 
reinforcements or building a secure base camp, aiming to reach 
Tigranocerta. But once again an invasion was halted by the approach 
of winter and the lack of supplies, and Paetus scurried back to Rhandeia. 
Meanwhile, Vologaeses had failed to force the Euphrates' crossing at 
Zeugma, and turned his attention to Armenia. Paetus sent a plea for 
help to Corbulo, but Vologaeses, seizing oh Paetus' error i n dividing 
his force, defeated half his army and besieged Rhandeia. Corbulo set 
out to help Paetus, but when he reached the Euphrates, remnants of 
Paetus * army straggled into his camp, for Rhandeia had surrendered. 
Once again Corbulo had to negotiate with Vologaeses, and for the 
second time both.armies evacuated Armenia. (119) Therefore, i n 
A.D.62, Armenia was i n the same position as i n the previous winter, 
but Nero's policy of annexation had been crushed. 
Yet Vologaeses had agreed to send envoys to Rome, and i n 
A.D.63 these arrived, announcing Vologaeses' intention to allow 
Tiridates to inaugurate his rule before the Roman army and statues 
of the emperor. This tigmlwai suzerainty had been Nero's earliest 
policy, but the defeat of Paetus had been more than Roman pride could 
endure, and Nero rejected the terms. Paetus was recalled and dismissed, 
and Corbulo was given the command of a l l the forces i n the east; this 
great command was p o l i t i c a l l y dangerous for the emperor, and his trust 
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i n Corbulo's loyalty was a great compliment to the general* 
Corbulo took four legions into Armenia, and so great 
was the fear he i n s t i l l e d into the Parthian army that Tiridates 
and Vologaeses immediately sued for peace. Corbulo chose Rhandeia 
as the place of meeting, and amid great ceremory, Tiridates l a i d 
his diadem before an effigy of Nero, to receive i t again i n Rome. (120) 
Tiridates set out for Rome i n A.D.65, and saluted Nero 
as master at Naples. I n Rome, the diadem was placed on his head 
by the emperor himself during a magnificent ceremony (121), and the 
problem of Armenia came to a peaceful conclusion for a time. This 
f i n a l settlement was a compromise by both sides, for Nero had to give 
up his designs of actual suzerainty, and Vologaeses had to concede to 
the granting of the throne by the emperor of Rome, but i t was the only 
policy which could bring a lasting peace. 
This peace would not have satisfied Augustus, for the 
Augustan policy was one of actual suzerainty, which did not include 
support for the brother of a Parthian monarch. However Augustus 
could only steer his policy successfully i f Parthia was preoccupied. 
Tiberius steered the same course, and was more successful than his 
predecessor, for he did not embroil Raman troops i n petty warfare, 
and his main protege, Zeno, died a natural death. However i t was 
at his death that Tiberius' policy was seen to f a i l , for i t seemed 
the installation of each client king would provoke counteraction 
from Parthia. Gains' novel policy of withdrawal was successful 
i n that peace was achieved, but i f i t had continued, Parthian arms 
would probably have advanced well into Roman t e r r i t o r y . I t was 
for this reason that Claudius reverted to Augustus' policy. 
Unfortunately, Parthia was stronger than she had been twenty years 
before, and was soon able to oppose a pro-Roman king i n Armenia. 
Therefore the efforts of Claudius resulted i n the loss of Armenia. 
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Nero realized the failings of actual suzerainty, and t r i e d other 
policies, with no success. By A.D.63, Rome was facing an empire 
almost as strong as her own, and the only conceivable outoome, 
apart from a military confrontation, was a compromise. This 
compromise enabled Nero to succeed where his predecessors had f a i l e d , 
for without losing prestige he established the only settlement which 
could bring lasting peace and foster friendship between Rome and 
Parthia. The extent of that friendship between the emperors was 
so great that at Nero's death, Vologaeses sent a l e t t e r to the senate, 
begging them to honour the memory of the former emperor. (122) 
Parthia. 
Augustus had known that his attempts to produce a peaceful 
settlement i n Armenia depended largely on the friendship of the 
Parthiaiking, and therefore he always attempted to hold an advantage 
over the King of Kings, either by inst a l l i n g him with a Roman army, 
or by holding his sons as hostage. But at the end of his reign this 
policy had collapsed, when the romanized Vonones had been driven out, 
and Artabanua I I I had seized the Parthian throne. (I2jj) 
Tiberius also attempted to prove his ascendency over the 
Parthian king. I n A.D.18, Germanicus1 settlement i n Armenia was 
successful because Artabanus feared Rome's military power, and this 
fear restrained the Parthian during Zeno's reign, but by A.D.35* 
Artabanus had grown more arrogant, and cm the death of Zeno, he 
placed his son, Are aces, on the throne of Armenia. Tiberius then 
remembered Augustus' policy. 
He planned to give Armenia to Mithridates (124), but he 
also listened to the request of some Parthian nobles-who wanted 
Phraates, the son of Phraates IV, to be sent from Rome to be their 
king. Tiberius saw a chance to undermine Artabanus, and readily 
complied. (125) Phraates died i n Syria, so another Parthian 
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prince, Tiridates, was sent out. 
Tiridates was escorted by Lucius V i t e l l i n e , the governor 
of Syria, to the Euphrates, and prepared to cross into Mesopotamia 
(126); to meet this threat, Artabanus had to abandon his incursion 
of Armenia. This failure led many Fart h i ana to support Tiridates, 
and Artabanus fled his throne i n despair. Tiridates and V i t e l l i n e 
advanced, and when they were met by Parthian supporters, V i t e l l i n e 
retired to Syria, confident that he had supplied a pro-Roman king 
to Parthia. 
But the rule of Tiridates was to be short-lived. He was 
crowned at Ctesiphon by the military commander-in-chief, the Surena, 
but a r i v a l faction turned again to Artabanus, and marched to meet 
the new king. Tiridates decided to r e t i r e to Mesopotamia, but the 
mass desertion of his forces compelled him to flee to the safety of 
Syria. (127) Thus Tiberius' attempt to impose a romanized king on 
the Parthian Empire f a i l e d , just as Augustus had f a i l e d with Vonones 
The emperor realized the danger of sending a further expedition, and 
made no opposition to the restoration of Artabnus. 
Yet the dangers which the Parthian king had overcome had 
shown him how perilous opposition to Rome could be. He decided to 
make peace with Ramie and i n A.D.40 he met V i t e l l i n e on a bridge over 
the Euphrates, did obeisance to the images of Augustus and Gaius, 
and undertook to send his son, Darius, as a hostage to Rome. (128) 
The friendly relations between Gaius and Artabanus, due 
i n part to the respect f e l t i n Parthia for a son of Germanious and 
also to the internal uncertainty i n the Parthian empire, were soon 
lo s t , for, by A.D.43, Artabanus had been succeeded by his three sons 
Inevitably these sons fought for the throne. (129) After several 
years, Gotarzes emerged as the sole ruler, and the faction opposed 
to him appealed to Claudius, asking for Meherdates, a son of the 
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former king, vononea, to be sent from Rome. Claudius regarded 
this petition as an acknowledgement of Roman suzerainty, and, 
mindful of the precedents set by Augustus and Tiberius, ordered 
C. Cassius Longinus, the governor of Syria, to escort Meherdates 
to the Euphrates. Once beyond the reach of Roman forces, Meherdates 
met with no success; he was defeated by Gotarnes, and instead of 
gaining the throne lost his ears. (l£0) Thus Claudius achieved 
no more success i n an attempt to i n s t a l l a king i n Parthia than Augustus 
had with Vonones, or Tiberius with Tiridatea. A l l three emperors had 
responded to a plea from a Parthian faction, and a l l three pretenders 
had been driven out i n a very short time. • 
Claudius made no further attempt to interfere i n Parthia. 
Gotarees was succeeded by Vonones I I , who was followed by his son 
Vologaeses I . (131) The wisdom of Vologaeses was apparent when 
he began by conciliating, not murdering, his brothers; Pacorus 
became king of Media, and Tirldates was to be placed i n Armenia. (132) 
The impact he made on Roman policy, and his eventual friendship with 
Nero have already been discussed. (133) 
The Julio-Claudian emperors seem to have been obsessed with 
a desire to humiliate Parthia. Augustus* attempts to make Parthia 
a client state met with l i t t l e success, especially i n the later years 
of his reign, but s t i l l Tiberius and Claudius t r i e d to follow his 
example. Gains was the f i r s t to establish a working alliance with 
Parthia, but i t was l e f t for Nero to achieve a sensible arrangement, 
for only an alliance based on the equality of the two empires could 
be successful. 
Ceylon. 
I t i s perhaps worth noting that, during the reign of 
Claudius (134)j the king of Ceylon sent four envoys to Rome. (133) 
This embassy cannot be regarded as a basis for elientship, but 
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i t undoubtedly benefitted Roman trade. 
Conclusion. 
At the beginning of the empire, the Armenian question was 
the major problem for the Roman government. Augustus had attempted 
to solve i t by surrounding Armenia with client kingdoms which were 
to act as buffer states against possible Parthian invasions. 
However his willingness to admit r.omanized peoples into the empire 
i s shown by his annexation of Galatia. 
This policy formed the basis for the succeeding four 
emperors. Tiberius, as always, attempted to follow Augustus' advice 
to the l e t t e r , and his treatment of Armenia was successful. Yet 
direct Reman government advanced substantially during his reign with 
the annexation of Cappadocia, Ccmmagene and C i l i c i a AmanuB. But i n 
following Augustus' lead i n one way, he had disregarded i t i n another, 
fo r the western l i m i t s of Armenia were now bounded by Roman provinces, 
i.e. by Commagene, and by Sophene and Armenia Minor which formed part 
of the province of Cappadocia. 
On the other hand, G-aius has been accused of reverting to 
the policy of Antony i n re-establishing client kingdoms. I n fact, 
he seems to have kept to Augustan policy with one exception. His 
answer to the troublesome problem of Armenia was to abandon i t ; as 
Tiberius had extended the provinces right up to the Euphrates, Gains 
wanted to restore some client kingdoms i f any buffer states were to 
exist. Therefore Commagene and Armenia Minor were given back to 
kings, and a new ruler was established i n Pontus. I t must also be 
remembered that Tiberius had promised a kingdom to the three Thraoian 
princes; G-aius merely honoured that promise* Rome certainly seems 
to have lost nothing by Gains' policy, f or she experienced no trouble 
from these kingdoms. 
Yet Claudius did revoke one Gaian decision: he restored 
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Roman Influence i n Armenia. I n th i s and i n every other case 
Claudius followed Augustus* lead, and he allowed even more caution 
than Tiberius, for only one annexation i s recorded during his reign, 
and that concerned a tiny confederation of c i t i e s . Claudius' rale 
brought only stagnation to Asia Minor, and his unwillingness to use 
force resulted i n the loss of Roman influence i n Armenia. (136) 
However Nero and his advisers restored the prestige lost 
by Claudius. Nero realized the failings of tlie Augustan policy i n 
Armenia, and eventually found the correct solution. This settlement 
allowed him to continue with the annexation of a.more rcmanized area, 
for the large kingdom of Pontus was brought into the empire during 
the l a t t e r part of his reign. 
I t i s significant that the Julio-Claudians were aware of 
the i r military capabilities, for no attempt was made to interfere 
with the kingdoms on the fringe of Roman influence; Iberia and 
Bosporus were allowed a large degree of freedom, and Parthia was not 
directly opposed. 
Undoubtedly the major influence on the Julao-Claudian 
attitude to the client kings of Asia Minor was the Great King of 
the Parthian empire. I t i s unfortunate that a friendly relationship 
was only established for the last three years of the dynasty. 
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CHAPTER V 
The Syrian and African frontiers 
under Auguatus' Julio-Glaudian anoceaaora. 
Augustus had kept a careful watofc OIL the kingdoms on 
the aouth-eaatern fringe of the Roman empire* He preferred to 
allow the Semitic and Arabian peoples to ho governed by their own 
leaders, but the legions stationed i n Syria were ready to intervene 
i f any serious trouble arose* The only Reman province i n Asia to 
the south of Syria was Judaea, which Augustus had annexed i n A.D.6, 
and i t was surrounded by tetrarchies under foreign kings. Yet, 
despite Augustus' benevolence, the rivalries of the Semitic peoples 
and their leaders were a constant source of trouble to his successors. 
Judaea. 
Although Augustus had annexed the troublesome regions of 
Idumaea, Samaria and Judaea, and formed them into the province of 
Judaea, other parts of Herod the Great's kingdom were not annexed: 
Herod Antipas reigned as tetr arch of Galilee and Feraea, and his 
brother Philip was given the tetrarohy east of Galilee which 
included Gaulanitis, Trachonitis and parts of Zturaea. ( l ) 
Tiberius was happy to keep this arrangement, and Philip 
and Antipas appear t o have ruled well, i n that their realms required 
no Roman intervention. They continued to consider Rome as their 
mistress, as their coins testify. (2) 
However, i n A.D.34, Philip died, after ruling his tetrarchy 
for thirty-seven years. The peaceful nature of his reign no doubt 
led Tiberius to believe that the peoples of Traclionitis and Gaulanitis 
had achieved a reasonable degree of romanization, and so he annexed 
the tetrarchy to the adjoining province of Syria. (3) Thus he 
pursued the Augustan policy of annexation on the death of a king, 
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and at the same time enlarged the important military province of 
Syria. 
Yet, as happened elsewhere, the accession of Gaius heralded 
a change of policy; I n A.D.37, the former tetrarchy of Philip was 
detached from Syria and given to Herod Agrippa, a grandson of Herod 
the Great. (4) Agrippa had been arrested and imprisoned by Tiberius, 
but his friendship with Gaius secured his release on the old emperor's 
death; Gaius• policy of providing kingdoms for his friends was thus 
continued, but the tetrarchy remained under the same royal house. 
The kingdom was increased to include the district of Abila which at 
one time had formed part of the kingdom of Ituraea. So Gaius restored 
the situation which had existed before the death of Philip, with two 
subject states to the east of the province of Judaea. 
However Herod Antipas had brought his kingdom to the 
attention of the emperor, for shortly before the death of Tiberius, 
Herod had married his niece, Herodias, and divorced the daughter of 
Aretas the king of Arabia Petraea. Aretas avenged his daughter by 
defeating Antipas i n battle, but the latter appealed to Tiberius, and 
the emperor ordered Vitellius the governor of Syria, ; to march on 
Aretas. However, when the news of Tiberius' death reached Vitellius, 
he withdrew his forces, and the quarrel was not resolved. (5) Yet 
Antipas must have f e l t humiliated by the defeat i n battle, and the 
appointment of Agrippa as a king increased this humiliation, for his 
status was inferior to that of his nephew. Moreover, Antipas' wife 
was jealous of the position of her brother, Agrippa, and persuaded her 
husband to petition the emperor for elevation to the status of king. 
Therefore Antipas sailed to Home, but his plea ivas countered by an 
accusation from Agrippa, who maintained that the tetrarch was 
conspiring against Earns, and pointed to Antipas' collection of 
weapons as proof. Gaius condemned Antipas and Herodias to exile 
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i n Lugdunum, and added his tetraroby to the kingdom of Agrippa. (6) 
The date of this i s uncertain, but a coin i n the British Museum 
shows that Antipas was s t i l l tetrarch i n A.D.39-40 (7), and as 
he was certainly deposed by Gains, the most likely date is A.D.40. 
So Gaius united the tetrarchies of two of the sons of Herod the Great 
under one man, and elevated Agrippa to the rank of king* Yet Gaius 
treatment of the Jews i n Judaea was not so benevolent, for his anger 
was aroused when an altar to the emperor at Jamnia was torn down, and 
he ordered Petronius, Vitellius 1 successor i n Syria, to set up an 
imperial statue i n the temple at Jerusalem. (8) The religious 
fervour of the Jews was inflamed by this, and Petronius ventured to 
warn the emperor of widespread resistence by the whole Jewish people. 
His advice provoked Gaius to command him to commit suicide, but the 
death of the emperor nullified both these orders, and i t was l e f t to 
his successor to restore peace* 
Claudius was helped i n gaining the principate by Agrippa, 
who seems to have been the most important adviser to the new emperor 
i n the confusion following the murder of Gaius j therefore Claudius 
rewarded his friend by confirming his rule and enlarging his kingdom 
by the addition of Judaea and Samaria. He also confirmed the grant 
made by Gaius of the territory of Abila, adding the mountainous 
region of the Lebanon from imperial territory. (9) By this action 
Claudius reversed the policy of his predecessors, for Judaea ceased 
to be a Raman province, which i t had been since A.D.6., and the 
kingdom of Agrippa thus was equal to that of h i * grandfather, Herod 
the Great. Claudius* motives must have been more than the desire 
to reward friendship, for this reversal of the Augustan policy was 
contrary to Claudius* other actions on the Hastern frontier. The 
emperor must have realized that direct contact between Romans and 
Jews had produced dangerous situations, for the JOWB possessed a 
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sense of independence i n government as well an i n religion, 
therefore he attempted to remove this danger try allowing a 
Jewish king, whom he could trust, to rule the whole country. 
At the same time, Claudius granted a. favour to Agrippa 
by giving the kingdom of Chalcis, i n the Lebanon valley, to the 
latter's brother, Herod. (10) 
Agrippa seems to have restored order to the districts 
of Judaea, and i n this respect Claudius' policy was successful, 
but there can be l i t t l e doubt that the emperor kept a watchful 
eye on Agrippa's ambition. An attempt to rebuild the walls of 
Jerusalem was reported to Rome by Vibius liar ami, the governor of 
Syria, and a letter from the emperor was needed to persuade Agrippa 
to desist from this refortification* ( l l ) Shortly after this, 
Marsus visited Agrippa at Tiberias i n Galilee and found him 
entertaining Antioohus, king of Commagene, Sampsigeramus of Emeaa, 
Cotya of Armenia Minor, Polemo of Pont us and Herod of Chalois. 
Agrippa may have been merely honouring his friends, but Marsus' 
suspicions were aroused, and the kings were ordered to depart (12); 
Rome could not condone such a convention of monarchs, especially 
when their kingdoms had a l l at one time or another been vassals of 
Parthia, and Marsus' action was correct, even i f his suspicions were 
not. 
Unfortunately, Claudius' arrangement was to last for only 
three years, for i n A.D.ii4 Agrippa died; Claudius was advised not 
to give the kingdom to Agrippa'3 son, Agrippa I I , who was only 
sixteen, for the likelihood that a mere youth could control the 
Jewish factions was very remote* Therefore, not only Judaea, but 
also the rest of the kingdom became a Roman province, and Cuspius 
Fadus was appointed procurator. Far the f i r s t time, Claudius 
attempted to control the whole of Judaea by means of an imperial 
procurator. (13) 
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However the rule of the Herodian family was not totally 
eclipsed by this annexation, for Herod, Agrippa'a brother, continued 
to reign as king of Chalcis, with o f f i c i a l recognition as a friend 
of Claudius. (14) On his death, i n A.D.49, Claudius did not 
assign his kingdom to one of his sons, but seized the opportunity 
of raising Agrippa H to the kingship, and gave him his uncle's 
kingdom. (15) I t is possible that Claudius hoped that Agrippa I I 
would prove as able as his father, so that he could eventually be 
given the whole kingdom, for the Roman procurators, Fadus, Tiberius 
Alexander and Cumanus, had found great difficulty i n controlling 
the various factions i n Judaea. The f i r s t step towards the 
reoonstitution of the kingdom took place i n A*S«53, when Claudius 
granted to Agrippa I I the territory which had once been the tetrarchy 
of Philip, and he added also the district of Abila. Agrippa I I 
received this kingdom at the expense of his former realm, for Chalcis 
was taken from him, and i t s fate remains uncertain. (16) The new 
king was not slow to consolidate his position by means of marriage 
alliances, for his sister DrusiUa was married to Azizua, king of 
Bmesa, and later to Felix, the procurator of Judaea, whilst Marianne, 
the daughter of Agrippa I I , was married to an influential Jew named 
Arohelaus; at about the same time Berenice, the widow of Herod of 
Chalcis and sister of Agrippa I I was married to Polemo of Cilicia. (17) 
Whether or not Claudius intended to return the whole of 
Judaea to the Herodian family is unknown, for his death put an end 
to his plana. However, Nero continued the friendship between Rome 
and Agrippa I I , for i n the f i r s t year of the new prinoipate, 
Agrippa I I was given part of Galilee, including the cities of 
Tiberias and Tarichaeae, and Julias, a city i n Peraea, was added 
to the grant. (18) Clearly Nero favoured the rule of a client 
king i n this region. In return for this increase i n his territory, 
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Agrippa was expected to aid i n the proposed expedition, into 
Armenia. (19) 
Yet Nero did not make any further additions to Agrippa's 
kingdom, and he seems to have held no desire to unite Judaea under 
one king. There were two reasons for this; f i r s t l y , the Jews 
proved extremely troublesome under a l l the .Roman governors appointed 
by Nero, and secondly, Agrippa himself was not popular amongst his 
own countrymen. During the procuratorship of Festus (A.D.66-62), 
Agrippa I I built an extension to his palace i n Jerusalem which 
overlooked the temple. The eminent men of Jerusalem then built a 
wall which blocked this view, and when ordered by Festus to demolish 
i t they appealed to Nero* The emperor allowed the wall to stand. (20) 
Agrippa's unpopularity grew when, during the procuratorship of Albinus 
(A*D. 62-64), he enlarged Caesarea Fhilippi and renamed i t Neronias, 
and at the same time transferred to Berytus most of the ornaments of 
his kingdom: his subjects considered that they had been robbed to 
adorn a foreign city. (21) But despite his unpopularity, Agrippa I I 
was loyal to Rome, and although his kingdom was not further increased 
by Nero, neither was i t decreased* 
But the conflict between Romans and Jews i n the province of 
Judaea was inevitable whilst Rome governed directly* This tension 
grew during Nero's reign u n t i l i t erupted into revolt i n A.D.66. 
The emperor took appropriate steps; i n February, A.D.67, T* Flavius 
TTespasianus was appointed as legate to promote the war (22), and 
C. Lioinius Muoianus became governor of Syria for the years A.D.68 
and 69. (23) Vespasianus reduced the districts of Judaea one by 
one, and when he returned to Rome to receive the prinoipate, his 
son Titus was l e f t to conduct the final siege of Jerusalem. The 
f a l l and sack of the city i n A.D.70 heralded the end of the Jewish 
state, although Judaism survived as a recognised religion* 
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Judaea remained a province, but a senatorial governor was appointed, 
who commanded the legion permanently garrisoned i n Jerusalem. 
What of Agrippa I I during this war? He remained loyal 
to Borne, providing troops for toe campaigns; he supported Vespasian 
on several occasions (24), and even set out for Rome to speak to 
Galba. (25) Agrippa took the f i e l d i n person with Cestius & alius 
(26), and was present i n the fin a l assault on Jerusalem. (27) 
His loyally to Rome was unsurpassed and he proved a valuable asset 
to Roman fortunes. The value of Agrippa I I is proved by the length 
of his reign which extended beyond the Flavian period. 
Yet the Julio-Claudian treatment of Palestine shows how 
l i t t l e they understood the temperament of the Jewish people. Tiberius 
attempted to follow the Augustan policy of supporting a province 
bounded by tetrarohies, and his annexation of Philip's tetrarchy 
foUowa the policy he maintained elsewhere i n the east. Gaius 
did reverse this annexation, but his subsequent actions show that 
he knew even less of Jewish zeal for freedom. At least, Claudius 
realized that a client kingdom was a better solution than annexation, 
and i n Agrippa I he found a king who was acceptable to both sides, 
but at his death, there was no-one strong enough to unite the Jews 
i n peace, and onoe again Judaea became a province. Agrippa I I did 
not emerge as a figure who could rule the whole of Palestine, and i n 
A.D.66 Nero was compelled to realize that there were only two ways of 
ending strife i n Judaea: either the Jews must be allowed complete 
independence or they must be completely crushed. Obviously no 
Roman government would allow a subject people to become completely 
free, so the Jews became the victims of their own fervour and their 
state was destroyed. 
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Ituraea. 
The kingdom of Ituraea, with i t s three important cities 
of Chalcis, Abila and Area, had been added to the kingdom of Herod 
the Great i n 20 B.C., but when Herod's kingdom was divided up, no 
mention was made of Ituraea. I t is possible that the kingdom was 
divided into tetr archies, for we know that i n A.D.29 the district 
of Abila was ruled by Iysanias the tetrarch (28); presumably 
Tiberius allowed Iysanias to rule undisturbed, but by A.D.37 he 
had died or had been displaced, for Abila was added to the new 
kingdom of Agrippa I (29), and from this tine the district was 
linked with Galilee. 
Of Chalcis we know nothing u n t i l A.D.41, when Claudius 
granted i t to Herod, the brother of Agrippa I.(30) At his death 
i n A.D.49, the district passed to Agrippa U (31), but was taken 
away when Agrippa*s kingdom was expanded to the south i n A.D.53* 
From this time the fate of Chalcis remains uncertain; i t may have 
been given back to Agrippa I I , or added to the province of Syria. 
The third district of Ituraea, that of Area, was ignored 
by the authorities u n t i l A.D.38, when Gaius created a kingdom by 
giving i t to a certain Sohaemus (32), thus establishing a king to 
complement Agrippa I . 
Sohaemus ruled, presumably peacefully, u n t i l A.D.49, and 
on his death, Ituraea was annexed and added to Syria; thus Claudius 
continued the Augustan policy of annexation. However Beer (33) 
points out that, although a large part of Sohaemus * kingdom was 
annexed, a «wn»T» section continued to be governed by a vassal, whose 
name was Varus, u n t i l A.D.53, when i t was joined to the reconstituted 
kingdom of Agrippa H. (34) This Varus, who was a relative of 
Sohaemus, probably his son, remained as a subordinate of Agrippa, 
and took charge of his master's domain whilst Agrippa was aiding 
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Cestiua. (35) 
I t appears that Claudius succeeded i n annexing the client 
kingdom, but was reluctant to ignore the claims of S ohaemus' 
descendant, so he allowed Varus to rule a smaller district which 
was eventually incorporated into another kingdom* Thus the 
kingdom of Ituraea disappeared. 
Arabia Petraea. 
Arabia Petraea was ruled by Aretas, king of the Nabataeans, 
who had been confirmed i n his kingdom by Augustus i n 9 B.C. (36) 
Although Rome showed no desire to interfere i n his domain, Aretas 
realized the importance of imperial friendship, and i n A.D.18, he 
entertained Germanicus and Piso at a sumptuous banquet, whilst the 
emperor's nephew was visiting the east. (37) 
We hear nothing more of Aretas u n t i l the last years of 
Tiberius' reign, but then he almost provoked a war with the legions 
i n Syria. Aretas' daughter had been married to Herod Antipas, but 
when Herod returned his wife to her father, Aretas took up arms, 
using the pretext of a boundary dispute, and defeated Herod's army. (38) 
Herod appealed to Tiberius, who ordered Vitellius to march against 
Aretas, and the governor of Syria had already begun his campaign when 
news reached him of Tiberius' death, he therefore returned to Syria 
to await instructions from the new emperor. Had Tiberius lived i t 
is likely that the kingdom of Aretas would have been absorbed. 
However Gaius did not continue with the war, for he may 
have remembered Aretas' friendship with Germanicus. Indeed i t seems 
possible that the new emperor increased Aretas' kingdom: Hartmann, (39) 
points out that when Paul journeyed to Damascus, probably i n A.D.39, 
the oily was ruled by the ethnarch Aretas. The Imperial coinage 
of the city goes only as far as A.D.34, and i t is not unlikely that 
Gaius presented Damascus to Aretas. 
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However this favour must have been granted towards the 
end of Aretas' reign, for Hartmann adds that the king's coinage 
and inscriptions continue up to the forty-eighth year of his rule, 
therefore Aretas must have died i n A.D.40* 
Aretas' successor i n this client kingdom i s not recorded 
i n ancient literature, but A. Grobmann (40) states that a study of 
the native coins reveals the next king to be Maliohos I I . This 
king was not given the city of Damascus, but his rule i n Arabia 
Petraea was lengthy, and he was s t i l l on the throne i n A.D.69, when 
he supported Titus with an auxiliary corps at the siege of Jerusalem. 
The Julio-Claudians seem to have known the importance of 
enjoying friendly relations with the powerful Nabataean kingdom, for 
such friendship safeguarded the troublesome Semitic kingdoms from 
outside interference. I t was fortunate that the death of Tiberius 
prevented a war, for Rome would have found i t d i f f i c u l t to subdue 
the nomadic Arab tribes whilst struggling to keep the peace i n Judaea. 
Emeaa. 
After Augustus, i n 20 B.C., restored Iamblichus to the 
throne of Emesa, now Horns, (41), the Emesenes disappear into 
obscurity; presumably they remained vassals of Rome, but we know 
nothing of changes i n the kingship, yet, by A.D..18 there must have 
been a change, for Alexandros, a citizen of Palmyra, was allowed to 
undertake a mission on behalf of Gezmanicus to Sampsigeramus of 
Emesa. (42) Presumably Sampsigeramus was king i n Emesa by this 
time, and Benzinger (43), assumes that this king was a descendant 
of the Sampsigeramua whom Pompey encountered. (44) 
Sampsigeramus' reign continued into the time of Claudius, 
and when Agrippa I was given a kingdom, the king of Emesa was eager 
to establish close bonds with him. Therefore Sampsigeramus' 
daughter, Jotape, was married to Agrippa'a brother, Aristobulns (43)* 
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and Sampsigeramus himself was present at Tiberias for the meeting 
of kings which was disbanded by Marsua. (46) 
I t is uncertain when 3ampsigeramus1 reign ended, but he 
had certainly been replaced by A.D.53, for i n that year Azizus of 
Emesa married Drusilla, the sister of Agrippa I I (47); this 
marriage was of short duration for Felix, the procurator of Judaea, 
took Drusilla from her husband. (48) Azizus cannot have ruled 
i n Emesa for long, for i n A.D.54* he was succeeded by his brother 
Sohaemus. (49) 
An inscription testifies that this Sohaemus, whose f u l l 
name was C. Julius Sohaemus, was the son of Sampsigeramus, so i t 
is not unreasonable to suppose that Sampsigeramus was succeeded by 
his elder son, Azizus and, on the latter's death, the younger son 
attained the throne. (30) 
Thus i n A.D.54 Nero gave both Emesa and Sophene (51) to 
a king named Sohaemus; Stein (52) points out that the two kingdoms 
were too far apart to have been ruled by one man, therefore there 
must have been two Sohaemi. 
The marriage ties between the families of Sohaemus of 
Emesa and Agrippa H indicate that their political attitudes were 
the same, and Sohaemus certainly appears to have been willing to aid 
Rome. I n A.D.66 he helped i n the Judaean campaign by sending 
Auxiliaries to Cestius Gallus (53), and he was present at the siege 
of Jerusalem i n A.D.69. (54) Moreover, Sohaemus was not slow to 
acknowledge Vespasian as emperor i n the same year. (55) Thus Rome 
maintained Emesa as a client state during the rule of the Julio-
Claudians, and the support which she received from the Emesenes was 
gratefully received. 
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Augustus1 successors followed a consistent policy i n the 
south-eastern corner of the empire; the deserts which separated 
the Roman and Parthian empires could best be patrolled by native 
kings, and i t was desirable that these kings be vassals of Heme. 
Therefore the Julio-Claudian emperors fostered client relationships 
with Arabia Petraea, Ernes a, and with Agrippa I I . Further west, 
the annexation of Ituraea and i t s addition to Syria enabled the 
Roman armies to keep a closer watch on Judaea, but the problems 
which the Jews presented to Rome were ultimately settled only by 
the destruction of the Jewish state. 
North Africa. 
The number of client kingdoms i n North Africa had been 
reduced by Augustus, and by the end of his reign, only Mauretania 
remained under a king. The commercial contact which Rome had with 
the African coast, and the increased wealth which this produced, 
resulted i n the ready acceptance of Roman provincial rule, and there 
was only one instance of revolt i n Africa under the Julio-Claudians. 
The emperors seem to have been content to accept the 
Sahara desert as the boundary of Reman rule, and indeed, i t provided 
an insurmountable barrier against any attack from the south. However 
there was a certain amount of curiosity about the peoples to the south 
of Egypt, and this was manifested when Nero sent a small expedition up 
the Nile which advanced as far as Ethiopia. (56) This was almost 
certainly an expedition for scientific rather than military 
advancement. 
But, further west, Tiberius faced a rebellion i n Numidia. 
This region had became a province i n UB B.C., but i t is possible 
that some of the tribes i n the interior wanted to resist any extension 
of Roman rule. I n A.D.17 a Numidian named Tacfarinas deserted from 
a Roman auxiliary force and led a revolt which spread to parts of 
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Mauretania. M. Furlus Camillus, the governor of Africa, was 
required to defeat the rebels. (57) But in A.D.20 the war 
was renewed. L. Apronius drove Tacfarinas back, but the revolt 
could not be subdued (58), and i t was not u n t i l A.D.23 that 
P. Cornelius Dolabella ended the war by defeating Tacfarinas, who 
f e l l i n battle. (59) 
Obviously this war had repercussions i n Mauretania. 
Augustus had given this kingdom to Juba I I , who ruled peacefully, 
but by A.D.33 he had been succeeded by his son, Ptolemy. (60) 
The new king's youth and inexperience led some of his subjects to 
join Tacfarinas' revolt, but when the revolt was subdued, Tiberius 
saw no reason to disturb the Augustan arrangement, and Ptolemy 
remained i n his kingdom. 
But when Gaius succeeded Tiberius, he reversed the former 
policy; for i n A.D.40 he ordered Ptolemy to Rome and put him to 
death. The authorities give two reasons for this: Cassius Dio (61) 
says that Gaius coveted Ptolemy's wealth, and put him to death i n 
order to confiscate his possessions; Suetonius (62) says the king 
was executed for daring to wear a purple cloak. The emperor's 
action was certainly inconsistent with his policy i n the east, where 
he restored several kings to their ancestral thrones, but perhaps i t 
was not the whim of a madman. Mauretania was annexed to form two 
new provinces, and, as Balsdon (63) points out, there were advantages 
i n this annexation. There were several Roman colonies i n Mauretania 
which, under a client king, had become anomalies, and at the same 
time, the support that Tacfarinas had found i n Mauretania suggested 
that more stringent control was needed. Nevertheless, i t i s 
questionable whether Gaius needed to accompany annexation with the 
murder of a seemingly loyal king. 
Th» murder of Ptolemy and the annexation was met by a 
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rebellion of the Mauretanians under the freedman Aedemon (64), and 
the revolt continued into Claudius' reign; i t was eventually 
suppressed by two bri l l i a n t campaigns by Suetonius Paulinas and 
Hosidius Geta i n A.D.41-42. Claudius then divided Mauretania 
into two provinces, with Mauretania Tingitana i n the west and 
Mauretania Caesariensis i n the east. (65) 
Thus the last client kingdom i n Africa was eliminated; 
Claudius and his successors had no cause to regret this annexation, 
and i t is unlikely that, i f the kingdom had remained, North Africa 
would have achieved such a high development of culture and prosperity 
during the following century. 
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Flavian Policy and Client Kings. 
The success of the attempts by the Julio-Claudian 
emperors to win the loyalty of the peoples on the fringes of 
the Empire was tested during the two years which followed the 
deposition of Nero. For the f i r s t time since the c i v i l wars 
which terminated the Republic, legions from several provinces 
of the Roman Empire marched on I t a l y , hoping to establish their 
own champions as emperor of the Roman world. The struggle which 
caused the overthrow of four emperors within eighteen months took 
place almost entirely south of the Alps and during this time the 
frontier provinces were l e f t with very meagre defences. This 
confusion provided an ideal opportunity for hostile states and 
unwilling a l l i e s to attack and plunder Roman territory, but such 
was the loyalty and friendship that previous emperors had engendered 
amongst the client kings and the newly annexed kingdoms that 
interference from provincials was minimal. The only former 
kingdom which proved troublesome was that of Pont us, which had been 
a province for only five years. Anicetus, a freedman of the former 
king, took up arms, but his revolt was soon crushed by one of 
Vespasian*s generals, ( l ) Yet, i n Europe, the less c i v i l i z e d 
tribes beyond the limits of Roman arms provided problems. Venutius 
of the Brigantes continued his struggle against the northward advance 
of the Romans i n Britain (2 ), whilst i n Lower Germany a Batavian 
leader, C i v i l i s , led a revolt against V i t e l l i u a , which, on the 
latter's death, became a general revolt against Rome. At the same 
time the Roxolani, the Daci, and the Sarmatae crossed the Danube 
and attacked Roman installations; they were driven back with 
difficulty. ( 3 ) 
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I t would appear that the Augustan policy of fostering 
client-kingdama i n the eastern and southern Empire was successful, 
for only one minor uprising occurred i n these areas during the 
troubled years of A.D.68 and A.D.69, but Augustus and his successors 
had been unable to follow the same policy i n Europe. Their 
unwillingness to foster client kings beyond the Rhine and the 
Danube, coupled with the inability to subdue so many strong and 
warlike tribes, meant that Rome was no nearer solving her problems 
i n the north than she had been ninety years ea r l i e r . Augustus 
had to solve other more pressing problems, but with the relative 
peace i n the east which followed the conclusion of the Jewiah War, 
the Flavian emperors had to give more thought to "their relations 
with the kings and chieftains of the tribes of Europe* 
Britain. 
The strategic importance of the three client kingdoms i n 
Brita i n had declined as the Roman armies established control over 
the southern portion of the island. Prasutagus' kingdom had been 
annexed on the death of the king (if), although firm control over 
the Iceni was established with d i f f i c u l t y . Tits flight of Cartimandua 
from her kingdom and the establishment of her husband, who was hostile 
to Rome, presented Vespasian with his major problem i n Britain. 
Unless the Brigantes could be subdued or brought under a friendly 
monarch, no Roman frontier i n Britain was safe. The emperor abandoned 
the prospect of protecting the armies with a client king, a policy which 
had already proved unsuccessful, and i n A.D.71, sent out Pe t i l i u s 
Cerealis as governor of Britain. Cere a l i a advanced against the 
Brigantes and defeated them i n a series of battles. Their territory 
was overrun i f not actually conquered. This policy of military 
conquest was continued by Julius Frontinus, Cerealis' successor, who 
subdued the warlike Silures of South Wales. ( 5 ) 
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However one client king i n Brit a i n s t i l l continued to 
rule; Tacitus ( 6 ) states that: quaedam civitates Cogidumno regi 
donatae - la ad nostram usque memorlam fidissimus mansit ... 
I t i s impossible to establish the exact date of the 
annexation of Cogidumnus' kingdom, and Stein ( 7 ) merely mentions 
that the king was s t i l l ruling i n the time of Tacitus. Yet the 
phrase 'ad nostram usque memoriam' suggests that Cogidumnus was no 
longer on his throne at the time of the composition of the 
'Agricola 1. ( 8 ) 
I t i s not unreasonable to suppose tliat Cogidumnus• kingdom 
was used as a base for Vespasian's campaigns i n the south-west 
during the early years of the invasion, and as a reward for his 
loyal service, the Flavian emperors allowed the king to build his 
magnificent palace at Fishbourne and to remain on his throne u n t i l 
his death. (9) Unless Cogidumnus, who had presumably reached 
manhood i n A.D.43* lived well beyond his allotted span, he must 
have died during the Flavian period, and at his death his kingdom 
was incorporated i n the province of Britannia, (lo) 
Yet Cogidumnus was the last client king to be fostered i n 
Britain, for Vespasian and his sons relied on & policy of military 
annexation to effect the submission of the tribes of Northern Britain. 
The military achievements of Cn. Julius Agricola carried 
Roman arms deep into Scotland and established a large legionary 
fortress at Inchtuthill on the Tay, with auxiliary forts even further 
north at Cardean and Stracathro. ( l l ) Agricola consolidated his 
successes, especially i n northern England, by building forts and 
roads, but he was unwilling or unable to protect his advances by 
making alliances with the barbarian tribes; he did give refuge to 
an I r i s h prince, ( 1 2 ), but since no attempt was made to attack 
Ireland, no alliance was made. 
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The r e c a l l of Agricola to Heme (13) and the subsequent 
withdrawal of a legion from Britain weakened Roman interest i n 
advance* Moreover our knowledge of events during the later years 
of Dcmitian's reign i s very scanty; the military outposts i n 
Scotland seem to have been abandoned before Domitian's death, and 
the fortress at Inchtuthill was systematically demolished even 
before i t had been fu l l y occupied. I t seems l i k e l y that the Tyne-
Solway line formed the Trajanic frontier, and no attempt was made 
to form client relationships with tribes to the north. 
Germany. 
Once Augustus' dream of a military conquest of Germany 
had been abandoned his successors made diplomatic contacts east of 
the Rhine to back up the military garrisons on the west bank; the 
tribes on the right bank of the riv e r had been brought into alliance 
with Rome by various agreements, and the area seemed to have accepted 
a reasonably peaceful settlement. 
Yet discontent, which had l a i n dormant for some years, 
appeared during the c i v i l wars of A .D. 6 8 - 6 9 . Julius C i v i l i s , a 
Batavian, led a German uprising, allegedly against V i t e l l i u s and i n 
support of Vespasian. Yet when the Flavian armies gained control 
of I t a l y the German revolt continued, and i t was not suppressed u n t i l 
A.D.70, by Petilius Cere a l i a and Annius Gallius. Most of the tribes 
who had revolted seem to have returned to their old allegiance on 
their old terms, but i t i s unlikely that Vespasian f e l t completely 
at ease with the German situation. For this reason several 
measures were taken during the Flavian period. The line of the 
R h i n a was guarded by new stone fortresses, and the legions were 
restored to their former number - four legions i n Lower Germany, 
and the same number i n the upper province. ( 1 4 ) 
Measures were also taken against the less trustworthy 
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tribes east of the Rhine. The Bructeri between the Lippe and Ems, 
had been formidable enemies, not least because of thei r fanatical 
devotion to their priestess Veleda. I t i s not known whether they 
were punished immediately for their part i n C i v i l i s 1 revolt, but 
at some time between A.D.75-78, Rutilius Gallicus defeated the tri b e 
and captured Veleda. ( 1 3 ) Thus Vespasian was w i l l i n g to interfere 
i n the leadership of the t r i b e . At some later date, probably towards 
the end of Domitian's reign, Rome was able to reinstate a Bructerian 
king who had been driven out by his subjects; obviously the Flavians, 
l i k e Claudius, were keen to preserve at least a semblance of 
vassalship. ( l 6 ) Rome's predominance i s further shown by Tacitus 
when he records a massacre of 60,000 Bructeri i n the presence of a 
Roman army by neighbouring peoples friendly to Rome. ( 1 7 ) This 
incident cannot be dated, but i t does i l l u s t r a t e the success of the 
Flavian policy. 
Yet the most important Flavian advance took place i n the 
region between the upper Rhine and the upper Danube, known as the 
Agri Decumates. Vespasian realised the failure of attempts to 
control this area by means of vassal chieftains, and the events 
of A.D.69 had shown the necessity of increasing the mobility of 
the army by shortening the distance between the Rhine and Danube 
frontiers. Therefore the emperor decided to annex the region. 
Roads were b u i l t across the Black Forest from the Rhine to the 
Danube, and i t seems l i k e l y that a military campaign took place 
i n A.D.73-74* when Pinarius Cornelius Clemens, the governor of 
Upper Germany, received triumphal decorations. ( 1 8 ) The 
construction of a series of forts ( 1 9 ) shows that Vespasian was 
prepared to defend Roman t e r r i t o r y by more trustworthy means than 
client kings. 
This policy was continued by Domitian, yet the last 
Flavian emperor expanded his father's policy by advancing deep 
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into German t e r r i t o r y , and i n A.D.83, campaigned beyond the Rhine 
and crushed the Chatti. (20) The reasons for t h i s attack are 
uncertain; perhaps Domitian aimed at forestalling a Chattan 
attack, and, i n addition, he saw the need to be known by his 
troops and he wished to gain a military reputation r i v a l l i n g 
that of his father and his brother. (21) 
Domitian established a series of wooden watchtowers 
and earth and stone forts i n the Wetterau region, which created 
a hew frontier beyond the Rhine. (22) The Chatti retreated 
beyond this l i n e of f o r t s , but the emperor had succeeded i n 
dividing northern and southern Germany, and this great easterly 
extension helped to provide security for the whole frontier. 
Yet Domitian was not forgetful of friendly tribes; the 
Mattiaci, whose land had been included i n the newly enclosed 
t e r r i t o r y , received compensation f o r the forts b u i l t on their 
possessions (23); moreover, the king of the Cherusci, Chariomerus, 
had been driven out by the Chatti because of his friendship with 
Rome. He regained his throne but alienated some of his supporters 
by sending hostages to the emperor; his lack of support led him to 
appeal to Domitian, and he received financial aid; the emperor 
realized the king could be useful, but was unwilling to support him, 
as a cl i e n t , with mil i t a r y aid. (24) 
I t seems l i k e l y that Domitian also succeeded i n compelling 
the Chatti to respect Roman t e r r i t o r y by means of a treaty. (25) 
Perhaps this was a result of the revolt of Saturninus, when a German 
tribe was unable to aid the rebellion because a sudden thaw melted 
the surface of the Rhine. (26) This tr i b e may have been the Chatti, 
for further evidence of their aggression i s provided by the burning 
of wooden towers between the Lahn and the Tannus around thi s time. (27) 
The completion of the l i n k between the Wetterau and the 
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Neckar, which joined the Rhine and Danube frontiers, was achieved 
during the later years of Dcmitian's rule (28), thus drawing a 
definite and distinct line between Roman and non-Roman t e r r i t o r y . 
The appearance of these man-made frontiers may well have 
created the impression that Rome was preparing to wash her hands 
of a l l i e s outside the line of fort s . I f so, th i s would explain 
the h o s t i l i t y of the Marcamanni and Quadi, north of Pannonia, who 
had been a l l i e s of Rome since the time of Augustus. The kings of 
these tribes, Sido and It a l i c u s , had fought i n the Flavian Armies 
i n A.D.69 (29), but friendly relations were broken when neither 
t r i b e sent help during the Dacian War of A.D.88-89. Dcmitian 
marched to Pannonia after settling the rebellion of S aturninus i n 
AoD.89, put to death members of an embassy who were making excuses, 
and promoted a war. But i t would seem that the tribes had been 
ma king preparations, for Dcmitian's army was defeated. (30) I t 
seems l i k e l y that the Iazyges joined i n the war, for at the 
termination of the Dacian War, a column under Velius Rufus took 
the Iazyges i n the rear. (31) At about the same time, Dcmitian 
made alliances with, and gave help to, the Semnones and Lugii who 
faced the rear of the German rebels; (32) thus the emperor used 
vassal tribes to isolate his enemies. Yet the problem was not 
settled, for another Suebo-Sarmatian War followed. The Suebi (33) 
and the Iazyges crossed the Upper Danube and crushed a legion. (34) 
Dcmitian seems to have put an end to the war with the aid of a 
legion from Upper Germany. 
Despite this unrest, the Flavian policy seems to have 
been successful, for the Rhine fro n t i e r , with i t s l i n e of permanent 
forts rather than client kings, no longer remained a continual source 
of trouble. Augustus* mistrust of German chiefs seems to have been 
j u s t i f i e d by the actions of Vespasian and Dcmitian. 
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Dacia 
The Flavian period witnessed the emergence of a new king 
who proved very troublesome to Roman supremacy on the Danube* The 
tribes of north-eastern Europe had long been a threat to the 
security of the eastern part of the Empire, but thei r raids across 
the Danube had been followed by quick retreats; the c i v i l war of 
A.D.68-69 proved an opportunity for such raids, and the Roxolanian 
invasion of A.D.69 was followed by a Dacian assault on legionary 
fortresses i n Moesia. Mucianus, on his way to I t a l y , repelled the 
invasion. I n the following year, the Sarmatae crossed the Danube 
and k i l l e d Fonteius Agrippa, the governor of Moesia. His successor, 
Rubrius Gallus, drove out the invaders and b u i l t a number of forts 
to prevent a recurrence of these raids. (35) These defences, and 
the return of settled government i n Rome, which allowed the armies 
to resume their allotted task, precluded further invasions, and the 
reigns of Vespasian and Titus produced no crises along the Danube. 
However, shortly after Dcmitian's reign began, the Daoi 
formed a kingdom under a new leader, Decebalus, who seems to have 
been exceptionally skilled i n warfare. (36) I n A.D.85, the 
Dacians crossed the Danube and slew i n battle Oppius Sabinus, the 
governor of Moesia (37)» and so Domitian himself marched to meet 
this threat with the praetorian guard and i t s prefect, Cornelius 
Fuscus. This army seems to have restored order i n Moesia, but 
Domitian, deciding to forestall further invasions, sent Fuscus and 
his army across the Danube. Unfortunately this army was crushed, 
Fuscus was k i l l e d , and a standard was lo s t . (38) This defeat 
was a serious affront to the emperor, who seems to have accompanied 
his forces i n Moesia (39) J accordingly he gathered another army, 
and probably i n A.D.88 Tettius Julianus advanced into Dacia to avenge 
Fuscus. He met Decebalus at Tapae and i n f l i c t e d a heavy defeat on 
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the Dacians. (40) The way to Decebalua;' capital was then open, 
but Julianus failed to take i t . Possibly he was wary of being 
trapped i n the d i f f i c u l t mountainous country and suffering the 
same fate as Fuscus; more probably, he intended to wait u n t i l 
the following year, by which time rebellion had broken out i n 
Upper Germany and the emperor's attention had been diverted. 
Dcmitian 1 s success i n Germany was quickly countered by 
his defeat at the hands of the Marcamanni and Quadi (41), and the 
emperor f e l t that the prosecution of the Dacian War would prove too 
great a strain on his resources. Therefore he asked Decebalus to 
consider a truce and the Dacian, no doubt mindful of his defeat at 
Tapae, agreed. (42) At this point Damitian instituted a policy 
which his predecessors would have regarded as untenable. Not only 
did he recognize a t r i b a l warlord as a friend of the Roman state, 
but he even agreed to his coronation i n Rome, similar to that of 
Tiridates i n A.D.66. (43) Decebalus was unwilling to travel to 
Rome, and so the diadem was placed on the head of his subordinate, 
Diegis. (44) Moreover, the Emperor realized that a client king 
i n Daoia would serve a very useful purpose i n protecting Roman 
possessions, and Decebalus received financial aid, skilled workmen 
and engineers, and a promise of annual payments. (45) Thus for 
the f i r s t time a client king i n Europe, who could be regarded as 
nominally subject, received financial rewards for future services. 
Bosporus. 
The kingdom of Bosporus, through which Rome was able to 
control the coasts of the Black Sea, had been granted to Rhescuporis 
during the c i v i l war of A.D.68-69. (46) Mazy scholars, including 
Cagnat and Latyschev, regard A.D.77 as the f i r s t year of Rhescuporis1 
reign, but the evidence points to an earlier date. Apart from the 
coin of Rhescuporis bearing the heads of Vespasian and Titus, dated 
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to A.D.68 ( 4 7 ) * an Inscription which gives Rhescuporis the t i t l e 
of king can certainly be ascribed to the year A.D.71 (48) 
Rhescuporis appears to have had a long reign. An 
inscription shows him to have been ruling i n A.D.80 (49), and 
many coins from Bosporus proclaiming him as king show the head of 
Domitian on the reverse. ( 5 0 ) Unfortunately only one of these 
bears a date, and that can be ascribed to the year A.D.87. ( 5 1 ) 
Presumably Rhescuporis must have died shortly before the 
end of the Flavian period, for the f i r s t coin of the next king, 
Sauramates I , i s dated to A.D.96, the f i r s t year of Nerva's reign. (52) 
The latest dated coin which bears the name of Rhescuporis i s from 
the year A.D.91-92 ( 5 3 ) > so he must have died shortly after this and 
was succeeded by Sauromates. 
C i l i c i a Olba 
That Rome supported a Marcus Antonius Polemo on the throne 
of Olba and i t s surrounding d i s t r i c t s up to the time of Galba, I have 
already shown ( 5 4 ) } however i t i s by no means certain when this 
king's reign ended. G.F. H i l l ( 5 5 ) points out that by the time of 
Domitian, the king had ceased to rule, for a coin showing: 
Obv. A0MITIAN0Y KAIEAPOE 
Rev. K0IN0N AAAESEJ2N KAI KENNATON 
can be dated to a year before A.D.81, as Domitian i s only 'Caesar' 
and not yet 'Augustus'. Therefore the region had no king by 
A.D.81, although i t i s by no means clear whether Polemo was dead, 
or had been deprived of his throne. 
There can have been no great economic or strategic 
advantage i n the annexation of such a tiny kingdom, and presumably 
this i s an instance of an area being absorbed into the empire on 
the death of i t s king. 
146. 
Ccmmagene 
King Antiochus IV of Commagene was a loyal a l l y of Rome; 
he had put down a revolt i n his kingdom i n A.9.53* and assisted 
Corbulo i n his Armenian campaigns. (56) The king was especially 
loyal to the Flavians: he had been among the f i r s t to swear 
allegiance to Vespasian (57), and assisted Titus i n the seige of 
Jerusalem (58); moreover his elder son, Epiphanes, had been wounded 
fighting against Vespasian's enemy, V i t e l l i u s . (59) 
But his kingdom, which included C i l i c i a Tracheia (60), 
was the only country which separated the important mil i t a r y provinces 
of Galatia, Cappadocia and Syria, on which the defence of the east 
rested. According to Magie ( 6 l ) , Vespasian planned to increase the 
size and strength of Galatia by annexing Commagene, and this would 
also make easier access to Asia Minor from Syria. 
Yet i t would have been impossible to depose Antiochus 
without a pretext; therefore an excuse was found (62): Antiochus 
and Epiphanes were accused of having formed an alliance with Parthia; 
Vespasian, apparently believing the charge, ordered CaesenixLus Paetus, 
the governor of Syria, to carry out expedient measures. Paetus 
invaded Commagene, and the king f l e d to the C i l i c i a n part of his 
kingdom, together with his wife and daughters; but Antiochus1 two 
sons remained i n Commagene and prepared to resist the Romans; i t 
may well be that Epiphanes and Callinicus tool: over the throne for 
a brief time, for a coin from Selinus i n C i l i c i a describes each of 
them as 'a great king'. (63) These two princes met the Remans 
i n battle and were not unsuccessful, but when i t became well-known 
that Antiochus had fle d , the native troops refused to continue with 
the war. Epiphanes and Callinicus were forced to take refuge with 
the Parthian king, Vologaeaea, and Commagene was l e f t to the Romans. 
At f i r s t Vologaeses treated Antiochus' sons with honour, but when 
1 4 7 . 
he was visited by the legate Velius Rufus, he w i l l i n g l y handed the 
princes over. (64) 
Antiochus was arrested at Tarsus and sent to Rome i n 
chains. However the emperor may have f e l t a pang of conscience, 
fo r once i n Rome, Antiochus and his family were treated with the 
greatest respect, and they were allowed to l i v e at peace i n the 
capital. Indeed, one of the sons of Epiphanes attained the rank 
of consul. (65) This treatment of the royal family shows that 
their deposition was the result of imperial policy rather than their 
own misdemeanours. 
Commagene and C i l i c i a Tracheia were once more annexed to 
Syria, and Rome obtained possession of the crossing of the Euphrates 
at Samosata. 
The date of this annexation i s uncertain. Hieronymus (66) 
puts the re-annexation of the Greek states freed by Nero and of 
C i l i c i a Tracheia and Commagene i n the year A.D.76, but Josephus (67) 
dates i t to the fourth year of Vespasian's reign, A.D.72. This 
earlier date i s preferable for i t i s confirmed by coins of Samosata, 
which show an era beginning i n A.D.71. (68) 
These events i n Commagene show Vespasian's determination 
to improve the existing defences of the empire. As i n Europe, he 
was unwilling to extend the li m i t s of the empire, but at the same 
time, he was prepared to supercede a successful client king for 
strategic reasons. 
The Caucasus. 
Julio-Claudian influence over the kings of the Caucasus 
region had gradually diminished since the time of Augustus, and 
the threat of anti-Reman act i v i t i e s i n the area north of Armenia 
appears to have been a cause of concern to Nero. (69) Vespasian 
inherited this problem, and countered the constant barbarian attacks 
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by Increasing the forces i n Cappadocia. (70) 
Yet the attacks continued, and a serious incursion took 
place at about the same time as the annexation of Commagene. A 
band of Aland raided Media and Armenia, forcing the Median king to 
pay them a hundred talents, and. almost capturing Tiridates, king of 
Armenia. (71) 
Two years later, Vologaeses asked for some Soman troops 
to use against the Alani, but Vespasian refused. (72) 
The I b e r i were the most important Roman vassals i n t h i s 
area, and Vespasian used thei r kingdom to protect the empire against 
the Alani. He helped Mithridates, who had inherited the throne 
from his father Pharaamenes (73), to f o r t i f y the town of Harmozica, 
which commanded the southern end of the Dariel Pass through which 
the Alani invaded Asia. (74) This help, a precedent for 
Domitian's aid to Decebalus, bound the I b e r i to Roman friendship 
and preserved the safety of the provinces of Asia Minor. After the 
f o r t i f i c a t i o n of Harmozica i n A.D.75, we hear of no more trouble i n 
the Caucasus during the Flavian period. 
Sophene 
Nero had given the tiny kingdom of Sophene to Sohaemus i n 
A.D.54, so that the king could guard the Isoghli. crossing of the 
Euphrates. (75) However this i s the only positive reference to 
Sohaemus of Sophene. Certainly a king Sohaemus gave his allegiance 
to Vespasian (76), took part i n the Jewish War (77), and supported 
the emperor i n the war against Antiochus of Commagene; (78) but 
these could equally well be references to Sohaemus of Emesa, who was 
an active supporter of Rome. (79) 
I n the absence of concrete evidence, a possible 
explanation i s that Sohaemus of Sophene ruled for only a short time, 
and at his death, or dethronement, his kingdom was incorporated i n 
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the province of Cappadocda. This nay have happened at any time, 
but the presence of permanent Roman garrisons i n Sophene during 
Corbulo's war i n Armenia (80), would suggest that the kingdom had 
become part of a province long before the end of Nero's reign. 
Armenia Minor 
Vespasian's plan to create a vast administrative unit 
from the Black Sea to the Taurus mountains was implemented i n 
A.D.72. The client kingdom of Commagene was not the only country 
to lose i t s independence at this time, for Armenia Ml"<?r was also 
absorbed into the province of Galatia. Although the l i t e r a r y 
authorities do not mention the removal of Aristobulus from the 
throne, T. Reinach (81) showed that the latest known coin of the 
king can be dated to A.D.70-71> whilst Nicopolis, a c i t y i n Armenia 
Minor, began to issue i t s own coins i n A.D. 71-72, the beginning of 
a new era. Presumably confirmation i s provided by a coin dated to 
the f o r t y - t h i r d year of the Armenian state, issued i n the seventeenth 
year of Trajan's reign. (82) 
This annexation shows that even at the beginning of his 
reign, Vespasian was eager to strengthen Raman control over the 
west bank of the Euphrates, and thus present invaders from the east 
with the prospect of advancing into a Raman mili t a r y province at 
every point along the upper reaches of the ri v e r . Yet i t seems 
l i k e l y that the emperor did not t o t a l l y cast aside Aristobulus, who 
had proved a loyal a l l y to Rome. The view that i n l i e u of Armenia 
Minor, Aristobulus received Chalcis i n Syria i s held by Wilcken (83), 
Reinach (84) and Stein. (85) This rests entirely on an 
identification with the Aristobulus, 'king of the so-called Chalcidice', 
who, according to Josephus, (86), led troops to the aid of Paetus i n 
his seizure of Commagene. This seems a reasonable assumption, 
since Aristobulus was the son of Herod, who had been king of Chalcis (87), 
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and i t i s probable that Vespasian, on depriving him of Armenia Minor, 
restored him to his father's kingdom. 
I f this theory i s accepted, Josephus' assertion that 
Aristobulus was king of Chalcis at the time of the expedition into 
Conmagene, indicates that Vespasian annexed the kingdom of Armenia 
Minor before turning to Commagene. The evidence suggests that the 
annexation of Armenia Minor took place late i n the year A.D.71, and 
that of Commagene was effected i n the following year. 
Armenia Maior. 
The problem of Roman and Parthian r i v a l r y over the kingdom 
of Armenia Maior seemed to have been solved by Nero i n A.D.66. ( 8 8 ) 
This settlement, by which Tiridates, the Armenian king, received his 
diadem from the hands of the emperor, satisfied both Roman and 
Parthian pride, and Armenia Maior was able to enjoy a period of peace 
i n which the scars l e f t by the wars of A.D.57 to A.D.63 could be 
repaired. Vespasian was content to enjoy nominal suzerainty over 
the kingdom without imposing too forcefully the w i l l of Rome. 
Nero had given permission for the rebuilding of Artaxata, 
destroyed by Corbulo i n A . 0 . 59 ( 8 9 ) , and sent sk i l l e d artisans to 
Armenia to aid the work ( 9 0 ); i n return Tiridates named the c i t y 
Neronia. ( 9 1 ) The rebuilding programme must have continued into 
the Flavian period, and the work was no doubt hastened by the raid 
of the Alani i n A.D.72-73, i n which Tiridates was almost captured. (92) 
An interesting insight into the f o r t i f i c a t i o n of Armenia 
is provided by an inscription found at Garni i n 1945 ( 9 3 ) » which 
commemorates a dedication by a certain Menneas, a stonemason, to 
king Tiridates. Mme. Trever argues that the inscription refers 
to Tiridates I , not to later kings of the same name who ruled i n 
the t h i r d century A.D. I f this is the case, then the inscription 
can be dated to A.D.76-77, and i t i s possible that the stonemason 
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was one o f those engaged from w i t h i n the Reman Empire, who helped 
T i r lda tes to f o r t i f y h is kingdom against attacks f rom the n o r t h . 
Domitian continued his f a t h e r ' s p o l i c y of peaceful 
co-existence beyond the Euphrates; Armenia Malar was one c l i e n t 
kingdom which the Flavians were happy t o r e t a i n . 
Par th ia 
The f r i endsh ip established i n A.D.66 between Nero and 
Vologaeses proved invaluable t o Rome, f o r w h i l s t such amity exis ted , 
the eastern Roman Empire was u n l i k e l y to be attacked by Par thian 
armies. 
Moreover, Vologaeses1 personal a f f e c t i o n f o r Nero l e d him 
t o support Vespasian, whom he no doubt regarded as the enemy o f those 
who had displaced Nero. The Par th ian k ing o f f e r e d t o help Vespasian 
i n h i s b i d f o r power by sending f o r t y thousand cavalry bowmen. (94) 
Vespasian, re luctant to appear i n Rome backed by o r i e n t a l t roops, 
p o l i t e l y decl ined. 
Vologaeses made a f u r t h e r attempt to combine Roman and 
Par thian forces when he suggested a combined campaign to d r ive out 
the A l a n i a f t e r t h e i r a t tack on Media and Armenia. (:95) Vespasian 
again decl ined. Yet despite these two r e b u f f s , Vologaeses remained 
an a l l y o f Rome u n t i l h i s death, and t h i s a l l i ance was probably the 
r e s u l t o f h i s a f f e c t i o n f o r the memory of Nero rather than h is fear 
o f Reman arms, as Aurel ius V i c t o r suggests. (96) 
The memory of Nero remained an emotive fo rce i n Par th ia , 
even a f t e r Vologaeses had been succeeded by A r t abanus I V , and i n 
A.D.79 the appearance of an imposter l e d t o f r i c t i o n on the eastern 
f r o n t i e r . A c e r t a i n Terentius Maximus, c la iming t o be Nero, gained 
support i n As ia , and Journied across the Euphrates. Artabanua IV 
welcomed Mm and made preparations to restore him as emperor. (97) 
The c r i s i s quickly passed, f o r an unsett led p o l i t i c a l scene may w e l l 
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have ccmpeUed Artabanus t o reconsider h i s plans. However t h i s 
conf ron ta t ion may w e l l have been the occasion on which Ulpius 
Traianus, governor o f Sy r i a from A.D.75 t o A.D.79 and the fa ther 
of the f u t u r e emperor, won h i s 'Par th ian l a u r e l ' . (98) He 
appears t o have been awarded tr iumphal decorations (99), but t h i s 
does not necessarily mean tha t warfare took place, f o r s i m i l a r 
honours had been awarded f o r diplomatic successes. (1X)0) 
The peace between the two great empires continued i n t o 
the r e i g n of Domitian, yet twenty years a f t e r Nero's death, i n 
A.D .88, another f a l s e Nero almost provoked a Par thian war. Wi th 
the Roman armies occupied i n Dacia and Germany, a war i n the east 
would have been disastrous, and once again diplomacy had t o be 
employed t o persuade the Parthian king t o surrender the pretender. (101) 
Thus during the F lav ian per iod the Par thian kings were 
t reated w i t h the respect due t o equals. No attempt was made t o 
impose Reman w i l l on the Par thian Empire, which Augustus and h i s 
successors had been a l l too ready t o do. The r e s u l t o f t h i s p o l i c y 
was a peaceful co-existence which brought unpara l le l led secur i ty to 
the eastern par t o f the Raman Empire. 
Palmyra 
Vespasian's attempts to increase the secur i ty of the east 
seem to have included Palmyra, which had h i the r to been independent.(102) 
This s tate was s i tua ted i n the Syr ian desert between Damascus and the 
Euphrates; the barren t e r r a i n was extremely d i f f i c u l t t o cross, 
especial ly w i t h an army, and i t s economy was based on p r o f i t s from 
the caravans which crossed the desert . The inherent d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of a m i l i t a r y conquest had ensured Palmyra's independence i n sp i t e 
o f the two great m i l i t a r y powers between which i t was placed, and t h i s 
was the s ta te of a f f a i r s even as l a t e as A J).77, when the elder P l i n y 
f i n i s h e d his H i s t o r i a N a t u r a l i s . (103) Yet there i s evidence tha t 
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Vespasian had already begun t o extend Reman c o n t r o l i n t o the desert . 
A milestone set up i n A.D.75 (104) informs us that Ulpius Traianus 
(105) was bu i ld ing a road which ran from Palmyra t o Sura on the 
Euphrates. Yet t h i s does not mean tha t Palmyra was i n Roman hands 
by t h i s t ime; Vespasian may merely have been marking the boundary 
o f S y r i a , and there i s no evidence tha t Palmyra was par t o f the 
Roman empire u n t i l Appian, w r i t i n g almost a century l a t e r , included 
i t amongst the provinces of the empire. (106) 
But although the Flavians d i d not annex Palmyra, c l e a r l y 
Roman inf luence was extended, and the secur i ty of the provinces o f 
Asia Minor improved. 
The Kingdom of Agrrppa 
Agrippa I I , whose kingdom was composed o f the former 
te t ra rohies o f Batanea, Trachonit ia and A b i l a , had proved h i s l o y a l t y 
t o Rome and t o the Flavians during the Jewish War. (107) This 
l o y a l t y was recognised by the imper ia l government, and the k ing was 
allowed t o r e t a i n h i s throne, despite the t i g h t e r c o n t r o l imposed on 
Judaea by Vespasian. 
There seems t o have been a close f r i endsh ip between the 
Flavians and Agrippa, and Ti tus i s said t o have considered marriage 
t o Agrippa• 3 s i s t e r , Berenice. (108) I n A.D .75, Agrippa and 
Berenice v i s i t e d Rome, and the king was granted prae tor ian rank (109), 
an extraordinary honour f o r a c l i e n t k i n g . Moreover, Agrippa was 
allowed t o issue coins which included his own name and t i t l e as w e l l 
as that of the emperor. (110) These coins were issued throughout 
the Flavian per iod , and Agrippa seems to have ru led peacefu l ly . 
Yet i t i s impossible t o know when Agrippa 1 s long r e i g n 
ended. Coins appear which are dated to the t h i r t y - f i f t h year o f 
h i s r e i g n ( i l l ) , which would suggest tha t Agrippa was s t i l l a l i v e 
i n A.D.95; ye t the existence o f two dat ing systems make i n d i v i d u a l 
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dates uncer ta in . On the other hand, an I n s c r i p t i o n g iv ing both 
dat ing systems belongs unquestionably to A.D.92 (112) , which remains 
the l a t e s t date at which Agrippa can be sa id w i t h ce r ta in ty t o have 
been a l i v e . He was dead by the time Josephus wrote h i s 
autobiography (113) but the date o f t h i s cannot be f i x e d d e f i n i t e l y . 
Despite the arguments of various scholars, no precise date can be 
given f o r Agrippa's death; i t occurred between A.D.92 and 100. (114) 
The death o f the k ing brought to an end the c l i e n t 
r e l a t i onsh ip which the region east of the Jordan had enjoyed. The 
f i r m g r i p which Rome had maintained over Judaea since the des t ruc t ion 
o f Jerusalem meant that a mediator between Jews and Remans, i n the 
shape of a c l i e n t k i n g , was no longer needed, and so Agrippa 1 s 
kingdom was annexed and d iv ided between the provinces o f Syr ia 
and Judaea. (115) f o r the f i r s t t ime d i r ec t Raman ru l e extended 
east o f the Jordan. 
Chalc is . 
The p r i n c i p a l i t y o f Chalcis i n the Lebanon v a l l e y seems 
t o have been used as a convenient sinecure by the government i n 
Rome. There Agrippa I I served h i s apprenticeship as a r u l e r from 
A.D.49 t o 53 (116); a f t e r A.D.53, the f a t e of Chalcis remains 
unknown u n t i l A.D .72, when a c e r t a i n Aris tobulus i s known to have 
been i t s r u l e r . (117) I t seems l i k e l y that he was given t h i s 
command as compensation f a r the annexation o f Armenia Minor, h i s 
former kingdom. (118) Once again Chalcis fades i n t o obscur i ty , 
but Benzinger (119)* quoting numismatic evidence, puts forward the 
theory tha t Domitian annexed Chalcis t o the province o f Syr ia same 
time a f t e r A.D .92. I t i s not unreasonable to assume tha t t h i s 
annexation coincides w i t h tha t o f Agrippa'a kingdom, when the 
possible absence of l o y a l nat ive r u l e r s enabled the emperor t o 
strengthen the eastern f r o n t i e r by enlarging the important m i l i t a r y 
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province of S y r i a . 
Emeaa. 
The l o y a l t y of Sohaemus o f Emeaa (120) continued i n t o 
the Flavian era. I n A.D .72, the k ing supported Caesennius Paetus 
on h is expedi t ion t o Commagene (121), but we hear nothing more o f 
the kingdom o f Emeaa, and presumably i t was brought under d i r e c t 
Raman con t ro l at some time a f t e r A.D .72. An. i n s c r i p t i o n (122) 
r e f e r s t o Sohaemus as ' a great k ing and a f r i e n d o f the emperor 
and the Roman people 1 , but i t also c red i t s him w i t h several Roman 
magis te r ia l t i t l e s . (Syme (123) i n t e rp re t s these t i t l e s as 
o f f i c e s held a f t e r the annexation of Emesa, and i n view o f the 
subsequent f a t e of the kingdoms of Agrippa and Ar i s tobulus , i t 
seems l i k e l y tha t the Flavian emperors absorbed Emesa w i t h i n the 
empire, although the exact date iB not known. 
Arabia Petraea. 
The peace which the Flavians brought t o the east i s 
r e f l e c t e d by the sparseness o f evidence f o r events i n t h i s r eg ion 
a f t e r the end of the Jewish War; we l ea rn nothing from l i t e r a r y 
sources of the r e l a t ions between c l i e n t kings o f the Nabataeans 
and the imper ia l government. However, A . Grohman (121*.) reveals 
a l i t t l e of the h i s to ry of the kingdom from a study o f the 
numismatic evidence. Malichos I I , the king of Arabia Petraea at 
the beginning of the Flavian per iod , supported T i tu s w i t h an 
a u x i l i a r y fo rce at Jerusalem; furthermore, Roman troops seem t o 
have been stat ioned i n h i s kingdom t o protect the caravan routes 
and c o l l e c t taxes. Malichos was succeeded by h i s son, Rabilos I I , 
who ru led at f i r s t w i t h h i s mother, and l a t e r w i t h h i s w i f e . 
Rabilos was s t i l l on the throne when Dcmitian d i ed . 
I t appears tha t the Flavians were content to al low the 
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Nabataeans to r e t a i n t h e i r c l i e n t r e l a t i onsh ip w i t h Rome, although 
imper ia l con t ro l over the caravan routes may w e l l have been 
increased. The prevalent peace made d ras t i c change unnecessary. 
Vespasian and h i s sons displayed a new a t t i t u d e t o 
c l i e n t k ings . The f a i l u r e s o f the Julio-Claudians t o es tab l i sh 
u s e f u l permanent c l i e n t kingdoms i n Europe, and the t r a d i t i o n a l 
impermanence of European l o y a l t i e s h igh l igh ted by the support f a r 
C i v i l i s , l ed Vespasian to make no use of c l i e n t kings i n B r i t a i n 
or along the Rhine and Danube. Out of kindness, the Flavians 
allowed Cogidumnus t o r e t a i n h is power, but he played only a minor 
par t i n t h e i r scheme, f o r the emperor prefer red the more t rustworthy 
p ro tec t ion o f Raman legions . Domitian modif ied h i s f a t h e r ' s p o l i c y 
when he found himself compelled to negotiate at the end of the Dacian 
War. Possibly the emperor would have prefer red t o crush Decebalus, 
but t h i s would have s t rained the resources of the Empire, and so 
Domitian was d r iven to recognise the Dacian monarch as a c l i e n t k i n g ; 
f o r the f i r s t time a c l i e n t king i n Europe was given payment f o r 
guarding the borders of Raman provinces. 
I n Asia Minor also, Vespasian introduced changes. C l i e n t 
kingdoms w i t h i n the recognised l i m i t s of the Raman Empire soon were 
annexed, and the m i l i t a r y provinces were enlarged; and when a 
su i tab le period o f t ime had elapsed a f t e r the des t ruc t ion of Jerusalem, 
the less troublesome Semitic peoples were brought under d i r e c t Roman 
adminis t r at i o n . 
The only c l i e n t kingdoms su f fe red by the Flavians were 
those which were beyond the l i m i t s o f d i rec t Roman r u l e ; the 
geography o f these t e r r i t o r i e s d i d not promise easy conquest, and 
providing they were content to accept Rome as t h e i r over lord , she 
was content t o al low them to guard the f r o n t i e r . 
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C H A P T E R V I I 
The Uae of C l i en t Kings a f t e r the F lav ian Per iod. 
The F l av i an p o l i c y of pro tec t ing Rome's possessions by 
m i l i t a r y ra ther than diplomatic means had resul ted i n a d ras t i c 
reduct ion i n the number o f c l i e n t kings dependent on Rome. Moreover, 
the establishment o f f r o n t i e r s defended by the legions ra ther than 
by vassal kings seems t o have provided greater secur i ty t o the empire, 
f o r . by A.D.96, the areas which were causing the most concern were 
those guarded by c l i e n t kingdoms, i . e . the Danubian provinces and 
the provinces of northern Asia Minor. These regions were t o form 
the theatres f o r Trajan 's famous campaigns. 
Dacia. 
The p ro tec t ion of the provinces immediately south o f the 
Danube had proved Domitian'a greatest s t ra teg ic problem; he had 
d r iven back w i t h d i f f i c u l t y attacks nor th o f Pannonia by the 
Marccmanni, Quadi, and Iazyges ( l ) , and his settlement w i t h Decebalus, 
k ing of the Daoi , had been l i t t l e more than a compromise. (.2) 
Shor t ly a f t e r Domitian's death, h i s successor, Nerva, seems 
t o have been faced w i t h f u r t h e r t rouble on the Upper Danube, but the 
evidence suggests that the Suebi were defeated and peace was res tored 
sho r t l y before the accession o f Tra jan i n A.D.98. (3) 
When Tra jan succeeded to the p r inc ipa te , the problems on 
the Danube proved t o be h i s primary concern. The emperor spent the 
win te r of A.D.98-9 on the south bank o f the r i v e r , and i t seems l i k e l y 
tha t Decebalus had begun t o put i n t o e f f e c t a p lan to un i te Rome's 
enemies. (4) Cer ta in ly Tra jan decided t o f o r e s t a l l a r e v o l t by 
the Daci by invading Dacia before Decebalus' power should grow too 
great . A f t e r a short period i n Rome, the emperor set out f o r the 
Danube early i n the year A.D.101. (5) 
163. 
Reman forces under Tra jan advanced towards the I r o n Gate 
Pass, w h i l s t a second column crossed the Danube lower down. (6) 
The Dacians re t reated before the Roman advance, u n t i l they reached 
Tapae at the entrance t o the I r o n Gate Pass, where an indecis ive 
b a t t l e was fought . (7) Tra jan held h is p o s i t i o n f o r the win te r 
and i n the spring of A.D.102, prepared a new l i n e of a t tack v i a the 
Red Tower Pass ( 8 ) ; he met no resistance, but Decebalus sent a t 
leas t two embassies t o sue f o r peace. No terms were agreed and 
Tra jan continued h is campaign, d i v i d i n g his fo rce t o march on the 
Dacian c a p i t a l , Sarmizegethusa; the capture o f various Dacian 
fortresses ended any serious resistance and Decebalus, to save the 
seige and des t ruc t ion of Sarmizegethusa, surrendered. (9) Tra jan 
now had the opportunity to remove the k i n g , whose l o y a l t y had been 
questionable, but the emperor rea l i zed tha t Decebalus, i f t rus tworthy, 
could be a u s e f u l bulwark against invaders from the no r th . Therefore 
Damitian's settlement was repeated; Decebalus was re ins ta ted as a 
c l i e n t k i n g , although Reman garrisons were stat ioned at Sarmizegethusa 
and i n seme mountain fortresses ; i n add i t ion , the Dacian a r t i l l e r y 
and engineers were t o be surrendered along w i t h the Roman deserters 
who had fought i n the Dacian army, and the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s were to be 
pu l l ed down. (10) I n the winter of A.D.102, a Dacian embassy 
appeared before the senate t o secure a formal peace, and Trajan, on 
h is r e t u r n t o Rome, received the t i t l e of "Dacicus". ( l l ) Thus 
Tra jan achieved an important m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y over the Daci , but he 
was u n w i l l i n g t o attempt an occupation of large areas nor th of the 
Danube; he pre fe r red to f o l l o w the example of h i s predecessors i n 
using Decebalus' kingdom as a b u f f e r against attacks from the nor th . 
Possibly the emperor considered tha t the forces needed t o po l i ce the 
mountainous areas of Dacia, inhabi ted by hos t i l e tribesmen, would be 
too numerous t o make the venture p r o f i t a b l e ; accordingly he pinned 
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h i s hopes on the l o y a l t y of Decebalus, despite the k ing ' s 
u n r e l i a b i l i t y under Domitian. 
But the peace d i d not endure f a r long. Decebalus paid 
l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to the clauses of the t r e a ty , and broke them one 
by one (12 ) , eventually, i n A.D.105, overrunning pa r t o f the 
t e r r i t o r y of the Iazyges, Rome's a l l i e s . Tra jan had no op t ion but 
t o declare war, and set out f o r the Danube t o conduct the campaign 
i n person. Decebalus captured the Roman garrisons i n Dacia, and 
seized others on the Danube; Tra jan re l i eved the l a t t e r on h i s 
a r r i v a l i n Moesia, but t o rescue those ins ide Dacia and t o put an 
end t o Decebalus• p l o t s , he had to attempt the t o t a l defeat of Dacia. 
Wi th t h i s i n view, the Roman forces crossed the Danube 
ear ly i n 106 a t Drobetae. The Dacian army retreated before t h i s 
advance, and as i t d i d so, Decebalus' a l l i e s disappeared. The k ing 
made attempts t o c o n c i l i a t e Trajan and then t o poison him (13 ) , but 
the Roman advance continued t o the gates of Sainizegethusa. I n the 
l a t e summer o f A.D.106, the c a p i t a l f e l l ; Decebalus escaped t o the 
nor th , but h i s capture was i nev i t ab l e , and eventual ly, surrounded by 
Raman forces , he committed su ic ide . (14) 
The emperor now had t o decide what t o do w i t h Dacia. The 
treachery of Decebalus had made i t almost impossible t o recons t i tu te 
the region as a c l i e n t kingdom, but i t would not be safe as a province 
w h i l s t so many t r i b e s were h o s t i l e to Rome; therefore Tra jan 
reduced the number o f tribesmen: f i f t y thousand prisoners were 
condemned t o the amphitheatres and many Dacians emigrated northwards; 
these were replaced by s e t t l e r s f rom other parts o f the empire, and 
Sarmizegethusa became a Roman colony. (15) 
Thus Tra jan was compelled to annex the only fo rma l ly 
recognised c l i e n t kingdom i n Europe, and i n doing so he extended 
Roman r u l e beyond the Danube f o r the f i r s t t ime; by t h i s he 
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achieved a promise o f s t a b i l i t y which had been. lacking f o r over a 
hundred years. 
Yet i t seems tha t T ra j an d i d not scorn the p o l i c y of 
making payments t o l o c a l c h i e f t a i n s t o protect Roman provinces, 
f o r , shor t ly a f t e r Hadrian's succession, the k ing o f the Roxolani , 
Rasparaganus, complained o f the diminut ion o f h is subsidy. ( l6) 
This would suggest tha t the payments began dur:Lng Tra jan ' s r e i g n , 
when the emperor rea l ized tha t the extension o f the empire d i d not 
necessarily make i t s boundaries any safer from a t tack . 
As w i t h Decebalus, even subsidies d i d not protect Roman 
t e r r i t o r y , f o r on making his complaint, Rasparaganus invaded Dacia. 
Hadrian mobilised the Uoesian legions and hur r ied t o the Danube, 
where he met the Roxolani an k ing and se t t l ed the dispute peace fu l ly . 
However, not long af terwards, Rasparaganus was l i v i n g a t 
Pola , i n I s t r i a , having received the imper ia l names of Publius 
A e i i u s . (17) Perhaps Hadrian interned him i n honourable e x i l e 
a f t e r the r a i d i n t o Dacia, or perhaps the k ing was expelled by h i s 
subjects a f t e r making a dishonourable settlement w i t h the emperor. 
Despite t h i s , Tra jan ' s p o l i c y seems to have been successful . 
He abandoned the o ld Augustan p o l i c y of keeping Roman troops south 
o f the Danube, and pro tec t ing the northern bank by a series of c l i e n t 
kingdoms. Instead, by the annexation o f Dacia, he drove a wedge o f 
Roman t e r r i t o r y deep i n t o the heart of the hos t i l e t r i b a l lands, and 
thus d iv ided the areas o f resistance. Yet Rome was s t i l l u n w i l l i n g 
t o r e l y so le ly upon her own troops to protect the f r o n t i e r , and the 
payments t o the Roxolani show tha t a l l iances w i t h nat ive t r i b e s were 
s t i l l considered important. 
Bosporus. 
The kingdom o f Bosporus had long been a c l i e n t kingdom o f 
Rome, and the advantages f o r both pa r t i e s were such tha t no tension 
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i s recorded between the kings o f Bosporus and the Roman emperors. 
Sauromates I had a t ta ined the Sosporan throne s h o r t l y 
before the death o f Damitian (18 ) , and he remained a l o y a l f r i e n d 
o f Rome throughout the pr inoipates of Nerva and Tra jan . (19) 
The l a t e s t recorded co in of Sauromates can be a t t r i b u t e d t o 
A.D.121 (20). and h is successor, Cotys I I , was on the throne by 
A.D.123. (21) Cotys too remained a f r i e n d and a l l y o f Rome, but 
he d i d not o u t l i v e Hadrian, and probably i n A . I ) . 132 the c l i e n t s h i p 
passed t o Rhoemetalces. (22) 
The long succession o f Roman c l i e n t kings i n Bosporus 
had thus been unbroken since Augustus* p r i n c i p a t e ; i t was t o 
continue i n t o the f o u r t h century of the Empire (23) , f o r a c l i e n t 
kingdom on the northern and eastern shores o f the Black Sea 
safeguarded the corn route from the Crimea, allowed Rome t o delegate 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r keeping p i racy under c o n t r o l , and provided 
Rome w i t h a b u f f e r against at tack from the north-east . A t the 
same t ime, Bosporus could keep her independence, ye t enjoy the 
economic and m i l i t a r y advantages o f her powerful mistress. 
The Caucasus. 
A f t e r the f o r t i f i c a t i o n o f Harmozica by Vespasian i n 
A.D.75 (24), invasions of Armenia by the A l a n i ceased, and the 
t r i be s of the Caucasus region were happy to continue t h e i r c l i e n t 
re la t ionships w i t h Rome. 
The peaceful s i t u a t i o n i n the East allowed the maintenance 
o f the status quo i n the Caucasus; but when Tra jan decided t o 
conquer Armenia, he had t o r e a f f i r m the l o y a l t y o f the c l i e n t states 
t o the nor th , so tha t the northern f l a n k of h i s advance would be 
protected. Therefore, when the Emperor reached Satala i n Armenia 
Minor i n A.D.114, he was met by various c l i e n t Icings of the Caucasus 
reg ion . Anchialus, k ing of the Heniochi, found that h i s al legiance 
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was rewarded w i t h g i f t s (25) ; and Jul ianas was i n s t a l l e d as k ing 
o f the Apsilae (26) ; even trans-Caucasian kings were honoured, 
when Tra jan gave a k ing to the A l b a n i , and made f i r m al l iances w i t h 
the kings o f the I b e r i , Bosporani and Co lch i . (27) 
Possibly these kings gave a id to Tra jan i n h i s Par thian 
campaigns o f A.D.115-116, and i t i s c e r t a i n tha t Amazaspus, the 
k ing of I b e r i a , f e l l i n b a t t l e i n Pa r th ia , f o r an epitaph states 
tha t he was buried at N i s i b i s , and his bones were l a t e r t ransfer red 
from Mesopotamia t o Rome. (28) 
Amazaspus was the brother of k ing Mi th r ida te s , and a 
Mithr idates had been king of the I b e r i during Vespasian's r e i g n . (29) 
However, as M.N. Tod points out (30), there i s a chronological 
d i f f i c u l t y i n i d e n t i f y i n g the Mithr ida tes o f A.D.75 w i t h the 
Mithr idates of the ea r ly par t o f Tra jan ' s r e i g n . Possibly a 
second Mithr idates succeeded the f i r s t , both as c l i e n t s of Rome, 
and on the death o f the second, he was succeeded by h i s brother , 
Amazaspus. (31) 
With the u l t imate f a i l u r e of Tra jan ' s Par th ian War, the 
p o s i t i o n of the Caucasian c l i e n t kings reverted t o that of A.D.113; 
they acknowledged the nominal suzerainty of Rome, but had l i t t l e 
contact w i t h the emperor; t h e i r main purpose was t o guard the 
northern boundary of Armenia. However, i n A . I ) . 129, Hadrian toured 
the east , and on a r r i v i n g a t Samosata, i n v i t e d those who had paid 
homage t o Tra jan f i f t e e n years before , to renew t h e i r bonds o f 
f r i e n d s h i p . Anchialus o f the Heniochi was once again present, 
and several smaller t r i b e s received kings and l a v i s h g i f t s from 
the emperor. (32) A notable absentee was Pharasmenes, k ing o f 
I b e r i a , who probably succeeded Amazaspus i n A.D.116. However, 
Hadrian showed f r i endsh ip t o Pharasmenes, and an exchange o f g i f t s 
took place. (33) Yet the l o y a l t y o f the I b e r i a n k ing does seem 
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t o have been questionable, f o r towards the end o f Hadrian's r e i g n , 
an invasion by the A l a n i which overran Media and endangered both 
Armenia and Cappadocia, was said to have been ins t iga ted by 
Pharasmenes. (34) The k ing was probably summoned t o Rome t o 
expla in h is conduct (35), but he a r r ived a f t e r Hadrian's death, 
and established a new f r i endsh ip w i t h AntoninuB Pius . (36) 
Shis conduct of Pharasmenes t y p i f i e d Rome's problem. 
She needed t o maintain the c l i e n t s h i p o f the Caucasian t r i b e s t o 
act as a p ro tec t ion t o the kingdom o f Armenia, ye t the absence of 
Roman troops i n the v i c i n i t y gave the various t r i bes a sense of 
freedom and independence which occasionally caused t h e i r l o y a l t y 
t o f a l t e r . Nevertheless, only Claudius and Hadrian had found 
that I b e r i a n actions d i f f e r e d from imper ia l p o l i c y , and the 
s i t u a t i o n had soon been r e c t i f i e d . Whi ls t Raman c l i e n t kings 
ru led i n Armenia, Rome kept her a l l iances w i t h the Caucasian kings. 
Armenia Maior 
The s i t u a t i o n i n Armenia Maior since A.D.66 had been tha t 
a Par thian noble r u l e d , on cond i t ion tha t he received h i s diadem 
from the hands o f the emperor i n Rome. (37) The Flavians had been 
happy t o r e t a i n t h i s arrangement (38), and i t appeared tha t the 
Armenian question had been sett led-. 
However, i n A . D . U 3 , the o ld problem arose once more. 
Axidares, the second son o f Pacorus, king of Pa r th i a , had been 
given the kingdom o f Armenia, presumably w i t h Rome's consent; but 
when Osroes, Pacorus 1 brother , succeeded t o the Par thian throne, the 
r i g h t f u l h e i r , Pacorus' e lder son, Parthamasiris, was l e f t without 
a throne, and so Osroes attempted to depose Axidares and give Armenia 
t o Parthamasiris. (39) Tra jan was now faced w i t h the s i t u a t i o n 
which most o f the Jul io-Claudian emperors had met: a Par thian k ing 
was r u l i n g i n Armenia wi thout the consent o f Rome. To the w a r r i o r -
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emperor who had ended the Dacian th rea t , t h i s p o s i t i o n was untenable, 
and Trajan prepared t o open h o s t i l i t i e s . He l e f t I t a l y i n the 
autumn of A .D .U3 (¥))> t u t when he reached Athens, he was met by 
envoys from Osroes, who brought g i f t s and asked f o r peace. They 
claimed tha t Axidares had proved unsa t i s fac tory to both Par th ia and 
Rome, and begged the emperor t o present Part hamasiris w i t h the 
Armenian diadem. (41) This concession, which was a l l Rome had 
asked since Nero's t ime, gave Tra jan an opportunity t o r e t i r e w i t h 
honour, but he refused Osroes1 g i f t s w i t h the r ep ly tha t he would 
do what was necessary when he reached S y r i a . 
Trajan* s i n t e n t i o n now became c lear , and the western 
Par th ian satraps must have f e l t very apprehensive; indeed one 
o f them, Abgarus of Osroene, sent an embassy to Ant ioch t o obta in 
Tra jan ' s f r i endsh ip {1*2), and Rome could c la im a c l i e n t kingdom 
w i t h i n the Par thian Empire. 
Tra jan continued his preparations, and detachments from 
f i v e legions were gathered at Ant ioch . (43) The emperor 
intended t o take con t ro l of Armenia before meeting the Parthians, 
and so he marched northwards through Commagene and Cappadocia t o 
Satala , i n Armenia Minor, where he was met by the Caucasian c l i e n t 
k ings . ( V f ) 
Meanwhile Parthamasiris had t r i e d t o placate Tra jan by 
sending him two l e t t e r s , i n the second of which he d i d not use the 
t i t l e of ' k i n g ' , and requested tha t Marcus Junius, the governor o f 
Cappadocia, be sent to him. Junius ' son went to the Armenian k i n g , 
w h i l s t Tra jan advanced t o Elegeia i n Armenia. Shor t ly a f t e r h i s 
a r r i v a l , Parthamasiris presented himself and l a i d h i s diadem at the 
emperor's f e e t , expecting to receive i t back; but the troops 
immediately ha i led Tra jan as Imperator, and the l a t t e r explained 
t o Parthamasiris tha t Armenia was now a Roman province. The 
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Parthian protested tha t he had not been defeated or captured, but 
had cone o f h is own f r e e w i l l t o receive the diadem, Just as 
T i r ida tes had done; he was t o l d tha t Armenia now belonged t o Rome, 
but tha t he himself would be allowed t o l i v e . (45) 
By t h i s ac t ion , Tra jan de l ibe ra te ly abandoned Augustus* 
p o l i c y of c o n t r o l l i n g Armenia by means o f a c l i e n t k i n g , i n favour 
of a p o l i c y o f annexation. Obviously he f e l t tha t the m i l i t a r y 
power o f Rome was now so great tha t she could withstand any 
opposi t ion which Par th ia might provide. Thus, l a t e i n A.D.114, 
Armenia became a Roman province. (46) The f i r s t and only governor 
was Lucius C a t i l i u s Severus (47)» whose province covered Cappadocia 
and Armenia, and T. Haterius Nepos was the procurator . (48) 
Shor t ly afterwards, Parthamasiris was murdered on the ground tha t 
he was attempting t o rega in his kingdom by v io lence . (49) T ra jan 
was now convinced tha t Armenia was secure, and he prepared t o invade 
Par th ia . 
Whi l s t Tra jan ' s army was campaigning i n Par th ia , Armenia 
remained a Raman province, but the f a i l u r e t o es tab l i sh Roman r u l e 
over the Par thian Empire (30) meant t h a t , on the death of Tra jan , 
h i s successor, Hadrian, was faced w i t h the prospect of increasing 
Roman aims and continuing the war, or re turn ing t o the pre-TraJanic 
p o l i c y . He decided t o abandon a l l conquests east o f the Euphrates, 
and, l i k e Nero before him (51), Hadrian rea l ized tha t t o r e t a i n 
Armenia as a province would be s t r a t e g i c a l l y impract icable . I t 
became once more a c l i e n t kingdom. (52) 
Unfor tunate ly , we cannot be c e r t a i n o f the name o f the 
new k i n g . Shor t ly before the end o f Hadrian's r e i g n , an invasion 
by the A l a n i was ended when they were bribed by a c e r t a i n Vologaeses 
(53) > Henderson (54) suggests tha t Vologaeses was the Armenian k i n g , 
but the lack o f evidence can nei ther confi rm nor deny t h i s suggestion. 
171. 
The re su l t s o f Tra jan ' s campaigns confirmed the opinion 
tha t suzerainty over Armenia was v i t a l t o Rome, but the permanent 
annexation o f the kingdom would be d i f f i c u l t t o mainta in . I t 
appeared that the Augustan p o l i c y , modif ied by Nero, was the least 
hazardous, and Hadrian was happy t o rever t t o i t . The p o s i t i o n 
o f Armenia was t o change l i t t l e . I t remained, a c l i e n t kingdom f o r 
many years, but Roman armies f requent ly had t o i n t e r f e r e t o r e t a i n 
Rome's in f luence . 
Shor t ly a f t e r Hadrian's death, Vologaeses I I o f Par th ia 
prepared to invade Armenia a f t e r being snubbed by Antoninus Pius , 
and only a diplomatic l e t t e r f rom the emperor dissuaded him from 
doing so. (55) 
On Antoninus' death i n A.D.161, the next Par th ian k i n g , 
Vologaeses I I I , invaded Armenia, defeated a Roman army, and placed 
a Par thian, Pacorus, on the Armenian throne; i t was not u n t i l 
A.D .I64 tha t Lucius Verus was able t o r e a f f i r m Rome's suzerainty 
by g iv ing the kingdom to Sohaemus. (56) Yet Sohaemus1 p o s i t i o n 
was by no means secure, and eleven years l a t e r he was d r iven out , 
only t o be r e i n s t a l l e d by Thucydides, a subordinate o f the governor 
o f Cappadocia. (57) 
I n A.D.215 the peace was again broken when Caracal l a , 
attempting t o emulate Alexander the Great, deposed the Armenian k ing 
and annexed the kingdom. (58) However, the Armenians rose i n r e v o l t , 
and were not p a c i f i e d u n t i l Caracalla 1 s successor, Macrinus, 
appointed the former monarch's son as r u l e r . (59) 
Roman r u l e i n Armenia seems to have ended sho r t l y before 
A.D.260. The k i n g , Chosroes, was assassinated by a Persian agent 
and h i s son forced t o f l e e i n t o Roman t e r r i t o r y . Shapur the Persian 
then invaded Armenia and despite the e f f o r t s o f Va le r i an , Rome was 
unable t o regain con t ro l o f the kingdom. (60) 
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Thus, a f t e r three centuries o f suzerainty i n Armenia, 
Rome l o s t con t ro l o f the area. Always the thorn i n the side 
o f Roman f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the east, a t l a s t the problem had 
been taken out o f her hands. 
Par th ia . 
Although Tra jan ' s conquest o f Armenia had been uncontested, 
no Parthian embassy came to him t o ask f o r peace, which was 
tantamount t o an i n s u l t . The emperor decided on f u r t h e r conquests, 
and, l a t e i n A.D.114, he marched southwards from Armenia i n t o 
Mesopotamia; the region f e l l almost without a s t ruggle , and became 
a new Roman province. (6l ) Various l o c a l princes submitted t o 
the emperor, and when he reached Edessa, Abgarus o f Osroene met him, 
fo rma l ly submitted, and became a f r i e n d and c l i e n t of the emperor. (62) 
During A.D.115 and 116, Tra jan ' s conquests continued. He 
crossed the T i g r i s , annexed Adiabene as the province of Assyr ia , and 
captured the Par thian c a p i t a l , Ctesiphon. When he reached the head 
of the Persian Gul f , Tra jan even expressed h is regret tha t h i s age 
prevented him from continuing to I n d i a . (63) 
But the Raman conquest had been too s u p e r f i c i a l , and i n 
the summer of A.D.116, w h i l s t the emperor was i n Babylon, a r e v o l t 
broke out i n the new provinces o f Assyria and Mesopotamia, and the . 
Roman garrisons were e i the r expelled or massacred. (64) T ra j an 
sent three armies t o put down the r e v o l t , and, although one was 
defeated, peace was res tored. However, t h i s r e b e l l i o n compelled 
Tra jan t o consider h is p o l i c y towards Par th ia ; we do not know 
whether he had intended t o d iv ide the whole Par th ian Empire i n t o 
Roman provinces, but the r e v o l t of Sanatruces had shown tha t 
permanent annexation was out of the question, f o r i t would require 
f a r too large an army t o maintain the peace. Therefore Tra jan 
preserved Raman prest ige by making Par th ia a c l i e n t kingdom; 
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Parthamaspates, a son of Osroes, was crowned by the emperor i n 
Ctesiphon (65), and f o r the f i r s t t ime (66) Rome could c la im tha t 
Par th ia was a vassal state.(67) 
Yet the r e v o l t was not completely subdued; Tra jan was 
forced t o abandon the siege o f Hatra and s tar ted t o r e t u r n t o 
Ant ioch, hoping to continue the campaign i n the next year . 
Unfor tunately , the emperor d i d not accompany h is generals i n the 
campaigns of A.D.117. He f e l l i l l and died a t Sel inus, i n 
C i l i c i a . (68) 
Trajan l i v e d t o see the beginning o f the disappearance 
o f his conquests, f o r the r e v o l t i n A.D.116 had resul ted i n a 
p o r t i o n of Armenia being given to Vologaeses, the son o f Sana truces, 
as the p r ice o f peace (69) ; s i m i l a r l y Eur opus, on the r i g h t bank o f 
the Euphrates, was evacuated by Roman forces , probably i n A.D. 116-117 
as a concession t o Parthamaspates. (70) 
Shor t ly a f t e r Tra jan ' s death, a l l h i s conquests east o f 
the Euphrates were abandoned, f a r the Parthians re jec ted 
Parthamaspates (71)* and Hadrian rea l i zed that to regain and mainta in 
the Par thian conquests was beyond Rome's m i l i t a r y s t rength. 
Therefore Hadrian re-established the Augustan p o l i c y , w i t h the 
Euphrates as the eastern boundary o f the Roman Empire; Mesopotamia 
and Assyria were given back to the Par thian monarch, Osroes and 
Armenia became once more a c l i e n t kingdom (72) ; the re jected 
Parthamaspates was given a minor p r i n c i p a l i t y on the borders o f 
the Raman Empire, perhaps Osroene. (73) 
Thus peace between the Par th ian and Raman Empires was 
res tored. Hadrian was regarded as a f r i e n d by the Par thian k i n g , 
and i n A.D.129, the emperor returned Osroes• daughter t o Par th ia , 
and promised the r e t u r n of the r o y a l throne, both o f which Tra jan 
had sent to Rome. (74) 
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The r i v a l r y between Rome and Par thia continued long a f t e r 
Hadrian's death; Antoninus' diplomacy averted a war w i t h 
Volagaeses I I (75), and Lucius Verus l a t e r drove Volagaeses I H 
out of Armenia (76) ; at the same t ime , Avidius Cassius repel led 
Par thian forces from Syr ia and advanced i n t o Mesopotamia. His 
capture o f Ctesiphon compelled Vologaeses I I I t o sue f o r peace i n 
A.D.165, and Osroene became a Roman vassal s t a t e . (77) 
The c o n f l i c t was renewed i n A.D.195* when Vologaeses IV/ 
of Par th ia and Abgarus V I I I of Osroene supported Niger i n h is claims 
to the p r inc ipa t e . On Niger ' s defeat by Septimius Severus, the 
l a t t e r l e d a pun i t i ve expedi t ion, t o which Abgarus submitted and 
was allowed t o keep h i s throne. Two years l a t e r the emperor 
invaded Par th ia and captured Ctesiphon; mutinies i n h i s army 
compelled him t o r e t i r e from Par thia i n A.D.199* but the provinces 
of Osroene and Mesopotamia were added to the Roman Empire. (78) 
Severus' son and successor, Caracalla, was the next t o 
attempt the defeat o f Par th ia . I n A.D.215, he f a i l e d t o provoke 
Vologaeses IV t o declare war, but i n the f o l l o w i n g year a new 
Par th ian k i n g , Artab anus, refused to give h is daughter i n marriage 
t o Caracalla; there fore , the emperor crossed the Euphrates and 
won a minor v i c t o r y . But Caracalla was assassinated i n A.D.217, 
and the new emperor, Macrinus, who was l oa th t o continue the war, 
was defeated by Artabanus. Peace was restored when the k ing 
accepted a large indemnity. (79) 
Yet shor t ly afterwards, Artabanus f e l l , and a new 
Persian dynasty, the Sassanids, took con t ro l o f the Par th ian 
Empire. (80) Rome, who had shown a gradual tendency t o t r ea t 
the Parthian kings as equals ( 8 l ) , found tha t the m i l i t a r y power 
of the Sassanids demanded equa l i ty , and from the time of t h e i r 
accession Rome's thoughts turned t o defence rather than expansion. 
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Arabia Petraea. 
The kingdom of the Nabataean Arabs had remained l o y a l 
t o Rome during the r e i g n o f the Flavians, but the incorpora t ion 
o f Agrippa's kingdom (82) increased the l i k e l i h o o d of the 
annexation o f the neighbouring t e r r i t o r y , Arabia Petraea. (83) 
Therefore, when the k ing o f the Nabataeans, Rabilos I I (84), 
died sho r t l y before A.D.106, Tra jan ordered A . Cornelius Palma, 
the governor of Sy r i a , t o occupy the kingdom. (85) 
Palma encountered same opposi t ion (86), but he successful ly 
annexed the reg ion; par t of the kingdom was Joined t o Syr i a , but the 
more southerly p o r t i o n became a separate province w i t h Bostra as i t s 
c a p i t a l . (87) 
By t h i s annexation, Tra jan fo l lowed Augustus' example o f 
the u l t imate annexation o f c l i e n t kingdoms i n the east. Yet the 
emperor no doubt had other motives, f o r he foresaw an improvement 
i n the trade routes w i t h I n d i a . Eutropius t e l l s us tha t the 
emperor stat ioned a f l e e t i n the Red Sea (88), and i n A.D.107, 
Ind ian ambassadors a r r ived a t Tra jan ' s cour t , no doubt encouraged 
by improved communications (89) i the trade routes were f u r t h e r 
increased by the road b u i l t f rom the Gu l f o f Akaba t o the c i t i e s 
o f Syr ia by C. Claudius Severus, the governor o f Arabia Petraea i n 
A.D.111-114. I t would appear that the kingdom of the Nabataeans 
was annexed f o r economic, ra ther than p o l i t i c a l or s t r a t eg ic , 
reasons. 
Nerva and Tra jan inhe r i t ed from the Flavians an empire 
of which boundaries were c l e a r l y defined and defensible ; on very 
few f r o n t i e r s were c l i en t -k ings allowed t o protect Roman t e r r i t o r i e s . 
Tra jan ' s b e l i e f i n Rome's m i l i t a r y power would a l low no threat t o 
Roman supremacy to go unpunished, therefore he prosecuted wars against 
any c l i e n t k ing who was not f u l l y obedient. Decebalus' d i s l o y a l t y 
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resul ted i n h i s death and the annexation o f h i s kingdom, and 
Par thian in ter ference i n Armenia l ed to the l a t t e r becoming a 
province and the occupation o f Ctesiphon by Roman t roops . The 
only c l i e n t kings suf fe red by Tra jan were those beyond the 
e f f e c t i v e reach o f Roman arms, in- the Caucasian mountains, who 
were ye t prepared to be f u l l y subserviant to Rome. 
But the f a i l u r e o f Trajan 's Par thian expedi t ion l ed 
h i s successor t o f i x the l i m i t s o f the Empire. Par th ia was 
given up, and Armenia once more became a cl ient-kingdom. Yet 
by the end o f the r e i g n o f Hadrian, Rome's m i l i t a r y power was so 
superior t o that o f her neighbours tha t very few c l i e n t kings 
were needed to give her s t ra teg ic support . The only possible 
m i l i t a r y threat could came from Par th ia , and only on t h i s f r o n t i e r 
were c l i e n t kings needed. 
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The development o f c l i e n t kingdoms i n the ea r ly Roman Empire: 
a summary. 
The l a s t one hundred years o f the Roman Republic had seen almost 
continuous c i v i l warfare , f o r generals and senator ia l leaders had 
consis tent ly taken up arms, i n attempts to ga in an advantage over t h e i r 
r i v a l s f o r power. Although the l i m i t s o f the Roman Empire were pushed 
outwards during t h i s century, especial ly by the armies o f Pompey and 
J u l i u s Caesar, m i l i t a r y conquests tended t o increase the ambitions o f 
the successful generals, persuading them t o t u r n towards Rome and 
contend w i t h t h e i r r i v a l s . Therefore armies became as large as 
possible , and a l l iances w i t h kingdoms and t r i b e s beyond the empire 
were made, w i t h the i n t e n t i o n o f making one array more powerful than 
another. Therefore i t i s hardly surpr i s ing that when Ootavian 
f i n a l l y brought the c i v i l wars to an end by defeat ing Antony a t Actium 
i n 31 5 .C . , the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s o f the Roman Empire were 
i n t u r m o i l . The new leader rea l ized tha t s t a b i l i t y must be reached i n 
both these f i e l d s before Rome could look beyond the i n t e r n a l struggles 
f o r leadership and begin t o make consistent e f f o r t s to expand and 
defend the empire. I n order to d i spe l fears tha t he would lead a 
m i l i t a r y d i c t a to r sh ip , Octavian reduced the number o f legions by more 
than h a l f , keeping only those which he thought were v i t a l to the 
secur i ty o f the empire ( l ) , and i n s t i t u t e d a c l e a r l y defined f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y . Octavian took as h i s guide the senator ia l p o l i c i e s o f one 
hundred and f i f t y years before, t ha t barbarians must be overcome by 
open aggression and expansion, whereas cu l tura l , equals or superiors 
should become subordinate but not dependent. (2) The r e s u l t o f 
t h i s was that Augustus d i d not fo s t e r c l i e n t re la t ionships along the 
European f r o n t i e r s , p r e f e r r i n g to protec t Roman provinces by m i l i t a r y 
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means. He d i d a l low nat ive kings from beyond, the Rhine and Danube 
t o seek refuge i n Raman t e r r i t o r y ( 3 ) > but these were refugees wham 
the emperor hoped to use as pretenders to keep t h e i r t r i b e s d iv ided . 
The only k ing beyond the boundaries o f Roman r u l e who became a c l i e n t 
was Maroboduus, f o r Augustus was unable to defeat him i n b a t t l e . (4) 
The Cot t i an A l p s , w h i l s t o f f i c i a l l y a c l i e n t kingdom, appear to have 
been l i t t l e more than a province w i t h a nat ive governor ( 5 ) , and 
therefore Thrace was the only European kingdom which Augustus 
purposely maintained as an independent c l i e n t s t a t e ; the u n c i v i l i z e d 
nature o f the Thracians and p o l i t i c a l d iv i s ions w i t h i n the kingdom 
made i t unsuitable f o r d i r ec t Roman r u l e , and the emperor obviously 
thought that a nat ive king would provide a u n i f y i n g f a c t o r i n Thrace. (6) 
Yet i n the east Augustus 1 po l i cy was d i f f e r e n t . A f t e r Actium, 
he had t o w in the support of the eastern k ings , who had aided Antony, 
f o r i f they had turned to Par th ia , the secur i ty of the Eastern 
Mediterranean would have been endangered. By recognizing the kings 
o f Asia Minor as f r iends o f Rome, Augustus not only ensured t h e i r 
l o y a l t y but also preserved the trade routes t o the Far East, thus 
pro tec t ing Rome's economic i n t e r e s t s . Nevertheless the emperor was 
w i l l i n g to extend the Empire and improve Rome's p o s i t i o n i n Asia Minor 
by peaceful means. Galat ia was annexed on the death o f i t s k ing ( 7 ) , 
and Augustus encouraged the amalgamation o f Cappodocia and Pontus by 
a marriage t i e , producing a kingdom which spanned Asia Minor and would 
have been a severe obstacle t o an army invading from the east. (8) 
Augustus' po l i cy i n the east was aimed at strengthening Roman 
t e r r i t o r y against Par th ia , and t o t h i s end the emperor thought i t 
imperative tha t Rome should maintain a c l i e n t k ing i n Armenia Maior . 
His diplomatic triumph i n 20 B.C. enabled him t o maintain a f i r m hold 
on Armenia, and his subs tan t ia l inf luence i n Par thia i t s e l f ensured 
the success of h is eastern p o l i c i e s . (9) 
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I n North Afr i ca , there was no serious threat of invasion from 
the south, and Augustus saw no need to protect Roman territory by 
means of buffer states; therefore Egypt was annexed after the death 
of Cleopatra, and the emperor acquired i t as a personal possession. (10) 
Yet the geography of Mauretania presented grave problems for direct 
ru le , and i t was advisable to entrust at least part of the long North 
African frontier to a native ruler; and so Ju'ba I I received the 
kingdom as a reward for his loyalty, ( l l ) 
By his policies the f i r s t emperor was able to s tabi l ize and 
determine the defence of the empire. His use of c l ient kings was 
based on the strategic and sociological conditions of the various 
frontiers , and his decisions were to be followed by most of his 
successors. 
Certainly Tiberius followed Augustus1 advice; i n Europe, the 
only advance across the Rhine was by Germanicus i n A.D.I4-16, and 
as soon as the la s t of the standards lost by Varus had been recovered, 
he was recal led. (12) Tiberius even refused help to Maroboduus, 
although he did sett le one king north of the Danube. (13) On the 
eastern frontier, Tiberius also followed his predecessor. On the 
death of a c l ient king, he annexed the kingdom rather than appoint a 
successor; i n this way Cappadocia, C i l i c i a Amanus, Commagene and 
Armenia Minor became Reman provinces. (14.) Yet i n following 
Augustus this far , Tiberius overlooked another .Augustan principle . 
By bounding Armenia Maior with Reman vassal states, Augustus had 
ensured that a Parthian attack through Armenia would s t i l l have to 
break through a chain of c l ient kingdoms before reaching Roman 
terr i tory . Tiberius annexed these kingdoms, so that the western 
borders of Armenia were bounded by Roman provinces. Perhaps his 
policy was r ight , for i t ensured that Roman legions could be 
stationed nearer to Armenia, enabling invasion to be resisted with 
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greater speed and effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, Gaius reversed the actions taken by Tiberius; 
he saw that Reman suzerainty i n Armenia Maior would be a continual 
source of r iva l ry between Parthia and Rome. Therefore he recalled 
the king of Armenia (15), abandoning i t to Parthian influence, and 
reconstituted Armenia Minor and Commagene as cl ient kingdoms; thus 
he ensured that the new boundary of Roman influence was s t i l l 
protected by c l ient kings. ( l6) Only i n Mauretania did Gaius 
continue Augustus* policy; he called Ptolemy to Rome, executed him, 
and prepared to annex his kingdom; but i t i s erroneous to c a l l this 
action truly Augustan, for Augustus would not have approved of the 
murder of a seemingly loyal c l ient king. (17) 
Claudius 1 succession saw a return to Augustan precepts; 
Mithridates was returned to Armenia with the aid of Roman forces (18) , 
and the annexation of Mauretania was completed; moreover, the kingdom 
of Ituraea was annexed on the death of i t s king and i t s addition 
increased the mil i tary importance of S y r i a . (19) But Claudius 
considered that Augustus* policy i n Europe was out-dated, and that 
an advance of Reman rule was possible. Therefore he invaded B r i t a i n , 
and the early years of the invasion saw the emergence of a new kind of 
c l ient king; three loca l chieftains, Cogidumnus, Prasutagus and 
Cartimandua, became a l l i e s of Rome, and were used to protect the flanks 
of the Roman army as the conquest was consolidated. (20) Claudius 
also attempted to form Roman vassal states on the east bank of the 
Rhine; i n A.D.47, the P r i s i i were given a Reman constitution, and 
I t a l i c u s was sent to the Cherusci as their king; moreover the ChattL 
seem to have accepted subservience to Rome. (21) However, i t i s 
important to note that although Claudius established these tribes as 
vassals of Rome, they cannot truly be called cl ient states, for their 
domains were outside the areas of Roman military control and the 
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emperor undertook no obligation to help them. Thus, when Vannius 
of the Marccmanni was attacked and appealed to Rome as a friend, 
he received no a id . Nor did Claudius entirely forget Augustus' 
example, for when i t proved impossible for a c l ient king to re ta in 
control i n Thrace, Claudius annexed the kingdom. (22) 
Nero accepted Augustus1 policies as they had been modified by 
Claudius, and his apparent lack of interest i n foreign a f fa irs i s 
reflected i n the fact that he only acted where he had to. During 
his reign i t was necessary to end two of the c l ient relationships i n 
B r i t a i n , and only the loyal Cogidumnus was allowed to retain his 
throne. (23) Yet once again i t was Armenia, that demanded the 
emperor's attention. Claudius 1 preoccupation with the west had 
allowed the Parthians to encroach on Roman clientship i n Armenia 
Mai or, and Nero was compelled to meet the problem. After an 
unsuccessful attempt to abolish the c l ient kingship by direct 
annexation, the campaigns of Corbulo resulted i n the emperor's 
acceptance of nominal rather than actual suzerainty (24); this 
settlement persuaded Nero to protect the states bordering Armenia; 
Polemo of Pontus was ousted and his kingdom annexed, to f a c i l i t a t e 
the access of Roman troops from the north (25), and Roman forces 
were stationed i n the cl ient state of Sophene. (26) 
Despite the actions of Gaius i n the east, and Claudius' policy 
i n Europe, the main principles of Augustus' policies were adhered to 
by the Julio-Claudians. They seem to have been successful, for few 
cl ient kings caused serious trouble to Rome. The only exception was 
Armenia M&ior, and i t appeared that the modification made by Nero i n 
reducing the kingdom from actual to nominal suzerainty had succeeded 
i n establishing a last ing peace with Parth ia . 
The Flavian emperors modified Augustus1 pol icies even more. 
Julio-Claudian fai lures to protect the European, frontiers by means 
of c l ient kings persuaded Vespasian to use more direct methods. 
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He kept the tribes east of the Rhine i n check by shows of force, 
and protected the Roman provinces by building a series of forts 
between the Rhine and the Danube. (27) Dcmitian followed his 
father*s lead as far as possible, but h i s fai lure to defeat the 
Daci resulted i n the inst i tut ion of a new cl ient king, Decebalus.(28) 
The emperor would, no doubt, have preferred to annex Dacia, but this 
would have resulted i n a weakening of defences elsewhere. I n the 
east, the Flavians also showed their unwillingness to re ly on cl ient 
kings. Kingdoms adjacent to Roman provinces were annexed on the 
death of their kings (29), and Armenia Minor and Ccmmagene, strategical ly 
important i n protecting the borders of Armenia Maior, were deprived of 
their kings shortly after Vespasian's rule began. (30) The only c l ient 
kings suffered by the Flavians were those beyond the recognised l imits 
of Roman rule . 
Trajan agreed with the Flavian ideals rather than those of 
Augustus. He regarded the power of Reman arms as being so great that 
no c l ient states should exist unless they admitted complete subservience 
to Rome. Therefore Decebalus was crushed and his kingdom annexed (31)* 
and the threat to the settlement i n Armenia resulted i n the Parthian 
campaigns. For a short time, no c l ient kingdoms existed within the 
empire, but Trajan then instal led a Roman cl ient on the Parthian 
throne. (32) 
However, after Trajan's death Hadrian realized that the resources 
of the empire were not great enough to maintain Trajan's conquests, and 
he was happy to return to Augustus* policy i n accepting an independent 
Parthia , with Rome's exercise of nominal suzerainty over Armenia Maior. 
(33) This settlement, perhaps the most important point i n Augustus' 
policy, remained i n force u n t i l the collapse*of the Parthian Empire. 
Thus imperial policy towards c l ient kings developed, but i t i s 
equally important to note the dist inction between the status of the 
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various c l ient kings. I n assessing the reasons for the 
establishment of c l ient relationships, I have distinguished four 
types, each important to Rome, but each receiving different 
privileges and concessions. 
The f i r s t category included those kings who became cl ients 
solely for mil i tary reasons, of which the three kings i n Br i ta in 
were the most important examples. They were temporary a l l i e s whose 
purpose was to protect Roman forces whilst conquest was made secure, 
and as soon as the more hostile regions were under Roman control, the 
kings found that their lands were absorbed into the Raman province; 
i f they resisted, they were crushed. Clearly Rome intended these 
clientships to be temporary, and of t ac t i ca l rather than strategic 
importance. 
Secondly, l e t us consider relations with tribes i n north-
eastern Europe; Rome did not attempt to form true c l ient relationships 
with them on a reciprocal basis , for they were regarded as untrustworthy 
and cultural ly infer ior , being useful only on the battle f i e l d . Tribes 
which accepted Rome's sovereignty seldom did so for more than a 
generation, for an anti-Roman leader always appeared to overthrow 
those who had prostituted their independence by all iances with Rome. 
Obviously such tribes were never absorbed into the empire and served 
merely as buffers against even more barbaric tribes further away from 
Roman influence. 
The third category of c l ient kingdoms were more permanent and 
much more important to the prosperity of the empire; these were states 
beyond the easy reach of Roman arms who yet served a useful purpose to 
the government i n Rome: the Nabataean Arabs preserved Rome's trade 
l inks with India and the Par East u n t i l they were absorbed into the 
empire by Trajan; the kings of Bosporus kept the Black Sea free of 
pirates and protected i t s r i c h eastern coast from the ravages of 
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inland tribes; and the kings i n the Caucasus mountains protected 
Armenia and Cappadocia from northern marauders, and at the same 
time aided Raman interests i n the confl icts with Parthia. The 
increased importance of this type of c l ient i s marked by the 
emperors' insistence that these kings obtained recognition of their 
rule from Rome and that their coinage depicted a Roman head as wel l 
as, or even i n place of, a native portra i t . These kings would have 
been d i f f i c u l t to subdue, but their friendship was invaluable to 
Rome, and i t continued far beyond the reign of Hadrian. 
But the fourth category was undoubtedly the most important; 
the kingdoms i n Asia Minor, including Thrace, those south of S y r i a 
and those i n North Afr ica were well within the accepted l imits of 
Roman influence, and were regarded as an integral part of the Roman 
Empire. Often they received Roman garrisons and Roman colonies, and 
their kings were held i n honour by the emperor, senate and people. 
I n return they were expected to bow to the Jurisdiction of Rome and 
to adhere to Roman foreign policy, even to supply forces for Rome's 
foreign wars. These contacts inevitably produced a high degree of 
romanization i n these kingdoms, and eventually they were absorbed 
into the empire. 
The one exception was Armenia Mai or, which faced an equal degree 
of contact with Parthia, and thus became the joint possession of the 
two empires. I f Rome could have gained permanent control of this 
kingdom, she would have been the complete mistress of her own sphere 
of influence, but never was Roman power strong enough to counteract 
pressures from the east, and Armenia, Rome's most important c l ient 
kingdom, remained her greatest problem. 
Notes to Chapter V I I I . 
1. Octavian did not embark on his policy of demobilisation 
until 29 B . C . , after he had toured the eastern Empire to 
ensure the loyalty of a l l those who had supported Antony. 
The 60 legions which had existed at the time of Actium 
were eventually reduced to 28. 
2. E . Badian (Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic. 
Oxford, 1967, 7 f . ) expounds this policy. 
3. See above 13-
4. See above 14. 
5. See above 15. 
6. See above 17-18. 
7. See above 22. 
8. See above 26. 
9. See above 31-38. 
ID. See above 47-48. 
11. See above 50. 
12. See above 67. 
13. See above 68. 
14. See above 112. 
15. See above 103. 
16. See above 112. 
17. See above 131. 
18. See above 104. 
19. See above 126. 
20. See above 64-65. 
21. See above 70-71. 
22. See above 77. 
23. See above 66. 
2^. See above 108. 
25. See above 89. 
26. See above 99. 
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27. See above 140. 
28. See above 144. 
29. Chalcia, Emesa and the kingdom of Agrippa I I were absorbed 
in this way. See above 154-155* 
30. See above 146-147, 149. 
31* See above 164* 
32. See above 172-173. 
33* See above 173* 
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Dubnovellaunus and Tincomnriua 
See D .F . Al len, Archaeologia XC, 1944. I -46 . 
Dubnovellaunua i n Essex. 
Dubnovellaunus possessed terr i tory on both sides of the Thames. 
Several types of coin were found i n Essex, especially a single type of 
stater ( P L . I I , no. 39) . The polished s ty le , more sk i l l ed than 
previous coins, suggests a Kentish craftsman. Most of the staters 
of Cunobelinus at Camulodunum seem to be descended from the horse of 
Dubnovellaunus i n Essex (PL. I l l , 1-12). They too have the palm-
branch, though i t i s placed above instead of below the horse, and the 
ears of com on the obverse was suggested by a pattern such as that on 
the staters of Dubnovellaunus. 
Therefore i t i s probable that Cunobelinus succeeded Dubnovellaunus 
at Camulodunum, driving him to retreat , either into exile or across the 
estuary into his Kentish kingdom. I t i s impossible to give a date to 
th i s , but i t may have been the occasion for Dubnovellaunus1 appeal to 
Augustus. 
Dubnovellaunus i n Kent. 
Tiae f i r s t coinage found i n the coastlands of Kent i s inscribed 
with the name Dubnovellaunus, but only i n the area east of the Medway 
(PL. I , 29-34). Gold, s i l v e r and bronze coins have been found, and 
they are different from and more numerous than those found i n Essex; 
presumably this was his main, and therefore ear l i er , realm. The 
details of his career are uncertain, but he appears to have held his 
main kingdom i n Kent. At some time he conquered the tr ibe of the 
Trinovantes north of the Thames estuary - the lettering appears to 
be later than on those i n Kent (E instead of I I , VS instead of 0 2 ) . 
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But the s imilarity between the bronze coins suggests they were 
simultaneous. He was expelled from Essex, by Cunobelinus, and.at 
about the same time, he appears to have been replaced i n Kent by 
a ruler names Vose . . . (PL. I , 36). 
Ei ther of these events could have been the cause of h is appeal to 
Augustus. 
Tincommius (Allen, 6 ) . 
That Tincammius succeeded his father, Cammius, as king of the 
Regni and Atrebates i s proved by his coins, which followed the pattern 
of those of Cammius. His date i s proved not only by the fragment of 
his name i n AG 32, but also by two s i lver coins (PL. I , 12-13), which 
are copies of a Lugdunum issue of Augustus between about 15 B.C. . and 
12 B . C . ( c f . Mattingly, HMD I , 561-3 ani 564 or 450ff) 
C . E . Stevens (Essays presented to D.G.S. Crawford, 338) sees 
these Roman coin-types as evidence of an attempt by Augustus to check 
the aggrandisement of Tasciovanus, king of the Hertfordshirei Belgae. 
Moreover, the f l ight of Dubnovellaunus and Tincommius must have 
disturbed Augustus' diplomatic balance i n B r i t a i n . The Ce l t i c nature 
of Dubnovellaunus' coins suggests that he was not an a l l y of Rome, but 
Tincammius was under some Roman influence, and Augustus possibly 
continued treaty arrangements with his successors. The t i t l e rex 
actually appeared on the coins of Epi l lus and Verica (Allen, PL . I , 15, 
17-19) and they may wel l have been regarded as c l ient kings by the 
emperor. 
A P P E N D I X I I 
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Marcus Antoniua Polemo 
G. F . H i l l (Num. Chron XIX, 1899, 201f), i n equating Marcus 
Antonius Polemo with the elder son of Pythodoris and Polemo I , 
follows Momma en i n giving the following family- tree: -
Polemo I = Pythodoris 
1 ' I , 
Marcus Antonius; Polemo Zeno Antonia Tryphaena = Cotys 
Polemo I I 
H. Dessau ( P I R 1 , PJ|05-6) gives a different interpretation:-
Polemo I = Pythodoris 
, , 1 , 
? Zeno Antonia Tryphaena = Cotys. 
1 
Polemo I I 
I 
Marcus Antonius Polemo 
Accepting the assumption that Marcus Antonius Polemo was the 
successor of Ajax, high priest of Olba during Augustus1 reign, H i l l ' s 
interpretation i s chronologically preferable, for Polemo I I must have 
begun his rule at approximately the same time as Marcus Antonius 
Polemo. 
However, Dessau's explanation must not be ruled out, for the 
change of t i t l e from dpxiepE\5s and SuvdTaxTis (™5» I^ycaonia etc. p. 123 
no. 18) to SaaiXetfs ( C o l l . Wadd. 4427) could indicate that there were 
two rulers with the name of Marcus Antonius Polemo, of whom the f i r s t 
began to rule during the reign of Tiberius and was succeeded by the 
second, who was on the throne i n Galba's time. I f this were so, 
194. 
then the second could have been the son of Jul ius Polemo (Polemo I I 
of Pontus - v. Pag. B r i t . Mus. I l l , 1178). However, I think that 
the names Marcus Antonius would be unlikely to appear i n the same 
branch of the family as J u l i u s , and a second Marcus Antonius would 
probably have been the son of the f i r s t Marcus Antonius, and 
therefore the cousin of Ju l ius Polemo. 
Further speculation i s possible, but i n view of the fact that 
the primary assumptions of Momma en and Dessau were founded on few 
certainties , i t would be unprofitable to continue. 
A P P E N D I X I I I . 
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The date of the meeting between 
Artabanus and V i t e l l i u s on the Euphrates. 
Gassius Dio (LIX, 27, 3) and Suetonius (Gaiua, 14 and V i t . 2) 
say this meeting took place during the reign of Gaius. Josephus 
(Ant. Jud. X V I I I , 101-105) places i t during Tiberius' reign, and 
E . Taubler (Die Parthernachrichten bei Josephus. 33ff) accepts 
Josephus' dating, arguing that the historians who were hostile to 
Tiberius begrudged him this success. J . G . C . Anderson (CAH X , 749-750) 
agrees, adding that no Parthian king would have done obeisance to 
Reman standards and images of Roman emperors unless at sword-point. 
Whilst I agree that this obeisance may wel l be a Raman embellishment, 
I prefer to think that the meeting took place during Gaius 1 reign for 
the following reasons:-
1) The evidence of Cassius Dio and Suetonius, together with 
Tacitus' silence i n Ann. V I , 44, which suggests that he mentioned the 
meeting during his account of Gaius' reign. 
2) The respect one might expect a Parthian monarch to fee l 
for a son of Germanicus, who had settled a Roman c l i ent on the 
Armenian throne i n A.D.18. 
3) Gaius' r e c a l l of Mithridates of Armenia, leaving the 
kingdom open to Parthian influence, must have pleased Artabanus. 
4) The chronology of the whole episode. Zeno had not died 
u n t i l A.D.35. After th i s , Artabanus placed his son on the Armenian 
throne, a Parthian embassy was sent to Rome, and Phraates set out for 
the east. He died i n Syr ia and Tiridates was then sent out. I t i s 
unlikely that he crossed the Euphrates before A.D.36. Tiridates was 
successful i n attaining the Parthian throne, and Artabanus was forced 
to f l ee . Artabanus had to gather new support and was successful i n 
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expelling Tir idates , but I find i t hard to believe that he had 
regained complete control by the beginning of A.D.37* Even so, 
i t i s unlikely that he would have been able to reach the Euphrates 
and arrange a meeting before the death of Tiberius on March l6th , 
A.D.37. (Tac. Ann. V I , 30). The meeting with V i t e l l i u s must have 
required much thought by Artab anus, and i n view of the fact that 
Tiridates of Armenia was not crowned u n t i l A.D,66, three years af ter 
agreement was reached, I regard A.D.irf) as the most l ike ly date for 
the meeting. 
A P P E N D I X IV. 
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Cogidumnua and Fishbourne 
The connection between Cogidumnus, Fishbourne and Chichester 
cannot be proved, but B.W. Cunliffe makes several convincing 
observations i n Excavations at Fishbourne. vols . I and I I , Leeds, 1971:-
p.13 There were three possible occasions when Tiberius 
Claudius Cogidumnus might have gained imperial favour: 
1) as a reward for help i n the Claudian invasion. 
2) for support i n the Boudiccan revolt . 
3) as a supporter of Vespasian i n A.D.69. 
p.14 . Did Cogidumnus l i ve at Fishbourne? "Again, conclusive 
proof i s not available, but the picture offered f i t s a l l the 
known facts , and i s , at the least , a l ike ly explanation of the 
'evidence." 
•pp. 75-76 The Palace at Fishbourne: "The driving force behind the 
construction must have been someone with a strong desire for 
things Roman, supported by considerable wealth. Here we must 
anticipate the next section of the report, by saying that 
within a short time the masonry building or, better, 'proto-
palace 1 was vastly expanded to create a palace of unsurpassed 
magnificence which, i t w i l l be argued, may well have belonged 
to the local c l ient king, Cogidubnus. Could i t not be that 
the progression from timber house to proto-palace, over the 
period c. 45 to c . 75, represented the gradual increase i n 
wealth and status enjoyed by the king? An explanation i n 
these terms would make good sense of both the observed sequence 
and what l i t t l e written evidence there i s , but i t could never 
be proven." 
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p.153 "The implications, then, are of a continuity of function 
and perhaps ownership, and of use by a high-ranking o f f i c i a l 
thoroughly conversant with Roman taste, whose i l lus ions of 
grandeur were acceptable to the central government. The 
imperial governor i s one poss ib i l i ty , but at this time, i t 
would have been Frontinus or Agricola, whose preoccupation 
with the west and north would surely have prevented the 
le isurely use of a southern residence. Moreover, for an 
o f f i c i a l residence to be placed i n the terr i tory of Cogidubnus, 
on the very door-step of his town, would have been an enormous 
insult to a king whose loyalty was so prized. I t i s indeed far 
more reasonable to suggest that the palace was owned by 
Cogidubnus himself. I t s growth from a modest late-Claudian 
timber house may well have echoed the fortunes of the king, 
on whom terr i tor ies and honours were forced by Rome. Moreover, 
the Audience Chamber would have been quite i n keeping for a 
local king who was also a Roman senator (legatus August i ) . I f 
this attribution i s correct, i t i s interesting to speculate why, 
early i n the reign of Vespasian, the small proto-palace should 
have been so enormously enlarged. I t may, however, be that under 
Vespasian the king received his senator ship, perhaps as a reward 
for support i n A.D.69, when Vespasian was struggling for power. 
I t was not unlike Vespasian to react i n this way to his supporters, 
and a sudden r i s e i n status would neatly explain the change from 
the proto-palace, suitable for a king, to a palace more f i t t ing 
for a king and senator. The matter w i l l always remain i n the 
realms of speculation, but the explanation has the virtue of 
being internally consistent." 
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